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ABSTRACT
Previous studies employing event related potentials (ERPs) have investigated the 
neural correlates of explicit memory using item recognition and source memory tests. 
These studies suggest that recollection, the retrieval of information about specific prior 
study episodes, is associated with two temporally and topographically dissociable ERP 
old/new effects. First, the Teft parietal’ effect (found in studies of item and source 
memory) which provides an index of the retrieval processes supporting recollection. 
Second, the ‘right frontal’ effect (found in studies of source memory) which is thought 
to be associated with more strategic task-related ‘post-retrieval’ memory processes.
In the present thesis the ERP otd/new effects were investigated in five experiments 
using tests of explicit memory for associative information. In each experiment subjects 
studied novel word pairs, and memory for these associations was assessed using 
associative recognition and associative recall tasks. Consistent with previous 
behavioural studies that suggest associative recognition is dependent upon recollection, 
performance on this task was associated with both the left parietal and right frontal 
old/new effects. Moreover, successful associative recall was associated with equivalent 
old/new effects, contrary to previous findings that suggest performance on this task is 
associated with the left parietal but not the right frontal old/new effect.
Whilst the findings support the previous functional account of the left parietal old/new 
effect, they necessitate the refinement of the account of the right frontal old/new effect. 
Significantly, the ERP findings suggest that the right frontal old/new effect can be 
dissociated from an early bilaterally-distributed frontal old/new effect that cannot be 
accounted for in terms of strategic post-retrieval processing. Finally, an alternative 
account of the frontal effects is proposed, drawing on evidence from neuroimaging 
studies, and distinguishing between pre- and post-retrieval support processes.
5
CONTENTS
ABSTRACT 5
INDEX OF FIGURES AND TABLES 10
FOREWORD 12
CHAPTER 1: MEMORY 14
Fractionating memory 15
Long-term and short-term memory 17
Explicit and implicit memory 18
Declarative (explicit) memory 24
Episodic and semantic memory 27
The neuroanatomical basis for episodic memory 32
Models of recognition memory 33
The formal basis of single and dual process models 34
Single process models 38
Dual process models 44
A dual process account of associative memory 59
Summary 62
CHAPTER 2: lAENTARAATED POTENTIALS 64
Electrogenesis 66
Individual cells 67
Groups of cells 68
Synchronicity 69
Volume conduction 69
Recording the signal 70
The Placement of Electrodes 70
Methods of Referencing 71
Extracting the signal from noise 72
Signal averaging 73
Analogue to digital conversion 74
Artifacts 75
Defining ERP components 76
Peak Picking . 76
6
Psychological components 77
Physiological components 78
Psychophysiological inferences 80
Tire invariance assumption 80
Interpreting ERP data 82
Summary 86
CHAPTER 3: ERPS AND MEMORY M
The left parietal old/new effect 89
Methodological issues 89
Initial investigations 90
The Familiarity explanation 92
Operational definitions of recollection 98
The right frontal old/new effect 99
Functional accounts of the old/new effects 102
Source memory revisited 105
Associative recall 106
Identifying the generators of the old/new effects 109
Summary 110
CHAPTER 4: GENERAL METHODS 116
Subjects 116
Experimental materials 117
Experimental tasks and procedures 117
ERP recording and data processing 118
Data Analyses 120
Magnitude analyses 120
Topographic analyses 121
CHAPTER. 5: EXPERIMENT 1 123
INTRODUCTION 123
METHODS 127
Subjects 127
Experimental materials 127
Experimental tasks, procedure and ERP recording 128
RESULTS 129
Behavioural data 129
ERP data 130
Summary of results 134
DISCUSSION 139
7
CHAPTER 6: EXPERIMENT 2 145
INTRODUCTION 145
METHOD 146
Subjects 146
Experimental materials 146
Experimental task, procedures and ERP recording 147
RESULTS 148
Behavioural data 148
ERP data 149
Summary of results 153
DISCUSSION 158
CHAPTER 7: EXPERIMENT 3 162
INTRODUCTION 162
METHOD 164
Subjects 164
Experimental materials 164
Experimental procedure and ERP recording 164
RESULTS 165
Behavioural data 165
ERP data 165
Summary of results 169
DISCUSSION 174
CHAPTER 8: INTERIM DISCUSSION 1 176
CHAPTER 9: EXPERIMENT 4 181
INTRODUCTION 181
METHOD 185
Subjects 185
Experimental stimuli 185
Experimental tasks, procedures and ERP recording 186
RESULTS 188
Behavioural data 188
ERP data 189
Summary of results 193
DISCUSSION 199
CHAPTER 10: EXPERIMENT 5 202
INTRODUCTION 202
METHOD 203
8
Subjects 203
Experimental stimuli 203
Experimental procedure and ERP recording 203
RESULTS 204
Behavioural data 204
ERP data 205
Summary of results 208
DISCUSSION 213
CHAPTER 11: INTERIM DISCUSSION 2 216
CHAPTER 12: GENERAL DISCUSSION 221
Summary of experimental findings 221
Functional accounts of the ERP old/new effects 224
The left parietal old/new effect 225
The late negative shift 231
The early frontal old/new effect 232
The late right frontal old/new effect 236
A proposal regarding the frontal old/new effects 238
Summary 244
APPENDIXA 246
APPENDIXB 253
APPENDIX C 256
BIBLIOGRAPHY 259
9
INDEX OF FIGURES AND TABLES
Tables
1. Chapter 2: Strengths and weakness of the ERP method 65
I. Chapter 5: Experimental design for experiment 1 127
3. Chapter 5: Behavioural results from experiment 1 129
4. Chapter 5: Reaction time data from experiment 1 130
5. Chapter 5: Results of the ERP magnitude analyses from experiment 1 132
6. Chapter 6: Experimental design for experiment 2 146
7. Chapter 6: Behavioural results from experiment 2 148
8. Chapter 6: Reaction time data from experiment 2 149
9. 6: Results of t^he ERP magnitude from e^^^p^iri^n^in; 2 151
10. Chapter 7; Behavioural results from experiment 3 165
II. Chapter 7: Reaction time data from experiment 3 165
12. Chapter 7: Results of the ERP magnitude analyses from experiment 3 167
13. Chapter 9: Experimental design for experiment 4 185
14. Chapter 9: Behavioural results from experiment 4 188
15. Chapter 9: Results of the ERP magnitude analyses from experiment 4 191
16. Chapter 10: Behavioural results from experiment 5 204
17. Chapter 10: Results of the ERP magnitude analyses from experiment 5 206
Figures
1. Chapter 2: Two ERP waveforms 87
2. Chapter 2: A topographic map 87
3. Chapter 3 : The ERP old/new effect - item recognition 113
4. Chapter 3 : The ERP old/new effects - source memory 114
10
5. Chapter 3 : The ERP old/new effects - associative recall 115
6. Chapter 4: 25 electrode recording montage 118
7. Chapter 5: 25 site ERPs from experiment 1 135
8. Chapter 5: ERPs from lateral frontal/parietal electrodes from experiment 1 135
9. Chapter 5: Mean amplitudes of the old/new effects from experiment 1 137
10. Chapter 5: Topographic maps of the old/new effects from experiment 1 138
11. Chapter 6: 25 site ERPs from experiment 2 154
12. Chapter 6: ERPs from lateral frontal/parietal electrodes from experiment 2 155
13. Chapter 6: Mean amplitudes of the old/new effects from experiment 2 156
14. Chapter 6: Topographic maps of the old/new effects from experiment 2 157
15. Chapter 7: 25 site ERPs from experiment 3 170
16. Chapter 7: ERPs from lateral frontal/parietal electrodes from experiment 3 171
17. Chapter 7: Mean amplitudes of the old/new effects from experiment 3 172
18. Chapter 7 : Topographic maps of the old/new effects from experiment 3 173
19. Chapter 9: 25 site ERPs for the recognition task from experiment 4 195
20. Chapter 9: 25 site ERPs for the recall task from experiment 4 196
21. Chapter 9; Amplitudes of the old/new effects for from experiment 4 197
22. Chapter 9: Topographic maps of the old/new effects from experiment 4 198
23. Chapter 10: 25 site ERPs for the recognition task from experiment 5 209
24. Chapter 10: 25 site ERPs for the recall task from experiment 5 210
25. Chapter 10: Amplitudes of the old/new effects for from experiment 5 211
26. Chapter 10: Topographic maps of the old/new effects from experiment 5 212
11
FOREWORD
“The prefrontal cortex is puzzling, since it seems to have little importance for 
man's behaviour” (Donald Hebb, 1958, p86).
Forty years on Hebb’s bold statement regarding the functional significance of the 
prefrontal cortex appears to have been an unfortunate over-statement. Hebb believed 
that the prefrontal cortex was ‘much more’ important for the behaviour of monkeys 
than humans - the increased intellectual capabilities found in humans were thought to 
have rendered the prefrontal cortex a redundant evolutionary hangover. The work 
presented here takes the opposite view, considering the prefrontal cortex to be an 
integral component of the human cognitive system. As will become clear however, the 
difficulty lies not only in establishing whether a particular area of the brain is involved 
in human cognition, but also in elucidating exactly what role it plays.
The foregoing paragraph exposes a fundamental issue that underpins the work 
presented in this thesis. As Kutas and Federmeier (1998) point out, in using any 
psychophysiological method, one is confronted by the mind-body problem. That is, 
one attempts to map between the levels of brain function and brain structure (between 
the psychological and neural levels of analysis), and in doing so one makes strong 
assumptions. Notably, one makes assumptions about the nature of relationship between 
the different levels of analysis, and about the nature of inferences that can be made on 
the basis of psychophysiological data. The work presented in this thesis does not, of 
course, attempt to solve the mind-body problem. Hopefully, however, in considering 
such issues this thesis will highlight the nature and complexity of the assumptions 
upon which such research rests.
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The main body of this thesis is organised into four sections. Section one consists of 
review chapters, providing an overview of the broad theoretical, methodological and 
empirical framework within which the experimental work fits. These initial chapters 
are necessarily detailed, discussing the cognitive memory literature, the basic Event- 
Related Potential (ERP) methodology and ERP studies of explicit memory retrieval. 
Sections two and three contain the actual experimental work. The nature of the 
experimental work is such that the studies fall neatly into two sections - the second set 
of experiments having been inspired by the results of the first set.
Experiments 1 through 3 investigate the ERP correlates of recognition memory for new 
associations, challenging the functional accounts of the ERP correlates of recognition 
memory that are discussed in section one. Experiment 1 starts with an introduction that 
briefly reiterates the most salient aspects of the work discussed in the review chapters. 
Whilst this necessarily entails some repetition, it serves to provide a succinct, focused, 
account of the reasons for the experiment. In addition, at the end of the first three 
experiments there will be an interim discussion section, examining the specific issues 
that are addressed by the first set of experiments, before moving on to the second set.
Experiments 4 and 5 directly compare the ERP correlates of associative recognition 
and associative recall, attempting to reconcile the results of experiments 1 through 3 
with previous published findings. As for the first set of experiments, experiment 4 will 
be preceded by an introduction that includes a re-cap of the central issues involved. 
Similarly, a second interim discussion will be presented, addressing the specific issues 
raised by the results of experiments 4 and 5.
Finally, section four consists of a broader general discussion, summarising the work 
presented in the thesis, relating it to the broader literature discussed in the review 
section, and suggesting ways in which the work could be extended. Hopefully, 
organising the thesis in this way should serve to highlight the way in which the work 
developed conceptually, and make it a more manageable, accessible, and pleasurable, 
experience for the reader.
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Chapter 1.
MEMORY
What is memory for? As Glenberg (1993) suggests, for most theorists memory is 
simply for memorising - the ability to store information for later use. This view is 
perhaps best characterised by the ‘storehouse' metaphor of memory, which describes 
memory as a repository of information. By this view, memory is the discrete storage of 
elements or inputs, a view that encourages a ‘quantity' oriented approach. As Koriat 
and Goldsmith (1996a) point out, an alternative view of memory is provided by the 
‘correspondence' metaphor. The correspondence view stems from a concern for 
whether what is remembered actually corresponds to what was experienced, rather than 
simply with a concern for how much is remembered. By this account, memory is not 
simply the passive storage and retrieval of discrete elements, but is a reconstructive 
process, whereby representations of the past are actively generated, and can deviate 
from reality in many different ways.
Koriat and Goldsmith (1996a,b) suggest that the storehouse and correspondence 
metaphors represent two essentially different conceptualisations of what memory is, 
what purpose it serves, and how it should be evaluated. The distinction is clearly 
somewhat forced (e.g., alternative conceptions of the correspondence metaphor have
14
been suggested, see Neisser, 1996; and Conway, 1996) and few memory theorists 
explicitly endorse one or other approach. However, a consideration of such underlying 
concepts is important, both in highlighting the implicit assumptions upon which 
research is based, and in emphasising that memory is not adequately characterised by 
the conclusion that memory is ‘simply for memorising’. As Tulving (1997) forcibly 
argues, the student of memory must recognise that memory storage is not the whole 
story.
An important criticism of Koriat and Goldsmith’s account of memory is that it is 
predominantly based upon a consideration of episodic (autobiographic or event) 
memory, and does not address the other forms or types of memory that exist. As 
McNamara (1996) suggests, it is difficult to see how the account applies to semantic 
and repetition priming, where subjects are not explicitly required to remember at all 
(see also Alterman, 1996). The foregoing criticism highlights a central feature of 
contemporary research, namely, that memory is not a unitary phenomenon and that 
some distinction must be drawn between different types or forms of memory. As 
Tulving (1995, p840) asserts, “no profound generalisations can be made about memory 
as a whole”.
Before discussing episodic memory in more detail, it is important to consider how it 
relates to other forms of memory. Thus, this chapter starts with a brief review of the 
taxonomy of memory, providing examples of the evidence on which memory has been 
fractionated, and highlighting some of the issues raised therein. Subsequently, an 
overview of the neuroanatomical basis for episodic memory will be provided, leading 
to a fuller discussion of single and dual process models of recognition memory - a 
commonly employed test of episodic memory retrieval.
Fractionating memory
As noted above, a central feature of modem memory research has been the 
demonstration that memory can be fractionated into several different forms or types. 
As Tulving (1995) notes, current accounts of the different categories of memory have 
developed from various conceptual dichotomies, such as memory vs. habit and 
procedural vs. declarative. However, these distinctions have been combined into
15
broader classification schemes, separating memory into several major memory 
‘systems’. Two such schemes are described below.
One influential taxonomy of memory comes from Squire and colleagues (e.g., see 
Squire and Zola-Morgan, 1991; Squire and Knowlton, 1994; Squire, Knowlton and 
Musen, 1993; Zola-Morgan and Squire, 1993). This model is founded upon a central 
distinction between ‘declarative’ (explicit) and ‘nondeclarative’ (implicit) forms of 
memory. Explicit, or declarative, memory includes episodic memory for prior events 
and semantic memory for facts. These two forms of memory are associated with the 
conscious retrieval of information, that is, retrieval accompanied by the 
phenomenological awareness that one is remembering. By contrast, implicit or 
nondeclarative memory includes priming, classical conditioning, associative learning 
and habit formation, forms of memory that are not associated with the 
phenomenological experience that one is remembering. That is, experience results in 
changes in behaviour (e.g., as measured by improvements in reaction time), without 
necessarily producing any concomitant conscious access to the prior learning 
experience, or the content of memory.
A similar model has been proposed by Tulving and colleagues (1983, 1985a,b). In 
several early formulations Tulving proposed just three distinct memory systems, 
episodic, semantic (two forms of declarative memory), and procedural memory 
(nondeclarative memory, Including motor skills, conditioning and associative 
learning). More recently Tulving (1993, 1994, 1995) has broadened the classification 
to include a primary memory system (short-term memory) and a perceptual 
representation system (responsible for priming). Clearly, the schemes proposed by 
Tulving and Squire are similar, but not entirely equivalent. One significant difference 
lies in the classification of priming. Squire views priming as a form of nondeclarative 
memory, whereas Tulving separates the two. For Tulving there is a critical distinction 
between procedural memories (skill learning, conditioning and associative learning), 
which are action systems, and the non-procedural memory systems that are 
representational systems, which mediate changes in cognition or thought, rather than 
action.
A second aspect of Tulving’s scheme is that the terms ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ memory 
refer to forms of expression of retrieved information, rather than memory systems per
16
se. Although, the terms are used to refer to forms of memory in the present thesis, it is 
important to recognise that states of awareness cannot necessarily be assumed to map 
directly onto forms of memory (Blaxton, 1989; Schacter, 1991; Tulving, 1993). 
Tulving also provides a specific account of the relationship between the different 
memory systems, both in terms of the evolutionary development of the different 
systems (see also Sherry and Schacter, 1987) and the way in which information is 
processed through the different systems. Tulving suggests that information is encoded 
serially, such that the output from one system is the input for the next system. Thus, 
information is represented in multiple forms, stored in parallel in each different system. 
Finally, it is proposed that stored information can be retrieved from each system 
independently, allowing the retrieval of information from one system without any 
concomitant retrieval from other systems.
An important element of the classification systems described above is that they are 
intended to reflect not only functional accounts of the different forms of memory, but 
also to provide neurologically ‘real' accounts of the underlying memory systems that 
are responsible for the operation of each type of memory. Before considering the 
details of the neurological account of the declarative/explicit memory system in more 
detail, it is worthwhile to consider the basis for some of the distinctions that have been 
drawn between different types of memory and the underlying systems upon which they 
are based. Obviously, the systems models have been proposed upon the basis of a 
whole range of empirical data, including experiments on brain damaged patients, 
animal experiments, and normal subjects. Whilst it is not possible to discuss the entire 
range of data here, relevant examples will be provided where appropriate.
Long-term and short-term memory
Perhaps the single most significant body of evidence that has contributed to the 
development of the fractionation of memory is research on brain damaged patients, 
dating back to Scoville and Milner's (1957) classic account of H.M., an epileptic 
patient who developed a severe memory impairment following bilateral temporal 
lobectomy. A central feature of the amnesic syndrome is that the memory impairment 
caused by damage to the temporal lobes is not global. As Baddeley and Warrington 
(1970) demonstrated, amnesics are able to remember information over relatively short
17
time periods, but they are severely impaired at longer delays, especially if any form of 
interference occurs between initial learning and later testing. Significantly, the opposite 
pattern of impaired performance has also been demonstrated. For example, Shallice 
and Warrington (1970) described a patient K.F., who exhibited impaired memory at 
long but not short retention intervals.
The finding that patients with damage to different brain areas exhibit complimentary 
deficits in memory performance is a ‘double dissociation’, providing strong evidence 
that memory is not a unitary phenomenon. The Individual deficits in performance in 
each group of memory impaired subjects could be accounted for in terms of a single 
memory system. For example, H.M.’s memory could have been impaired when tested 
at a long but not short delay because the latter task was simply easier. However, the 
finding that short and long term memory performance can be differentially impaired 
allows such an interpretation to be ruled out (e.g., see Weiskrantz, 1989; Ellis and 
Young, 1989; Olton, 1989; Dunn and Kirsner, 1988; Crowder, 1989; for debate 
regarding the logic and utility of single and double dissociations). On this basis (and a 
range of evidence from studies of normal subjects), the distinction between short-term 
(working) memory and long term memory is perhaps the most widely accepted 
fractionation of memory (e.g., see Atkinson and Shltfi'in, 1968; Milner, 1966; 
Baddeley, 1986, 1995, 1996; see Gathercole, 1997, for recent discussion of short-term 
memory models; and see Smith and Jonides, 1997, on neuroimaging studies of short­
term memory).
Explicit and implicit memory
Studies of brain damaged patients have also provided evidence for a fractionation of 
long term memory; the distinction between explicit (conscious) and implicit 
(unconscious) memory. As noted above, explicit memory refers to forms of memory 
that are accompanied by an awareness that information has been retrieved from 
memory, whereas Implicit memory refers to the Influence of prior experience that 
occurs in the absence of an awareness (e.g., see Richardson-Klavehn and Bjork, 1988; 
Schacter, 1987, 1994; Graf and Schacter, 1987; Schacter and Tulving, 1994; Tulving, 
1983; Tulving and Schacter, 1990; Squire, 1994; Roediger and McDermott, 1993). The 
dissociation between short and long term memory (discussed above) was illustrated by
18
considering differences in performance across different patient groups. By contrast, the 
distinction between explicit and implicit memory is discussed below, and is illustrated 
within individual patients, by contrasting temporal lobe amnesics’ performance on 
different classes of memory task, namely, direct and indirect memory tasks.
Direct and indirect memory tasks
Direct memory tasks are those that explicitly require subjects to remember some aspect 
of a prior study episode (such as the previous occurrence of an item in a word list). 
Item recognition is a typical direct memory task; subjects are presented with a list of 
study items, and at test are instructed to discriminate between studied (old) and 
unstudied (new) items. By contrast, Indirect memory tasks make no overt reference to a 
prior study episode, and subjects are not explicitly required to remember the previously 
encountered material. Perceptual Identification is a typical indirect task, whereby 
subjects are required to identify items that are presented under perceptually degraded 
(e.g., masked) conditions. In this type of task subjects are not told that their memory is 
being tested, and subjects are not necessarily aware that they have experienced some of 
the items previously. Thus, in this indirect task the memory effect is a form of priming, 
measured by an increase in the probability that an item is identified correctly following 
prior exposure to that item.
A host of experimental evidence suggests that amnesic patients are impaired on direct 
memory tasks, whilst exhibiting relatively spared performance on indirect tasks (e.g., 
see Warrington and Weiskrantz, 1970; Weiskrantz and Warrington, 1979; Jacoby and 
Witherspoon, 1982; Cohen, 1984; Graf, Shlmamura and Squire, 1985; for reviews see 
Moscovitch, Vriezen and Goshen-Gottstein, 1993; and Shimamura, 1986). For 
example, Corkin (1968) demonstrated that despite being severely impaired on direct 
tests such as recognition and recall, the amnesic patient H.M. (discussed above) was 
able to learn a simple motor skill. Similarly, Jacoby and Witherspoon (1982) 
demonstrated that amnesic subjects are impaired at recognising old items in a direct 
test of memory, despite being susceptible to a priming effect on an indirect test - they 
were biased towards particular spelling of homophones (e.g., plate vs. plait).
Evidence of dissociations in performance on direct and indirect memory tasks have 
also been found in studies of normal subjects (e.g., see Jacoby, 1983; Jacoby and 
Dallas, 1981; Mitchell and Brown, 1988; Jacoby, Woloshyn and Kelley, 1989; Cave
19
and Squire, 1992), adding weight to the suggestion that there are distinct explicit and 
implicit memory processes. Dissociations between direct and indirect tasks are 
typically shown by the differential effect of a specific experiment variable on one or 
other type of task, such as differences in performance when the modality in which 
items are presented is either maintained or changed between study and test, or 
differences in performance when attention is either full or divided at study. For 
example, Jacoby and Dallas (1981) used a ‘levels of processing' manipulation, 
requiring subjects to study items either deeply (a semantic categorisation task) or 
shallowly (a vowel counting task). At test subjects performed both direct (item 
recognition) and indirect (perceptual identification) tasks. Jacoby and Dallas found that 
performance on the direct task was affected by the depth of processing manipulation, 
recognition memory being superior following deep than shallow encoding, whereas 
performance on the indirect task was unaffected by the manipulation.
Clearly, this form of functional dissociation is consistent with the suggestion that 
performance on direct and indirect memory tasks is not based entirely on the same 
processes. However, the extent to which such dissociations necessarily reflect the 
contribution of entirely independent memory systems is a matter of ongoing debate. As 
Roediger, Weldon and Challis (1989) point out, the distinction between different forms 
of memory cannot be safely made on the basis of functional dissociations. As well as 
dissociations between direct and indirect memory tasks, functional dissociations can 
also be formd between different direct memory tasks. For example, studies have shown 
that a change in environmental context (i.e., the place/room in which the experiment is 
performed) between study and test significantly affects recall but not recognition 
memory performance (e.g., see Smith, 1994). This does not necessitate separate 
memory systems for each task however; the differences in performance could be 
accounted for in other ways. For example, both tasks could be reliant on two retrieval 
processes, with differential engagement of the two processes for each task. 
Alternatively, the tasks could share a reliance on one common retrieval process, with 
each task also relying on additional processes that are not shared.
System and processing theories
An alternative view of memory has been proposed by several authors, based on a 
processing view of memory. The essence of the processing view is that the
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dissociations in performance that are seen across direct and indirect memory tasks 
reflect differences in the processing demands, rather than differences in the underlying 
memory systems (e.g., see Blaxton, 1989; Roediger, 1990; McKoon, Ratcliff and Dell, 
1986; Roediger et al., 1989; Kolers and Roediger, 1984; McDermott and Roediger, 
1996; Crowder, 1989). By this view, the ability to access or make use of memory 
information is dependent upon the degree to which the processing operations required 
at test overlap with (or match) those performed at study. This approach to memory 
retrieval is consistent with the general principles of ‘transfer-appropriate processing’ 
(Morris, Bransford and Franks, 1977) and ‘encoding-specificity’ (Tulving and 
Thomson, 1973; Wiseman and Tulving, 1976), whereby memory retrieval at test is 
seen as dependent upon the recapitulation of processing operations performed at study.
Within the transfer-appropriate processing framework performance on a given memory 
test is seen as dependent upon the overlap between the processing afforded items at 
study, and the processing requirements imposed at test. For example, Morris et al. 
(1977) has subjects study a list of words using either a semantic or rhyming task. They 
found that the semantic study task lead to superior performance on a standard item 
recognition test, but that the rhyming study task led to superior performance when a 
rhyming recognition test was employed (i.e., does the word rhyme with one presented 
at study). At the time, the significance of this experiment was in demonstrating that 
performance on memory tasks was not simply a function of ‘depth of processing’ (as 
per Craik and Lockhart, 1972), because the effectiveness of the deep and shallow 
encoding tasks depended upon the use to which Information was put at test. In the 
present context however, the experiment also serves to demonstrate that dissociations 
in performance might reflect the specific retrieval orientation or task demands imposed 
by particular memory tests, rather than necessarily reflecting a reliance on different 
memory systems.
Although processing theorists can be characterised as arguing against the fractionation 
of memory into distinct memory systems, they must nonetheless account for the 
dissociations in performance found across different memory tasks. Consequently, a 
critical distinction within the processing view is between ‘data-driven’ and 
‘conceptually-driven’ processes. Data driven processes are predominantly associated 
with the sensory and perceptual representations of test Items, whereas conceptual
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processes are associated with high-order semantic representations. By the processing 
view, direct memory tasks are more closely associated with (or dependent upon) 
conceptual processes, and indirect tasks more associated with data driven processes. 
Moreover, Individual direct and indirect tasks vary in their reliance on data and 
conceptual process, for example, item repetition priming is primarily data driven, 
whereas semantic priming relies more heavily upon conceptual processes. Thus, by 
distinguishing between data driven and conceptually driven processing, the transfer 
appropriate processing framework can account for dissociations in performance across 
different direct and indirect tasks, and dissociations in perfonnance within each class 
of task.
At the extreme, the processing view can be characterised as proposing that 
performance on all memory tasks relies upon a single memory system. Thus, 
dissociations in performance that result from the effect of different experimental 
manipulations (both across and within direct and indirect tasks) reflects different 
modes of processing associated with a single underlying memory system. Even the 
most hardened processing theorists is unlikely to propose an entirely unitary model of 
memory however (e.g., see Roediger, Srivinas and Weldon, 1989). Rather, the 
‘systems versus processes’ debate has largely focused upon whether a multiple systems 
are necessary to account for the distinction between explicit (episodic) and implicit 
(priming) memory. Moreover, the systems and processing approaches are not 
inherently Incompatible and a combined approach may ultimately be necessary (e.g., 
see Roediger et al., 1989; Tulving, 1995). In sum, it is generally accepted that a 
distinction can be drawn between the form(s) of memory assessed by direct and 
indirect memory tasks, and other fonns of memory such as associative learning and 
classical conditioning, although the appropriate characterisation of the distinction 
between different forms of memory remains a matter of debate.
Before considering the systems model of memory in more detail, it should be noted 
that the challenge from processing theorists has led systems theorists to look for 
alternative forms of evidence to support the distinction between memory systems. 
Thus, alongside evidence of functional dissociations between different memory tasks, 
there is also evidence of stochastic dissociations - evidence that measures of memory 
performance on different tasks are statistically unrelated. That is, demonstrations that
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the likelihood that a specific item is remembered on one task is independent of (i.e., 
not correlated with) the likelihood that it is remembered on a second task. This form of 
item specific dissociation has been demonstrated between a number of different tasks 
(e.g., between priming and semantic memory, Tulving, Hayman and Macdonald, 1991; 
and between priming and episodic memory, Tulving, Schacter and Stark, 1982). For 
example, Jacoby and Witherspoon (1982, noted above) demonstrated that the semantic 
priming effects for individual items on an indirect memory task were independent of 
the subject's ability to recognise the same items on a direct recognition test.
As with the findings of functional dissociations, the value and utility of stochastic 
dissociations have been challenged. It has been suggested that the presence of 
stochastic dissociations is dependent upon the particular experimental procedures 
employed (e.g., see Shimamura, 1985; Ostergraad, 1992) and that the rationale of the 
approach is logically unsound (e.g., see Hintzman, 1990). For example, stochastic 
independence can also be demonstrated between different indirect tasks (e.g., see 
Witherspoon, and Moscovitch, 1989). Nonetheless, it has been claimed (e.g., see 
Tulving, 1985; Hayman and Rickards, 1995; Schacter, 1995) that stochastic 
independence provides stronger evidence for multiple memory systems than is 
provided by functional dissociations because the dissociations are item specific. At the 
very least, such evidence adds weight to the conclusion that memory retrieval is not an 
entirely unitary phenomenon, and that some form of distinction (whether in terms of 
memory systems or memory processes) can be drawn between forms of memory.
Process purity
The discussion of the debate between systems and processing accounts of memory 
highlights that fact that there are problems with the conclusion that dissociations in 
performance on direct and indirect memory tasks can be taken as evidence for separate 
memory systems. The debate has contributed to an important development in the 
memory literature however. As several authors (e.g., see Dunn and Kirsner, 1988, 
1989; Richardson-Klavehn and Bjork, 1989; Jacoby and Kelley, 1992; Reingold and 
Toth, 1996) have pointed out, individual tasks cannot be assumed to be ‘process pure' 
- that is, if there are multiple memory systems, performance on a given task is unlikely 
to reflect the isolated operation of a single system. Thus, performance on direct and 
indirect tasks may involve contributions from multiple memory processes, and because
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there may not be a transparent, discrete, relationship between tasks and processes, 
direct and indirect tasks cannot be assumed to map exclusively onto explicit and 
implicit (respectively) memory process. For example, performance on a given direct 
memory task such as item recognition memory may predominantly tap explicit 
memory processes, but may also be influenced by implicit memory processes such as 
priming. As will be discussed below, this issue has generated considerable debate in 
the context of recent models of recognition memory. Similarly, performance on 
indirect tasks may be influenced by explicit memory, especially if subjects become 
aware that some items have been previously experienced (e.g., see Bowers and 
Schacter, 1990).
The foregoing discussion of the fractionation of memory highlights several important 
issues. Memory is clearly a not a unitary phenomenon. Different proposals have been 
made to account for the dissociations in performance that can be found across different 
memory tasks, however, it Is clear that different fonns of memory do exist. 
Nonetheless, for the systems theorist a fundamental limitation exists in employing 
purely behavioural investigations of memory - it cannot be assumed that performance 
on individual memory tasks provides direct access to the neural activity of individual 
memory systems. Rather, behavioural studies simply measure the combined output of 
the different memory systems across different memory tasks. As Jacoby (1991) notes, 
measures of performance on a specific memory test cannot necessarily be assumed to 
reflect a specific memory process. Even though a range of different dissociations may 
be demonstrated (stochastically or functionally, using different subjects, tasks or 
experimental manipulations), this cannot provide conclusive evidence for different 
memory systems. Behavioural Investigations of memory must be integrated with 
neuroanatomical and neuroimaging data, to provide convergent evidence concerning 
the underlying neural processes that are engaged by different memory tasks. The 
neuroanatomical basis of declarative (explicit) memory is discussed In more detail 
below.
Declarative (explicit) memory
An Important element of the systems view of memory has been to characterise the 
neural basis of behaviour. One of the clearest and most well formulated examples of
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this approach comes from work by Cohen, Squire and colleagues (Cohen and 
Eichenbaum, 1993; Cohen and Squire, 1980; Squire and Zola-Morgan, 1991; Squire 
and Knowlton, 1992; Squire, Knowlton and Musen, 1993). A great deal of the 
evidence in support of this model comes from animal lesion studies, and brain 
damaged patients. The intention here is not to extensively review the evidence, rather 
the components of the system will be described, providing an overview of the neural 
basis for declarative memory. Although there Is widespread agreement regarding the 
importance of the medial temporal lobes memory system, the manner In which the 
system functions and the exact role of the constituent parts remains a matter of ongoing 
debate. A number of different models of the hippocampal formation have been 
proposed, including detailed connectionist models and more abstract theoretical 
accounts (e.g., see McClelland, McNaughton and O’Reilly, 1995; Teyler and 
Discenna, 1986; Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; Damasio, 1989; Foster, Ainsworth, 
Faratin and Shapiro, 1997).
In essence, declarative memory is thought to be dependent upon the integrity of the 
medial temporal lobe memory system; the hippocampus and anatomically related 
structures (including entorhinal and perirhinal cortex, midline thalamus and fornix). 
The medial temporal lobe memory system refers both to the hippocampus and the 
major input and output pathways which allow the hippocampal formation to 
communicate with the rest of the brain. Whilst the fine details of this system are 
beyond the scope of the present chapter, it is important to note that the hippocampus Is 
reciprocally connected with numerous subcortical structures and higher-order 
association cortex. For example, the parahippocampal cortical areas (entorhinal and 
perirhinal cortex) receive Inputs from numerous areas of sensory and association areas 
(including posterior parietal lobes and prefrontal cortex), providing multimodal 
Information about current experiences. Similarly, the fornix provides an important 
output pathway from the hippocampal formation, projecting to numerous subcortical 
areas, Including the thalamus, septum and hypothalamus.
A critical feature of the hippocampal formation is that it has widespread and reciprocal 
connections throughout the brain, placing it in an ideal position to receive activity from 
the multiple areas of cortex in which information is processed during ongoing 
experience. However, whilst the hippocampus is at the center of the medial temporal
25
memory system it is not thought to actually store information per se. As evidence from 
brain damaged patients such as H.M. attests, damage to the hippocampus does not 
obliterate memory completely. The presence of intact remote memories suggests that 
the hippocampal system cannot be the ultimate storage site for long term memories. 
Thus, the hippocampal system is thought to serve as a ‘relational processor' or 
‘convergence zone', storing information (‘addresses' or ‘indexes') about the pattern of 
cortical activity associated with ongoing experience. The hippocampal system extracts 
a concentrated representation of the activity that occurs across multiple regions, 
associated with the different elements of ongoing experience, allowing that activity to 
be reactivated at a later date. Thus, by this view, memory retrieval involves the 
reactivation of the areas of cortex that were involved in processing information at 
encoding.
An important property of the declarative memory system is that remembered 
information can be used in a flexible way. That is, information can be accessed in a 
variety of ways, using different retrieval cues and in novel contexts, such that 
information can be made available in situations that do not correspond closely to the 
original learning experience. In contrast, non-declarative memories are inflexible, and 
can only be expressed in situations that recapitulate the original learning episodes. A 
central reason for the representational flexibility of the hippocampal memory system 
stems from the ability to support the learning of relations among perceptually distinct 
items or events. As Cohen and Eichenbaum (1993, p62) state, “the form or nature of 
declarative representations is fundamentally relational” (their emphasis). At a basic 
level this corresponds to the ‘binding' of information that is represented across 
multiple areas of cortex. The individual aspects of a stimulus (e.g., shape, colour, and 
position) are associated with the activity of different cortical areas at encoding. At 
retrieval the hippocampus acts to simultaneously reactivate these multiple areas of 
cortex, activating the specific conjunction of stimulus features that represent the 
original event.
Although the relational ‘binding' process can be considered at the level of sensory or 
perceptual features of a given stimulus, it applies equally at all levels of abstraction. 
That is, to the relative positions of a given stimuli in time and space, and to the 
relations between stimuli. Thus, the ability to bind different stimuli together into a
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unique memory representation can be considered a fundamental characteristic of the 
hippocampal memory system. One obvious example of this function of the core 
memory system can be seen in the impaired memory abilities of amnesic patients. A 
widely acknowledged aspect of hippocampal amnesia is impaired performance on tests 
of ‘paired-associate learning’. For example, a list of word pairs is presented (e.g., dog- 
box, wood-fork, blue-inch, etc) and then the first item from each pair is presented, and 
the subject is asked to report the study associate. Amnesic subjects are notoriously 
impaired at this form of memory task, as Cohen and Eichenbaum (1993, p69) note, 
“paired associate learning provides a test that is most revealing of human amnesia”.
Episodic and semantic memory
In the context of the present thesis, a particularly important distinction within 
declarative memory is between episodic and semantic memory. Episodic and semantic 
memory are both forms of explicit (declarative) memory in that subjects are aware that 
they are remembering, and retrieval is assessed directly. Nonetheless, there appears to 
be a general consensus that some form of distinction can be drawn between episodic 
and semantic memory in terms of the type of information that is retrieved. Episodic (or 
autobiographical) memory refers to memory for events - specific prior occurrences 
occupying a distinct spatial and temporal context. By contrast, semantic memory refers 
to memory for facts - general knowledge.
As with the distinctions between forms of memory discussed earlier, one basis for the 
distinction between episodic and semantic memory comes from brain damaged 
patients. For example, De Renzi, Liotti, and Nichelli (1987) reported a single patient, 
L.P., who became amnesic following encephalitis. L.P. appeared to have normal 
episodic (autobiographical) memory, short-term memory, speech and perception. 
However, L.P.’s exhibited impairments in several aspects of semantic knowledge, 
including naming objects, word meaning and identifying famous people. In contrast, 
Tulving et al. (1991) report the opposite dissociation in patient K.C., an amnesic 
subject who exhibited severely impaired episodic memory, but was nonetheless able to 
learn semantic information (in the form of arbitrary three-word sentences).
More recently Vargha-Khadem, Gadian, Watkins, Comielly, Van Paesschen and 
Mishkin (1997) presented a striking example of three children who sustained brain
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lesions very early in life - at birth, four years, and nine years of age. Despite their early 
onset, the lesions, which were limited largely to the hippocampus (bilaterally), did not 
produce general cognitive impairment. The children were competent In speech and 
language (fairing well in educational terms, learning to read, write and spell) and were 
unimpaired on tests of semantic memory. By contrast, the children failed to remember 
events of daily life, and were impaired on tests of episodic memory (including delayed 
recall of stories, verbal and auditory recall, and copying complex figures). Vargha- 
Khadem et al., suggest that these patients exhibit sever episodic memory impairment in 
the face of spared semantic memory, and because the damage occurred so early, the 
formation of semantic memory could not have been reliant upon episodic memory. 
They suggest that episodic memory is dependent upon the hippocampus proper, 
whereas semantic memory depends upon the underlying entorhinal, perirhinal and 
parahippocampal cortices. By this account, the degree of memory loss In amnesia is 
dependent upon the extent of damage across the medial temporal lobes - episodic and 
semantic memory are only Impaired together when the damage is widespread.
Although some form of distinction between semantic and episodic memory is 
generally accepted, there is considerable disagreement concerning the precise details of 
the functional and neuroanatomical relationship between of the two forms of memory 
(e.g., see Tulving, 1986; Dosher, 1984; McKoon and Ratcliff, 1986; Ratcliff and 
McKoon, 1986). As forms of explicit or declarative memory, it is clear that both 
episodic and semantic memory are likely to be related to the operation of the brain 
system underlying this form of memory. Nonetheless, the precise relationship remains 
a matter of continuing debate. Two related accounts of the distinction between episodic 
and semantic memory are described below, focussing upon possibility that the frontal 
lobes play a role in supporting episodic memory.
According to the framework provided by Tulving and colleagues (e.g., see Tulving, 
1985a,b; 1986; 1993; Tulving and Schacter, 1990) the distinction between episodic and 
semantic memory implies more than just the retrieval of different forms of 
information. Episodic and semantic memory are characterised by a ‘mono-hierarchical’ 
relationship; semantic memories are seen as being formed from the gradual 
accumulation of episodic memoi^ie^^, knowledge from Individual experiences being re­
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represented to form generalisations about the world1. Moreover, episodic and semantic 
memory can be distinguished by the subjective state of awareness associated with the 
retrieval of information. Episodic memory retrieval is not simply the explicit 
remembering of past events, ratber, episodic memories are specifically associated with 
an ‘autonoetrc' (self-knowing) state of consciousness. By this view autonoetic 
consciousness is a necessary correlate of episodic memory, providing memory with a 
self-referential quality (for Tulving, tbe hallmark of episodic recollection). By contrast, 
semantic information is associated with a ‘noetic' (knowing) state of consciousness, 
the explicit knowledge of facts without any necessary memory for where or when that 
information was acquired.
Although the distinction between episodic and semantic memory is intended to reflect 
separate memory systems, tbe account provided by Tulving is primarily focused 
towards a functional account, ratber than addressing the underlying neuroanatomical 
structures responsible for the two forms of memory (although see Wheeler, Stuss and 
Tulving, 1995, 1997). An alternative account is provided by Squire and colleagues 
(e.g., Squire and Zola-Morgan, 1991; Squire and Knowlton, 1992; Squire, Knowlton 
and Musen, 1993). By this account the distinction between episodic and semantic 
memory is more strongly tied to neuroanatomical systems, rather than in terms of tbe 
types of awareness associated with them. In essence, both episodic and semantic 
memory are seen as being dependent upon the functioning of medial temporal lobe 
memory system, but episodic memory is thought additionally to depend upon the 
integrity of the frontal lobes.
Circumscribed damage to the frontal lobes has not traditionally been associated with 
impaired performance on typical episodic memory tasks sucb as recognition and recall. 
However, evidence flom a recent meta-analysis of episodic memory in frontal lobe 
patients suggests that the prefrontal cortex does contribute to performance on these 
tasks. Wheeler, Stuss and Tulving (1995) reviewed a large number of studies, and 
found clear evidence of impaired performance on tests of recognition, cued recall and 
free recall. Significantly, the pattern of impairment was graded, with the smallest 
disruption on tests of recognition, and the largest on tests of flee recall. Moreover, 
damage to the frontal lobes is known to produce impaired memory performance on a
1 Note that the cases reported by Vargha-Khadem et al. (1997) present strong evidence against this view.
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range of other memory tasks. For example, frontal lobe lesions are associated with 
impairments in the ability to judge the temporal order in which remembered items 
were experienced (e.g., Milner, Corst and Leonard, 1991), and in making meta­
memory judgements about remembered items (e.g., Janowsky, Shimamura and Squire, 
1989a).
For example, Moscovitch and Melo (1997; see also Shallice and Burgess, 1991; 
Burgess and Shallice, 1996) examined aspects of strategic retrieval in patients with 
damage to the frontal lobes. In response to cue words (e.g., battle) subjects were 
required to describe either an event from their personal life or an event from history. 
Temporal lobe amnesic patients were impaired at this task relative to normal age 
matched controls. However, a subset of subjects with additional damage to the frontal 
lobes were more severely impaired at recovering memories in relation to the cues, 
benefited less from prompting than the other subjects, and exhibited sever 
confabulation - producing distorted responses that conflated semantic, historical and 
personal memories. Thus, Moscovitch and Melo suggest that the frontal lobe damage 
resulted in impaired strategic retrieval processes that are required to help initiate the 
search of memory, and to monitor and organise the output from memory.
Another deficit associated with frontal lobe damage is impaired ‘source memory’ - the 
ability to report the context in which remembered items were previously experienced 
(Johnson, 1992; Johnson, Hashtroudi and Lindsay, 1993). Impairments in source 
memory highlight a central feature of episodic memory, i.e., that the retrieved 
information is autobiographical in nature - the recollection of previous personal 
experiences that are situated in time and space. Several studies have reported 
impairments in source memory following frontal lobe damage (e.g., see Janowsky, 
Shimamura and Squire, 1989b; Schacter, Harbluk and MaLachlan, 1984; Glisky, 
Polster and Rothieaux, 1995). As Squire et al. (1993) note, source amnesia is 
essentially a disturbance of episodic memory, a disconnection between events and their 
contexts, and the loss of the autobiographical, recollective, aspect of declarative 
memory, rather than the loss of information per se. Thus, amnesic patients with severe 
source memory impairments may nonetheless be able to report as much information 
about the original learning episode as amnesic patients who show no impairment in 
source memory (Shimamura and Squire, 1987).
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Several authors have suggested a role for the frontal lobes in terms of support 
processes, rather than memory retrieval per se. For example, Moscovitch (1992, 1995a; 
see also Moscovitch and Umilta, 1991) suggests that prefrontal cortex is critically 
involved in ‘working-with-memory’, I.e., post-retrieval processes that operate upon 
information that has been retrieved from the medial temporal lobe memory system. 
Thus, the prefrontal cortex can contribute to performance on episodic memory tasks, 
but it is thought to play a supporting role to the more central medial temporal lobe 
memory. By this view, information retrieved from the medial temporal system is 
thought to be sufficient for making simple judgements about the ‘oldness’ of a given 
stimuli (as might be required by standard tests of recognition memory), but the frontal 
lobes may be required if more complex judgements are required concerning the 
‘context’ in which an a stimuli was experienced (as might be required In tests of source 
memory).
An important aspect of Moscovitch’s view is that the frontal lobes are thought to play a 
strategic role in memory retrieval, guiding behavioural In a goal or task dependent 
manner. Similarly, Shimamura (1995) suggests that prefrontal cortex may be necessary 
for the control of search and retrieval processes, Inhibiting irrelevant or misleading 
information that has been retrieved from memory. Again, the operation or use of the 
central medial temporal lobe memory system is characterised as being dependent upon 
the activity of tbe frontal lobes. Although there is a great deal of similarity across 
current views, there is by no means a consensus regarding the fine details. For 
example, by Moscovitch’s account (e.g., Moscovitch, 1995a,b) the hippocampal 
memory system operates on a ‘consciousness In, consciousness out’ basis, such that the 
hippocampus acts as a record of ongoing conscious experience, and consequently 
‘reactivated’ memories are necessarily associated with consciousness. By contrast, in 
recent proposals Tulving and colleagues (e.g., Wheeler, Stuss and Tulving, 1997) see 
the frontal lobes as being necessary for episodic memories to be conscious. Tbe 
prefrontal cortex is thought to play a critical role in ‘empowering healthy adults with 
autonoetic consciousness’. Nonetheless, by both these views the role of tbe frontal 
lobes is ‘supervisory’ to that of the more central medial temporal lobe memory system.
Despite the straightforward account provided Here It should not be forgotten that the 
fiontal lobes have been widely implicated in a range of functions, including, but by no
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means limited to, attention, verbal behaviour, executive frmctioning, motivation, 
emotion and affect, and working memory (e.g., see Damasio, 1979; Stuss and Benson, 
1983; Stuss, Eskes and Foster, 1994; Kertesz, 1994; Schacter, 1987; Shallice, 1988). 
These functions are generally regarded as ‘high-order' cognitive functions, associated 
with supervisory processes that consciously direct and structure Tower level' functions 
towards specific behavioural goals. Although the frontal lobes are widely implicated in 
supporting high-order cognitive functions, the size and complexity (including 
widespread connectivity) of the frontal lobes suggest that they are neither functionally 
nor neurally homogenous. Nonetheless, at present the evidence for specific 
subdivisions of the frontal lobes in relation to memory is rare. As Wheeler et al. (1997, 
p334) state, “despite tbe possibility that lesions in different regions of prefrontal cortex 
produce different symptoms, much of the available evidence has been drawn flom the 
behaviour of patients with relatively large lesions of the prefrontal cortex.”
The neuroanatomical basis for episodic memory
As noted above, the research presented in this thesis is primarily concerned with 
episodic memory retrieval - the ability to consciously remember past events. 
Consistent with tbe foregoing review, a broadly accepted view of the neural basis of 
episodic memory has developed over recent decades, the idea that multiple, widely 
distributed neural systems are responsible for tbe encoding, storage and retrieval of 
episodic information. As Rubin and Greenberg (1998) note, there is widespread belief 
that episodic memory retrieval involves the reactivation of tbe cortical activity that 
occurred during the original event. The idea of retrieval as ‘reactivation' is 
characterised by a tripartite model of episodic memory. This view appears to be 
broadly consistent with both the declarative memory systems view, and the distinction 
between episodic and semantic memory discussed above.
First, the encoding of new experiences is thought to rely primarily upon the ‘core' 
memory system; areas within tbe medial temporal lobes, especially the hippocampus 
and adjacent parahippocampal cortex. Damage to this core system is associated with 
anterograde amnesia, tbe inability to form new episodic memories. Second, although 
the medial temporal lobe memory system is necessary for encoding, the information 
itself is thought to be stored elsewhere, in the areas of cortex that mediated the initial
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sensory, perceptual and conceptual processing of the episode. The reactivation of 
stored information is thought to involve both the core medial temporal memory system 
and also more strategic control processes mediated by the frontal lobes.
The third component, the frontal lobes, is not thought to contribute to the storage of 
information, but rather to support the retrieval processes that are required to allow 
access to episodic memories. Damage to the frontal lobes is associated with impaired 
source memory, and involvement of the frontal lobes may distinguish episodic from 
semantic memory. Whilst the core medial temporal lobe memory system may normally 
be involved in memory retrieval, the gradual consolidation of information in posterior 
cortex eventually allows memories to be retrieved independently of the core memory 
system (presumably involving the strategic processes that are supported by the frontal 
lobes). The process of consolidation is suggested by the fact that amnesics are better 
able to retrieve older than recently formed memories (although see Nadel and 
Moscovitch, 1997).
The view of episodic memory described above has provided the framework for 
neuroanatomical interpretations of the ERP correlates of episodic memory retrieval. As 
will be discussed in chapter 3, it is thought that the ERP correlates of episodic memory 
retrieval are generated by the activity of the component parts of the neuroanatomical 
system described above. However, the investigations of the ERP correlates of episodic 
memory retrieval that are of interest in the present thesis have predominantly employed 
item recognition memory tasks (including modified item recognition tasks that allow 
an assessment of source memory and associative recall). Consequently, functional 
interpretations of the ERP studies have predominantly been interpreted within a 
framework based on current models of recognition memory. The following section 
provides a review of these models of recognition memory.
Models of recognition memory
Of central interest here are theoretical accounts of the retrieval processes that support 
recognition memory, a direct task that has been primarily associated with the explicit 
(conscious) retrieval of episodic memories. Recognition memory has been most 
commonly investigated using a study-test ‘item recognition’ task, whereby recognition 
is defined as the ability to correctly distinguish between items (usually words) that
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have been studied (old), and items that are unstudied (new). As Mandler (1991) notes, 
a predominant view of memory retrieval In the 1960s was that recognition judgements 
were based upon a single strength or familiarity process, whilst recall occurred via a 
separate retrieval process. As is discussed below, sucb single process accounts were 
typically based upon a signal detection model of recognition. Behavioural studies of 
recognition memory in the early 1970s lead some theorists to abandon single process 
models in favour of more complex dual process models, based initially on the idea that 
retrieval processes operate in recognition as well as recall. Although the earliest dual 
process models were based upon a threshold model of recognition, more recent models 
have incorporated both signal detection and tlrresbold accounts.
The formal basis of single and dual process models
Numerous different models Have been proposed to account for tbe retrieval process(es) 
that underlie recognition memory, resulting in considerable debate over the 
appropriateness of the different models (e.g., see Donaldson, 1992, versus Snodgrass 
and Corwin, 1988, with regard to non-parametrlc models). Several different models of 
recognition memory are described below, illustrating the development from single- to 
dual-process models, and highlighting tbe different formulations that the models can 
take. First however, it Is worth considering tbe formal basis of the different models, 
which have generally been derived from signal detection and threshold theories.
Signal detection models
Findings from investigations employing tbe standard item recognition paradigm have 
been widely interpreted using signal-detection theory (e.g., see Green and Swets, 1966; 
Banks, 1970; Macmillan and Creelman, 1991; Snodgrass and Corwin, 1988). Models 
based upon signal detection theory typically represent the memory trace associated 
with each item along a single continuum of strength or familiarity. Although there are 
numerous ways of formulating signal detection models (e.g., representing old and new 
items as having different variances, or logistic distributions), in tbe most 
straightforward case ' tbe familiarity of both old and new items are assumed to Have 
equal variance and to be normally distributed, with old items having a higher mean 
familiarity due to their having been presented at study. To discriminate between old 
and new items (i.e., to assess the likelihood that a test item is old), subjects must select
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a specific level of familiarity (i.e., a response criterion level) above which items will be 
judged old. By definition the distributions of tbe old and new items overlap, thus, the 
use of a response criterion leads a subjects responses to include a proportion of misses 
(i.e., old items rejected as new due to their Having a lower than criterion level of 
familiarity), and a proportion of false alarms (i.e., new items incorrectly recognised as 
old due to their having a higher than criterion level of familiarity).
As Macmillan and Creelman (1991; see also Macmillan, 1993) note, signal detection 
models offer a way of accounting for the decision processes underlying recognition 
memory. Tbe models provide a measure of the extent to which subjects are able to 
accurately recognise old items (i.e., discrimination), and an estimate of their 
willingness to do so (i.e., response bias - how liberal or conservative subjects are in 
judging items old). For the equal-variance model, discrimination is defined as tbe 
difference between the means of tbe old and new distributions, divided by the common 
standard distribution. Note that, witbin this framework signal detection models 
effectively represent memory as a form of educated guess. That is, there is no way of 
determining whether a given item is genuinely old, rather, any item that has a 
familiarity level above the response criteria will be accepted as being old.
Threshold models
Threshold theories are based on the assumption that there are discrete memory states 
(rather than a continuum), and that a given test item has a probability of being old - an 
item will be judged old if it exceeds tbe memory threshold. As with signal detection 
theory a number of different threshold models can be formulated (e.g., see Snodgrass 
and Corwin, 1988, Macmillan and Creelman, 1991). Tbe most straightforward ‘high- 
threshold' model assumes a single threshold, However Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) 
note that the high-tbresbold model Has not been widely employed, being easily 
falsified by data. Consequently, they focus upon an alternative threshold model, tbe 
two-high-tbreshold model, which has been widely used in studies of recognition 
memory.
The two-high-thresbold model assumes that there are three distinct memory states, 
delineated by two response criterion levels (i.e., thresholds). The upper threshold 
determines a level of familiarity above which an item is known to be old. Conversely, 
the lower threshold determines a level of familiarity below which an item is known to
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be new. Significantly, new items cannot cross the upper threshold, and similarly, old 
items cannot cross the lower threshold. However, both old and new items can lie 
between the two thresholds, leading to a state of uncertainty. In this state responding 
depends upon guessing (the response bias towards responding old or new), thus misses 
and false alarms always occur from this uncertain state.
There are two points worth noting here. First, the introduction of the low threshold is 
important, because it suggests that subjects are able both to recognise studied items as 
old, and unstudied items as new. By the two-high-threshold model the subject is able 
to respond ‘new’ because the item is genuinely known to be new (e.g., consider the 
scenario whereby a subject’s own name is presented as an unstudied item). Second, 
although the high and low thresholds in a two-high-threshold model may differ, a 
single data set does not allow both thresholds to be defined. Thus, in practice, it is 
commonly assumed that the thresholds are equivalent, an assumption that Snodgrass 
and Corwin (1988) believe to be supported by the ‘mirror effect’ phenomenon, the 
finding that hit rates and false alarm rates vary inversely with one another (e.g., see 
Glanzer and Adams, 1985; Glanzer, Adams, Iverson and Kim, 1993; but see Green, 
1996).
The two-equal-high-threshold model allows the use of a discrimination measure of 
recognition accuracy that accounts for the fact that the hit rate is composed of 
responses based upon both veridical recognition and guessing. Because guessing only 
occurs when an item is not veridically recognised, the false alarm rate provides a direct 
estimate of the likelihood that an item is judged old on the basis of a guess. Thus, 
discrimination is assessed by the probability of a hit, minus, the probability of a false 
alarm.
Retrieval mechanisms versus retrieval content
It is important to stress that threshold and signal detection models are inherently 
different ways of accounting for the retrieval mechanism underlying recognition 
memory performance. In essence, signal detection models represent recognition 
memory as being based upon a graded retrieval process based a continuum of memory 
states, whereas threshold models assume that there are discrete memory states and 
therefore that retrieval is an all-or-none process. Thus, for signal detection models 
there are various levels of familiarity that can occur, with increasing certainty that an
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item Is genuinely old, whereas for threshold models an Item either is, or is not, 
remembered. It is equally important to recognise however, that the models do not 
commit the memory theorist to a specific conceptualisation of the information content 
of tbe memory retrieval process.
The distinction between the mechanism by wblcb information Is retrieved and the 
content of the retrieved information is perhaps best understood by example. Snodgrass 
and Corwin (1988) describe threshold models In manner that is analogous to signal 
detection models, based upon the retrieval of familiarity - thus the threshold defines a 
level of familiarity above which items are accepted as old. However, as Yonelinas et 
al. (1996) note, threshold theories can also be conceptualised in terms of ‘recollection’, 
a memory retrieval process that provides qualitative information about recognised 
Items. By this account an item will be accepted as old because Information about the 
prior study episode bas been retrieved, Including contextual information about when 
and where the item was encountered, going beyond a sense that tbe item bas been 
previously encountered. Note however, that whilst threshold models represent retrieval 
as an all-or-none mechanism, Yonelinas at al. contend that the models do not 
necessitate that subjects must either remember everything or nothing about a study 
episode. On both logical and empirical grounds it is clear that different aspects of a 
given study episode may be remembered under different conditions (e.g., due to 
different memory cues being presented).
The distinction between retrieval mechanisms and the Information content of what is 
retrieved has not been clearly drawn within tbe memory literature. Single process 
models, which typically represent recognition memory as dependent on a signal 
detection familiarity process, have been challenged by dual process theories. However, 
as is discussed below, dual process models vary both in terms of tbe retrieval 
mechanisms proposed and the information content that Is retrieved. For example, ‘two- 
bigh-threshold’ models have been widely employed in studies of recognition memory, 
including item recognition (Atkinson and Juola, 1973; 1974) and source memory 
(Johnson, Kounios and Reeder, 1994), with tbe accounts employing equivalent 
retrieval mechanisms, but proposing the retrieval of different kinds of information. 
Before discussing dual process theories in more detail However, it is necessary to 
consider single process models of recognition memory.
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Single process models
There are various different forms of single process model of recognition memory, 
dating back to associative network models that allow direct access to information 
stored in memory (e.g., Anderson and Bower, 1972), and search models that 
necessitate a comparison of each test item with a list of items stored in memory (e.g., 
Tulving, 1976). However, of central interest here are a class of models that are known 
collectively as ‘global matching models', which have been influential in guiding both 
empirical and theoretical accounts of recognition memory.
There are a number of different global matching models, including TODAM 
(Murdock, 1982, 1997), SAM (Gillund and Sbiffrin, 1984), MINERVA (Hintzman, 
1984), and CHARM (Eicb, 1982). As Clark and Gronlund (1996, p37) note, “global 
matching models are quite simple and clear variants of signal detection models”. 
Although the models differ in terms of tbeir specific assumptions and methods of 
implementation (i.e., whether individual items are stored in distinct or distributed 
form) they share important common properties. In all of the models mentioned above, 
recognition memory involves using the cues provided at test to access (or probe) 
memory broadly, comparing each test item to tbe entire content of memory. Thus, 
rather than retrieving specific items flom memory, the interaction between the probe 
and the memory store provides a global index of memory strength or familiarity. That 
is, a measure of the match between the item and tbe entire content of memory, or put 
another way, a measure of the activation of memory generated by the test item.
To take one example, in the SAM model (e.g., see Gillund and Shiffrin, 1984) each 
studied item is stored as a distinct memory trace (called an image). At study the image 
for each item is compared to all other images in memory, including itself and an image 
that represents the experimental context. Tbe familiarity level for each of the 
comparisons, for all the images, are stored as an array (or matrix) of individual 
familiarity strengths. To make recognition decisions the information provided by 
retrieval cues at test is used to probe the stored images. Tbe global match (strength or 
familiarity index) is given by the product of the strengths of connections between the 
retrieval cue and all of the images stored in memory. The resulting familiarity value for 
each test item is then compared to an internal response criterion, determining whether a 
positive recognition response should be made.
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Global memory models such as SAM are able to account for a range of behavioural 
findings, e.g., the effect of other items in memory, on the retrieval of a specific item. A 
simple manipulation of list length can have a profound effect upon the recognition of a 
given test item - that is, recognition of an individual item decreases as more items are 
added to the study list (e.g., see Atkinson and Juola, 1974; Bowles and Glanzer, 1983). 
Associative network models of recognition memory that propose a direct access of 
memory information are unable to account for such list length effects, because the 
retrieval of individual items occurs directly, and should therefore be uninfluenced by 
the size of the memory store. By contrast, for the global memory models the familiarity 
of a test item depends not only upon a match with the stored memory representation of 
itself, but also upon a match to the stored memory representation of other items in 
memory. Thus, global memory models can account for list length effects because the 
recognition of a given item is influenced by the total content of memory (see also 
Murdock, 1997).
The SAM model illustrates the central assumption of global matching models - that 
recognition responses are based upon a simple assessment of familiarity. Significantly, 
it also demonstrates that the models do not distinguish between item and associative 
(contextual or relational) information. By definition, ‘item information’ represents the 
occurrence of individual items or events, whereas ‘associative information’ represents 
the connections or relations between events (cf. Humphreys, 1976, 1978). Because 
each item is compared to all other items in memory, the familiarity level of a given 
item includes information about its relationship to other items in memory. Thus, the 
representation of a pair of items is essentially equivalent to the representation of an 
individual item. No additional retrieval mechanism is proposed to allow the recovery 
of associative information beyond that which is available for individual items in 
memory. When a test probe consists of a word pair, the familiarity index is simply the 
summation of the joint contributions of familiarity for each item. As Gronlund and 
Ratcliff (1989, p847) note “item and associative information are treated inseparably in 
the memory representations of these models”.
Item versus associative information: Experimental findings
Unfortunately, because global memory models do not distinguish between item and 
associative information they have difficulty in accounting for findings from a range of
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experiments where the two forms of information Have been shown to be dissociable 
(e.g., see Clark and Gronlund, 1996; Gronlund and Ratcliff, 1989; Clark, 1992). For 
example, item and associative Information have been found to exhibit different rates of 
forgetting In memory (Hockley, 1991, 1992). In these studies subjects studied 
semantically and associatively unrelated word pairs (e.g., shoe-table) and their memory 
was tested in two ways. Memory for item information was assessed using a standard 
‘item recognition’ test, requiring subjects to discriminate single old from new items. 
By contrast memory for associative information was assessed using an ‘associative 
recognition’ test, whereby subjects were required to distinguish between pairs 
presented In the same pairing as at study, and pairs that were presented in rearranged 
(recombined) pairings. This procedure allowed recognition memory for item and 
associative information to be compared directly, with item and associative information 
being derived from a single stimulus event (altbougb the tests were exclusive of each 
other - individual study items were only employed In one or other test).
Hockley (1991) compared performance on Item and associative recognition tasks over 
various different study-test lags. As would be expected, item recognition performance 
decreased significantly as the delay between study and test was increased. In contrast 
however, there was no change in performance on the associative recognition task over 
equivalent study-test lags. Tbe dissociation in forgetting rates for item and associative 
information was shown to be independent of both tbe overall level of recognition 
accuracy and subjects’ confidence In their recognition responses. Furthermore, in a 
second set of experiments the findings were generalised fiom a standard yes-no 
recognition task to a forced choice test procedure (Hockley, 1992).
In a related set of experiments Hockley and Cristi (1996) investigated the degree to 
which performance on item and associative recognition tests is influenced by the 
encoding instructions given to subjects. They presented word pairs at study, and 
emphasised the encoding of either item or associative Information. One group of 
subjects were instructed to remember tbe Items, and were given an item recognition 
test immediately after the study phase, whereas the other group were Instructed to 
remember associative information and were given an associative recognition test 
Immediately after the study phase. Importantly, a final unexpected memory test was 
administered, whereby both groups of subjects were tested on both item and
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associative recognition tasks. Hockley and Cristi found that emphasising the encoding 
of item versus associative information bad differential effects on performance of the 
final memory tests. For subjects who were encouraged to encode item information, 
performance on the item recognition task was considerably better than performance on 
the associative recognition task. However, the opposite was not true; subjects wbo 
were encouraged to encode associative information performed equally well on both 
item and associative recognition tasks. Indeed, their performance on the item 
recognition task was equivalent to that for subjects who bad emphasised item 
information.
Item and associative recognition have also been dissociated in several other ways. For 
example, whilst item recognition is superior for low than high frequency words (e.g., 
see Gregg, 1976; Mandler, Goodman and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1992), associative recognition 
has been found either to be equivalent for low and high frequency words, or to be 
superior for high than low frequency words (e.g., see Hockley, 1994; Clark, 1992). 
Similarly, performance on item and associative recognition tests are differentially 
affected when subjects are tested using the response-to-signal procedure. By 
instructing subjects to respond at various delays after stimulus presentation it is 
possible to investigate the time course of retrieval on a given task. At very short 
delays, before information is available flom memory, performance is at cbance. As the 
delay is increased performance rises above cbance, providing an index of the time by 
which information Has become available from memory. Using this procedure Gronlund 
and Ratcliff (1989; see also Dosher, 1988) demonstrated that information that can 
support item recognition judgements becomes available approximately 150 msec 
before information that can support associative recognition judgements. Tbe difference 
in the time course of retrieval has been taken to strongly suggest that item and 
associative information make different contributions to memory.
The experimental dissociations between performance on item and associative 
recognition tasks, in particular tbe crossover interaction for the effects of word 
frequency (and similar findings in relation to the effect of tbe similarity of distracters, 
Clark, Hori, and Callan, 1993), are difficult for global memory models to account for. 
The results suggest that item and associative information make distinct contributions to 
retrieval, or put another way, that item and associative recognition tests are not
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performed on the basis of entirely equivalent retrieval processes. As discussed above 
however, the models do not distinguish between item and associative information at 
either the level of representation or retrieval mechanism - both forms of information 
are retrieved together, as integral to the overall familiarity of a test item (cf. Clark and 
Gronlund, 1996; Clark, 1992; Murdock, 1997).
Item versus associative information: Accounting for the data
In attempting to resolve the discrepancy between global matching models and data, 
Clark and Gronlund (1996) suggest that different cues are responsible for item and 
associative recognition. Of course, different cues are presented at test. However, this is 
effectively a restatement of the experimental findings, and does not explain why the 
different cues result in different patterns of performance. Fortunately, the models can 
be modified to account for the data in two ways. First, at the level of representation, 
associative information can be stored in higher order units that contribute to 
recognition memory independently of the information held in units for the individual 
items constituting the association. Such a modification has been implemented in the 
case of SAM (e.g., see Shiffrin, Mumane, Gronlund and Roth, 1988), effectively 
recasting the model such that item and associative information are no longer treated 
inseparably. A second and even more radical modification is possible however. That is, 
simply abandoning the ‘single process’ assumption, and proposing differences in the 
retrieval processes engaged by tests of item and associative recognition. By this 
account associative recognition decisions are based, at least in part, upon a recall-like 
retrieval process, that is not required for item recognition decisions.
To maintain the single process assumption, global memory modellers favour the 
separation of item and associative information into lower and higher order 
representations. By this account, the dissociations in performance on item and 
associative recognition tests are taken to reflect ‘information dissociations’ rather than 
‘process dissociations’ (cf. Previous discussion of task dissociations as evidence for 
multiple forms of memory). Whilst this possibility is feasible, it is unattractive because 
it necessary involves representing contextual information twice, in both the item and 
associative units. Moreover, when altered in this way, the models require a weighted 
average of the higher and low order units to be formed at retrieval (providing both item 
and associative information), which does not account for the differences in the time
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course of retrieval discussed above. As Gronlund and Ratcliff (1989, p857) note, “time 
course data like these cannot be readily incorporated into the existing theoretical
frameworks”.
The introduction of an additional retrieval process for associative recognition is 
fundamentally at odds with the idea of a single-process model of recognition memory, 
and is therefore not favoured by global memory model theorists. Nonetheless, it is an 
attractive explanation. Whilst global memory models are able to account for 
performance on item recognition tests on the basis of a familiarity mechanism, the 
models generally aheady possess a separate retrieval process that accounts for 
performance on tests sucb as cued- and ffee-recalP. Because recall does not involve the 
presentation of the to-be-recalled item at test, it is clear that this task cannot be 
performed simply on an assessment of familiarity or item strength, and that a retrieval 
process is necessary to access stored information directly. Moreover, performance on 
tests of cued-recall bas been shown to dissociate from item recognition in similar ways 
as associative and item recognition. For example, cued recall is superior for High rather 
than low frequency stimuli (cf. Clark, 1992; Clark and Burchett, 1994), and differs 
from item recognition In the effects of encoding instructions (cf. Hockley and Cristi, 
1996).
The suggestion is not that associative recognition and cued recall are equivalent; 
dissociations in performance can easily be found between these two tasks. Rather, a 
recall-like retrieval process may operate to some degree in supporting associative 
recognition, in addition to the operation of tbe familiarity process that supports item 
recognition. Note However, that If an additional retrieval process is introduced to 
account for performance on tests of associative recognition, it seems nonsensical to 
assume that the retrieval process operates exclusively for associative recognition, and 
cannot contribute to performance on tests of item recognition. Thus, if it is accepted 
that an additional process operates in associative recognition, single process models
2 An interesting example is the distributed associative model proposed by Humphreys, Bain and Pike (1989), 
whereby recognition memory is thought to depend solely upon a matching process that provides an index of 
familiarity (comparable to global memory models, Humphreys, personal communication). Within this framework 
differences in performance across recognition tests are accounted for in terms of the task demands placed upon the 
subject, rather than differences in the processing operations engaged. However, the model also proposes a retrieval 
process (which provides associative, contextual information) that supports recall and free-associating. Thus, to 
account for the dissociations between item and associative recognition, the model could be adapted such that both 
the matching and retrieval process support performance on recognition memory tests.
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almost inevitably become dual process models. As will be discussed below, dual 
process theorists have drawn similar conclusions regarding the involvement of a 
retrieval process in supporting both associative and item recognition.
In sum, there is much to recommend signal detection models, not least their simplicity 
and ability to account for a wide range of experimental findings. For example, 
Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) demonstrate that signal detection theory provides 
relatively sensitive measures of discrimination and response bias in normal and patient 
populations. Nonetheless, ‘single process’ signal detection models of memory have 
become relatively unpopular within the cognitive memory literature. One reason for 
the decline of the signal detection models is their inability to account for changes in 
performance associated with experimental manipulations, including, but not limited to, 
those involving item and associative recognition. For example, Yonelinas, Dobbins, 
Szymanski, Dhaliwal, and King (1996) suggest that signal detection models do not 
adequately account for changes in performance that occur on tests of item recognition 
when the number of presentations of study items is varied, or when depth of processing 
is manipulated. Consequently, dual process models have largely supplanted single 
process models.
Dual process models
Dual process models are firmly based upon the proposal that there are two routes to 
recognition. Alongside an assessment of familiarity, recognition memory performance 
can also be based upon recollection, the retrieval of information about the prior episode 
in which a test item was experienced. To be clear, recollection is defined as the 
retrieval of contextual information, beyond a simple assessment of familiarity or 
memory strength. Although both familiarity and recollection can support recognition 
memory judgements, only recollection provides information about specific learning 
episodes (as might be assessed by context or source judgements). Thus, dual process 
models distinguish between different retrieval mechanisms, but this separation 
incorporates a distinction in terms of the information content that is retrieved. Rather 
than choose between a distinction at the level of representation or mechanism, dual 
process models combine the two.
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Atkinson and Juola: A threshold model
Atkinson and Juola (1973, 1974) extended two-high-threshold models, exchanging 
guessing (which occurs when an items familiarity level lies between the two 
thresholds) with a separate retrieval process. Atkinson and Juola developed their dual 
process theory from associative network models, which represent memory as 
dependent on the accessing of nodes within a lexical store (each node representing a 
single concept or word). When presented with a list of words, the words are encoded 
and mapped onto the appropriate node or combination of nodes. Earlier associative 
network models (e.g., see Anderson and Bower, 1973) proposed that nodes are 
accessed directly at test. However, by such direct access models, new items can only 
be correctly rejected if the memorised study list is exhaustively searched, contrary to 
experimental data demonstrating that speeded correct rejection responses do indeed 
occur (e.g., see Atkinson and Juola, 1974).
Atkinson and Juola proposed that the accessing of nodes simply results in a change in 
familiarity (or activation), and an additional memory store is created, containing an 
array of codes relating to the nodes that were accessed. When presented with a test list, 
items are mapped to the relevant nodes in the lexical store, providing an index of each 
item’s familiarity. Familiarity levels lying above the high criterion result in positive 
recognition responses, and familiarity levels below the low criterion result in correct 
rejections. Thus, familiarity provides a reliable indicator of list membership for very 
low or high familiarity levels, allowing a rapid response to such items. When an 
intermediate familiarity value occurs, an extended memory search is implemented, 
comparing the codes associated with the current item, to the stored codes for the 
memorised list. This is the second route to recognition (i.e., recollection - the actual 
retrieval of information from the learning episode), which, because of the extra 
search/retrieval process, is associated with slower, accurate, and highly confident, 
responses.
There are several sources of support for the model proposed by Atkinson and Juola. 
For example, Juola, Fischler, Wood and Atkinson (1971) manipulated the familiarity 
level of distracter (new) items, by using synonyms of target (old) words as distracters, 
leading to increased response times compared to when non-related distracters were 
used. Atkinson and Juola’s model accounts for this finding by assuming that increased
45
semantic relatedness causes the distracter items to have increased familiarity levels, 
pushing new items above the lower threshold, necessitating more extended memory 
searches, and thus increasing response times. Similarly, Atkinson and Juola (1973) 
varied the familiarity level of old items by including these items either once, twice or 
three times within the study list. Response latencies and error rates were lower for 
repeated items, compared to those occurring once, reflecting increased familiarity, 
which reduces the need for extended memory searches (as more items are above the 
high threshold).
Atkinson and Juola’s model marked a significant theoretical development. For 
example, introducing the concept of relative familiarity; the familiarity level is a 
function of the time since a node was last accessed, relative to the total number of 
times the node has been previously been accessed. However, such associative network 
models have become unpopular. For example, because they are unable to account for 
memory for entirely novel stimuli that are not represented by an existing node within 
the lexical store. Nonetheless, the model illustrates that early dual process theorists 
represented recognition memory as being fundamentally dependent on familiarity. The 
secondary retrieval process is only employed when the familiarity level of an item 
leaves the subject uncertain. Whilst Atkinson and Juola characterise recollection as 
being contingent upon familiarity, Mandler (1980) suggests an alternative account, 
whereby the two processes are independent.
Mandler: An independence model
Mandler (1980) illustrates his dual process theory by considering the everyday 
experience of recognising a person on a bus, identifying them as being familiar, but 
being unable to remember any specific details about the person until a search of 
memory has occurred to identify when and where the person has been previously 
experienced. Thus, whilst recognition can occur on the basis of a familiarity 
judgement, a retrieval process is necessary if detailed contextual information is to be 
retrieved. Mandler describes the characteristics of familiarity and recollection in some 
detail. Familiarity is seen as a process of ‘intraitem integration’, whereby increased 
exposure to an event leads to greater structure, organisation and stability amongst the 
sensory and perceptual features of an event (in contrast with Atkinson and Juola’s 
assumption that semantic information influences familiarity). Mandler (1980, p256) is
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equally clear about recollection, proposing that the “retrieval processes involved in 
recognition are essentially the same as those involved in recall”.
Empirical support for this dual process model comes from experiments by Mandler, 
Pearlstone and Koopmans (1969). Mandler et al., manipulated tbe organisation of 
items in a study list, and then tested memory at varying delays. They found that 
recognition memory was relatively uninfluenced by organisational effects when tested 
immediately (i.e., the organisation of study items bad little effect on recognition rates), 
but became more dependent upon them over time. This contrasted sharply with the 
findings for recall; the organisation of study material bad a large impact Initially, an 
effect that decreased over time. Following this Mandler (1980) argued that occurrence 
information (i.e., familiarity) decays from memory more quickly than does 
organisational information (i.e., recollection). Increased organisation facilitates 
recollection, and becomes more important as familiarity decreases (see Mandler, 1991, 
for further discussion).
Although Mandler’s proposal has much in common with Atkinson and Juola’s (e.g., 
tbe notion of relative familiarity), tbe two models are not entirely equivalent. Whilst 
Atkinson and Juola employed a ‘two-higb-tbresbold’ model, Mandler rejects this In 
favour of the simpler ‘two-equal-bigh-thresbold’ model. Formally,
P(recognltlon) = R + (1 - R) F 
.*. P(recognltion) = R + F - RF
The probability of a correct recognition response equals tbe probability that an item is 
recognised on the basis of recollection (R), or recognised on the basis of familiarity (F) 
given that the failure to recollect. Whilst formally equivalent to the two-equal-high- 
tbreshold model described earlier, tbe model replaces guessing with recollection. Thus, 
by this account, no responses are made on the basis of guessing. Moreover, Mandler 
rejects the claim that subjects correctly reject new items on the basis of their low 
familiarity levels, although it is accepted that certain experimental manipulations may 
encourage this form of responding (e.g., when time pressures are imposed, as in the 
studies of Atkinson and Juola, 1974).
Finally, Mandler rejects the idea of sequential processes, whereby familiarity is 
followed by a conditional search. Rather, recognition is thought to occur on the basis
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of two additive and separate processes - a relationship of independence, whereby one 
or other processes can contribute to performance. However, there appears to be little 
direct evidence in support of this change, beyond the assertion that it is “more 
reasonable to suggest that both processes are initiated upon event presentation” 
(Mandler, 1980, p268). Nonetheless, there is considerable overlap between the 
proposals of Mandler, Atkinson and Juola, and the modification of single process 
models discussed earlier. In each case, it is proposed that item recognition is supported 
by two processes - familiarity and a retrieval process (recollection) - the later of which 
also supports recall.
Jacoby: The fluency heuristic
Jacoby and colleagues have formulated a very different dual process model. In support 
of their model Jacoby and Dallas (1981) start by arguing that a single process model 
cannot account for the memory impairment found in amnesic patients. As discussed 
earlier, amnesics show impaired performance on direct tasks such as recognition 
memory, whilst having normal performance on indirect tasks such as perceptual 
identification. The comparison of the two processes contributing to recognition 
memory with amnesics’ pattern of impaired memory performance marks a significant 
change in the formulation of these processes; familiarity becomes more closely allied 
to implicit memory processes associated with performance on indirect tasks (i.e., 
priming, as discussed previously). Whilst this is a quite different conceptualisation of 
familiarity than was originally intended in signal detection and early dual process 
models, it has become a widely accepted conceptualisation of familiarity (cf. Hintzman 
and Curran, 1994; Knowlton and Squire, 1995). The appropriateness of this view, and 
the potential relationship between familiarity and priming is discussed in more detail 
below. First, however, the model is worth considering in more detail.
Jacoby and Dallas (1981) proposed that recollection (the retrieval of the episode in 
which an item previously occurred) is the central process supporting recognition 
memory, and is influenced by factors such as level of processing. Note that the 
characterisation of the information content of recollection is equivalent to that 
proposed in previous dual process models. By contrast, familiarity is seen as dependent 
on a ‘fluency heuristic’, related to the perceptual processing of an item. Specifically, 
the easier (i.e., relatively more fluent) that processing is, then the more familiar the
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item will be judged to be, Jacoby and Dallas’ account of familiarity is clearly very 
different from the earlier accounts. Notably, the ‘fluency heuristic’ is an attributional 
process, whereby changes in fluency only influence recognition when differences in 
the ease of processing among items are taken to reflect differences in the ‘oldness’ of
the stimuli.
Jacoby and Dallas (1981) originally argued that subjects notice differences in fluency 
of processing, and an awareness of these differences is (consciously) attributed to past 
experience. However, the specific characterisation of familiarity has changed 
significantly over time. For example, in a more recent formulation Whittlesea, Jacoby 
and Girard (1990) argue that the attribution of fluency information occurs 
unconsciously. This account is based on a ‘constructivist’ theory of conscious 
awareness, whereby unconscious processes are seen as making as much sense as is 
functionally useful from sensory data, prior to information becoming available to 
awareness. Importantly, Whittlesea et al., view ‘attribution’ processes as the basis for 
subjective experience, rather than as constructed within it. The two accounts of fluency 
noted above clearly differ as to whether or not the attribution is conscious, a shift in 
emphasis that seems to match the development of the ‘process dissociation procedure’ 
(PDF discussed below), which characterises familiarity as an automatic process that 
can contribute to recognition memory performance.
According to Jacoby’s model, differences in the perceptual characteristics between 
study and test (such as modality changes, or stimulus degradation/masking) will lead to 
poorer fluency and thus less familiarity based recognition, whilst factors facilitating 
fluency (such as frequency of prior experience) will enhance recognition. Note, 
however, that the attributional basis of familiarity means that differences in fluency 
only result in increased recognition when subjects both register differences in the 
fluency of processing for some items, and attribute this difference to those items being 
old. This means that if changes in fluency do not result in changes in recognition, it is 
always possible to claim that subjects are not attributing the changes to the past.
Notwithstanding concerns about the conceptualisation of familiarity (including the 
possibility that it is impossible to falsify) support for a connection between familiarity 
judgements and relative perceptual fluency can be found in a variety of studies. For 
example, Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989) tested the influence of subliminal pre­
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exposure of an item (i.e., unconscious repetition) on item recognition. At study 
subjects studied a list of words. At test, a context word (i.e., prime) was briefly 
(subliminally) displayed prior to presentation of some old words. When tbe context 
word was a repetition of tbe test item processing (as indexed by recognition 
performance) was facilitated, whereas when It was a different word processing was 
disrupted. Significantly, the effect even occurred for new items (i.e., pre-exposure to 
the same context word Increased false alarm rates) showing that subjects can be 
Induced to falsely recognise items that they have not seen at study. Moreover, Jacoby 
and Whitehouse found that, compared to subjects wbo were naive, subjects that were 
made aware of the pre-exposure (prime) produced tbe opposite pattern of results - 
presumably because they were able to correctly attribute differences in fluency to tbe 
pre-exposure.
Support for the ‘fluency heuristic’ can also be found in experiments that manipulate 
fluency without the repetition of items. Whittlesea, Jacoby and Girard (1990; although 
see Watkins and Gibson, 1988) manipulated the subjective experience of familiarity by 
occluding stimuli with either a heavy or light visual mask. Subjects were not informed 
of tbe masking manipulation, wbicb was orthogonal to whether items were old or new. 
Nonetheless, for both old and new words, recognition performance was impaired for 
the heavy compared to light mask, suggesting that easier perceptual processing did 
influence recognition memory. Moreover, as Jacoby and Whitehouse found, when 
subjects were informed of the variations in visual occlusion, tbe manipulation no 
longer had any effect upon recognition memory.
Finally, because familiarity judgements based on tbe ‘fluency heuristic’ are seen as 
dependent on an attrlbutional process, Jacoby and Dallas see tbe current aims and goals 
of the subject as critically important. Consequently, researchers Have manipulated 
perceptual fluency in a variety of contexts, and found that subjects will mlsattrlbute 
items that Have been previously presented (as opposed to novel items) as having longer 
duration of presentation (Witherspoon and Moscovitch, 1989), as being presented in 
louder background noise (Jacoby, Allan, Collins and Larwill, 1988), and as being 
anagrams which others would find more difficult to solve (Jacoby and Kelly, 1987). A 
particularly interesting example of the mlsattrlbution of fluency comes from Jacoby, 
Kelley and Dywan (1989). In tbe context of the process dissociation procedure, they
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showed that simply reading a name in the first part of the experiment increased the 
probability that it would later be judged to be famous. This finding is significant, 
because it suggests that information from a previous presentation can influence 
responding on semantic memory tasks, not just on episodic memory tasks.
The Process Dissociation Procedure
Jacoby and Dallas (1981) originally claimed that their dual process model was broadly 
in agreement with Mandler’s. Jacoby has gradually moved away from this position 
however, arguing that the two approaches are significantly different (e.g., see Jacoby, 
1991b; Whittlesea et al., 1990; Jacoby et al., 1989). Specifically, Jacoby and 
colleagues suggest that Mandler’s model is based on ‘naive realism’, whereby 
recognition memory is dependent on the activation of memory traces, giving rise to an 
output such as the level of familiarity of an item. Importantly, Mandler’s model treats 
familiarity as an explanatory concept, which can account for subjects’ performance on 
recognition tests. Jacoby et al., argue that such a view of memory is insufficient to 
account for the illusions of memory that changes in perceptual fluency can bring about. 
More specifically, familiarity simply cannot be the direct consequence of the use (or 
accessing) of a memory trace, as illusions of recognition can occur when such a trace 
does not even exist (discussed above). Whilst it is not denied that memory traces play a 
role in memory, the point is that representations within memory are neither necessary 
nor sufficient to produce the subjective experience of remembering.
The change in approach noted above appears to coincide with Jacoby and colleagues’ 
(Jacoby, 1991a; Jacoby et al., 1992) developing a method for separating different bases 
for performance on memory tasks. The process dissociation procedure (PDP) is 
founded on the belief that experimental tasks are not ‘process pure’ (as discussed 
above; see Jacoby, 1991b; Dunn and Kirsner, 1989). More specifically, it is assumed 
that task performance represents a blend of automatic and intentional processes. In the 
context of recognition memory, the assumption is made that recollection is a 
consciously controlled (intentional) use of memory, whilst familiarity is an automatic 
(unconscious) use of memory, and that the two processes operate independently.
Estimates of the influence of recollection and familiarity on recognition performance 
can calculated by applying mathematical formulae to subjects’ recognition 
performance on two experimental tasks, that are designed to vary the consequences of
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responding on the basis of recollection and familiarity (the method of opposition). 
Firstly, subjects study items in two different contexts, a target and a non-target context 
(e.g., reading words versus making words from anagrams respectively). Subjects are 
then tested in two different ways. In the ‘inclusion’ condition, subjects are instructed to 
respond ‘old’ to both target and non-target context items. By contrast, in the 
‘exclusion’ condition subjects are instructed to respond ‘old’ to items from the target 
context only (e.g., items that were read), but to respond new both to items from the 
non-target context (e.g., items that were presented as anagrams) and genuinely new 
items.
On the assumption that recollection (R) and familiarity (F) act as two independent 
means for responding old to a target item (i.e., read words in the example given above), 
two recognition scores can be calculated. The inclusion score is the probability of 
correctly recognising a target word as old. Given the instructions, both recollection and 
familiarity will serve as bases for recognition responses
p(‘old’|inclusion) = p(R) + p(F) - p(R D F)
The exclusion score is defined as the probability of the endorsement of a non-target 
item as a target. Given the task instructions this will only occur when non-target items 
are familiar but not recollected, because subjects can intentionally use recollection as a 
means for correctly rejecting non-targets
p(‘old’|excluslon) = p(F) - p(R n F)
Given that performance measures from the inclusion and exclusion tests are known, the 
above formulae can be rearranged to calculate the probability of recollecting a target 
item across the two experimental conditions
p(R) = p(‘old’|inclusion) - p(‘old’|exclusion)
Finally, the resulting measure of recollection can be used to calculate the probability of 
recognising an item on the basis of familiarity, using either the inclusion or exclusion 
formulae. Looking at the results of Jacoby (1991), the probability of recognition was 
larger for anagrams than read words in the inclusion condition, whilst the opposite was 
tme in the exclusion condition. Calculated from this, the PDF showed that recognition 
of anagrams was more reliant on familiarity than was recognition of words.
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Jacoby and colleagues have presented a range of evidence in support of the PDP (e.g., 
see Jacoby, Yonelinas and Jennings, 1996; Jacoby, 1997; for reviews). For example, 
Jacoby (1991) calculated estimates of familiarity and recollection when recognition 
memory was tested under conditions of divided or full attention, revealing that divided 
(compared to full) attention caused a reduction In the probability of recollection, whilst 
leaving the probability of familiarity unchanged. Similarly, Jennings and Jacoby 
(1993) compared ttb3 performance of young and olid u^iing the PDP. They
demonstrated that the elderly subjects made significantly fewer recollection-based 
responses, but equivalent proportions of familiarity-based responses - suggesting a 
differential Impairment in recollection based responding in elderly subjects. Finally, 
Yonelinas and Jacoby (1994) demonstrated that increasing tbe length of study lists lead 
to decreasing levels of recollection based responding, whilst leaving familiarity levels 
unaffected.
The PDP is an ingenious method for separating tbe influences of automatic from 
controlled processing and has become a widely employed across different memory 
tasks (e.g., word-stem completion, see Jacoby, Yonelinas and Jennings, 1993). 
Evidence that experimental manipulations can lead to dissociations in the measures of 
recollection and familiarity have been taken as support for the assumption that 
performance on such tasks is based upon Independent underlying processes. 
Nevertheless, debate surrounding tbe process dissociation procedure has been 
extensive (e.g. see Curran and Hintzman, 1995; Richardson-Klavebn, Gardiner and 
Java, 1996; Dodson and Johnson, 1996; Mulligan and Hirsbman, 1997; Clark and 
Gronlund, 1996; Jacoby, 1996; Jacoby, Begg and Toth, 1997; Jacoby, Totb, Yonelinas 
and Debner, 1994; Yonelinas, Regehr and Jacoby, 1995; Jacoby, 1997). For example, 
the procedure bas been modified sucb that the Inclusion and exclusion conditions are 
embedded in a single testing session, avoiding the possibility that the likelihood of 
recollection and familiarity could be invariant in the two conditions, a major criticism 
of the early experiments employing tbe process dissociation procedure (cf. Graf and 
Komatsu, 1994; De Houwer, 1997). Similarly, tbe procedure bas been criticised for not 
accounting for response bias, leading to refinements such as the multl-nomial models 
proposed by Bucbner and colleagues (e.g., see Buchner, Erdfelder, Steffens and 
Martensen, 1997; Buchner, Erdfelder, Vaterrodt-Plunnecke, 1995).
53
Debate surrounding the process dissociation procedure is not of central interest here. 
However, it is worth noting that one of the most significant criticisms of the approach 
is that it dramatically shifts the focus of the ‘dual process' debate. Several authors 
(e.g., Richardson-Klavehn, Gardiner and Java, 1996) note that the PDP assumes that 
specific forms of memory are associated with specific forms of awareness, and 
moreover, confounds awareness with intention - the instructions given to subjects are 
based upon the ability to use information that is retrieved from memory in a controlled 
manner. As Clark and Gronlund (1996) point out, the procedure essentially amounts to 
a list-discrimination experiment, and is analogous to a source memory task, whereby 
information retrieved from memory is used to distinguish between different classes of 
study item. More significant perhaps is the changing formulation of familiarity.
Whilst the PDP is (in principle) neutral about whether familiarity is an explicit or 
implicit memory process, the characterisation of familiarity as an automatic process 
has lead to it being tied to implicit memory processes such as priming. This view is 
well characterised by Wagner, Gabrieli and Verfaellie (1997, p305), who state that 
“Dual process theories of recognition posit that a perceptual familiarity process 
contributes to both explicit recognition and implicit perceptual memory. This putative 
single familiarity process has been indexed by inclusion-exclusion, remember-know, 
and repetition priming”. However, Wagner et al. go on to suggest that this is an 
inappropriate view, demonstrating that ‘familiarity' associated with recognition 
memory is facilitated by conceptual (compared to perceptual) processing, whereas 
‘familiarity' associated with word-identification priming is facilitated by greater 
perceptual processing.
Whether familiarity can or should be explained in terms of implicit memory processes 
such as priming is a matter of ongoing debate. For example, Mayes (1991) discusses 
three possible relationships between the processes involved in priming and recognition 
memory. Priming and recognition memory may be anatomically and functionally 
distinct; priming may be involved in supporting familiarity as a basis for recognition, 
but not in supporting recollection; or, familiarity may be dependent upon priming, but 
priming may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for accurate familiarity based 
responding. All three relationships are plausible, however, dissociations between 
recognition memory and priming suggest that they are anatomically and functionally
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distinct. For example, Gabrieli, Fleischman, Keane, Reminger and Morrell (1995; see 
also Hamann and Squire, 1997; and earlier discussion of explicit and implicit memory) 
demonstrate a double dissociation between recognition memory and priming. A patient 
with damage to the right occipital cortex exhibited impaired priming but Intact 
recognition memory, whereas amnesic patients with damage to the medial temporal 
lobes exhibited impaired recognition memory and intact priming.
More directly, Hintzman and Curran (1994) argue that the reformulation of familiarity 
as an automatic process is simply inappropriate, because the use of both processes is 
intentional (i.e., determined by the task instructions). They employed the response-to- 
signal procedure to show that recognition memory is associated with two classes of 
response; fast and slow (consistent with the findings of Atkinson and Juola, discussed 
above). Hintzman and Curran compared item recognition memory performance to 
target items and very similar distracters, and found that whilst distracter items were 
falsely recognised at shorter response delays, subjects were able to correctly reject the 
distracter items when longer response times were allowed. This finding was Interpreted 
as evidence for a fast familiarity process that supported the early responses, and a 
slower recall process that could be employed when longer response intervals were 
available, allowing a more accurate check to be made on distracters items.
Hintzman and Curran suggest that both the faster familiarity and slower recollection 
processes can contribute to recognition performance, with the influence of each process 
depending on the nature of the task. Moreover, they argue that the apparent dominance 
of familiarity may be due to its faster availability and simpler uni-dimensional nature, 
rather than due to it being an automatic process - a suggestion that accounts for a 
variety of experimental findings, such as the reliance on familiarity during divided 
attention, without recourse to viewing familiarity as an automatic ‘implicit’ memory 
process. However, it remains to be seen whether recognition memory should be 
characterised as being reliant on three memory processes - recollection, familiarity and 
priming (cf. Rugg et al., 1998).
Notwithstanding the differences between Mandler and Jacoby’s accounts with regard 
to familiarity, an important similarity between them is that they both propose a 
relationship of Independence between the two bases for performance (see Jones, 1987; 
and Joordens and Merikle, 1993; for further discussion of the possible relationships).
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By contrast, the early dual process models (e.g., see Atkinson and Juola, 1973, 1974) 
which were developed from previous single process models characterised familiarity as 
the primary basis for making recognition judgements, with recollection being 
contingent upon familiarity3. A third relationship is also possible however - 
exclusivity, whereby recognition Is associated with one or other, but not both 
processes. As is discussed below, Gardiner and Java (1993) have proposed an 
exclusivity model.
Remembering and Knowing; An exclusivity model
Tbe Remember/Know procedure was introduced by Tulving (1985a), again aimed at 
dlstinguisbing between recollection and familiarity. This procedure is based on 
subjects’ reports about their pbenomenological experience of recognition. Whenever a 
subjects judge an item to be old, they must report whether this is accompanied by a 
recollection of previously encountering tbe item (R - remember), or a general sense of 
familiarity for the item (K - knowing). Gardiner and Java (1993) propose a relationship 
of exclusivity between R and K responses, because at tbe level of conscious 
experience, recognition memory is necessarily associated with either a sense of 
recollection or familiarity. The Remember/Know procedure has been used extensively 
by Gardiner and colleagues, tbe results being interpreted both as an alternative to PDP, 
and as the basis for a model of recognition memory. Before looking at the 
experimental data that has been produced with tbls method, it is necessary to note the 
theoretical context in which Gardiner and Java (1983; see also Gardiner, Java and 
Richardson-Klavelin, 1996) place their work.
Gardiner and colleagues have described the R/K approach to recognition memory as a 
‘first person’ account of memory, concerned with analysing memory at the level of 
phenomenological experience. By contrast, tbe dual process models discussed 
previously are ‘third person’ accounts, concerned with analysing memory at tbe level 
of underlying processes. Based upon a review of psychological approaches to the study 
of conscious and unconscious processing by Velmans (1991), Gardiner and Java argue 
that first and third person accounts are not commensurable, both being necessary for a
3 The correct characterisation of Atkinson and Juola’s model is unclear. The model is clearly not one of exclusivity 
or independence - recollection is contingent upon familiarity, and recollection based responses cannot occur in the 
absence of familiarity. Nonetheless, if the relationship was one of redundancy then recollection should, by
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full explanation of behaviour and consciousness. Specifically, Gardiner and Java’s 
argue for the ‘inconvertibility of terms’. That is, terms should have meaning at either 
the level of memory task, hypothetical construct, or state of awareness, and should not 
be used across different levels of analysis, because the transfer of terms across levels 
presupposes an identity between the levels. Nonetheless, the R/K procedure has been 
interpreted at both first and third person levels of analysis, and has been employed to 
provide data that has been interpreted within the dual process debate.
As with the PDP a range of experiments have been performed using the R/K 
procedure, providing evidence for three forms of dissociations. First, variables have 
been found that alter recognition levels with the effect being due entirely to changes in 
R responding, whilst K responding remained constant (e.g., depth of processing 
Gardiner, 1988; divided attention, Gardiner and Parkin, 1990; and word frequency 
Gardiner and Java, 1990). Second, variables have been found that influence K but not 
R responding, (e.g., masked primes, Rajaram, 1993). Finally, variables have been 
found that have opposing effects upon R and K responding. For example, Parkin and 
Walter (1992) found that whilst for young subjects recognition responses were 
associated with more R than K responses, for elderly subjects the opposite was true. 
Similarly, Gardiner and Java (1990) found that whilst recognition of words depends on 
higher levels of R than K responding, recognition of non-words depends on higher K 
than R responding.
The findings from studies employing the R/K procedure are in general agreement with 
the experimental findings from equivalent process dissociation experiments. However, 
at the processing level of analysis the two approaches need not provide equivalent 
results, because their underlying models assume different relationships between the 
memory processes. For example, Yonelinas and Jacoby (1995) contrasted the PDP and 
R/K procedures in relation to recognition memory for size congruent and incongruent 
shapes. Subjects were shown a series of shapes at study, and at test were shown the 
same shapes in either congruent or incongruent size. As expected, the PDP model 
showed that both recollection and familiarity based responding increased for size 
congruent compared to incongruent items. By contrast, the R/K procedure showed that
definition, never be necessary - familiarity should always be sufficient to support performance (M. D. Rugg, 
personal communication).
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size congruency lead to greater recollection, but less familiarity based responding. 
Thus, counter-intuitively, by the R/K account changes in stimulus size do not lead to
less familiarity.
Clearly, if subjects respond ‘Remember’ whenever familiarity and recollection co­
occur, then the R/K procedure will underestimate the proportion of responses 
associated with familiarity. Noting this, Yonelinas and Jacoby (1995) produced an 
alternative R/K procedure, in which the original exclusivity assumption is replaced 
with an independence assumption. K judgements are no longer measured as the 
absence of R judgements, rather the proportion of K responses is divided by the 
opportunity for making such judgements (i.e., 1 - R). With this alternative formulation, 
the ‘independent R/K’ model produces results that are in agreement with those of the 
PDP.
A second study that highlights the differences between the PDP based model and the 
R/K procedure comes from. Knowlton and Squire (1995). They investigated the pattern 
of R and K responding by amnesic patients, and found that both types of response were 
impaired in amnesics compared to the perfonnance of normal subjects. Moreover, by 
tracking the responses associated with individual items, Knowlton and Squire 
demonstrated that a significant number of items that initially receiving R responses 
become associated with K responses over time. This finding is difficult to reconcile 
with an ‘exclusivity’ dual process model, rather, suggesting a relationship of 
redundancy (see Knowlton, 1998, for further discussion).
Within the framework of memory processes, an independent R/K procedure is more 
attractive than the original exclusivity version. However, in employing the R/K 
procedure in this way the Independent R/K simply becomes an alternative version of 
the PDP, using subjective awareness rather than conscious control as a means of 
separating processes. Note though, that Gardiner and Java (1993) state that they see 
this as inappropriate, because the R/K procedure was intended to measure 
phenomenological experience. Unfortunately, recent Investigations (e.g., see 
Donaldson, 1996; Hlrshman and Master, 1997) suggest that the majority of findings 
from the ‘third person’ exclusivity R/K procedure can be accounted for by a single 
process signal-detection model that incorporates two response criteria (i.e., old/new
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and R/K criteria). By this account tbe R/K procedure is of questionable worth at either 
the processing or phenomenological levels of analysis.
A dual process account of associative memory
Notwithstanding the differences between the dual process models described thus far, it 
would be inappropriate to conclude that tbe models do not share important similarities. 
In each case, ‘recollection’ Is an effortful retrieval process that provides contextual 
information about tbe specific prior study episode in wbicb an item was experienced, 
and is associated with the phenomenological experience of remembering. Moreover, 
there appears to be agreement across the PDP and R/K procedures concerning the 
measure of recollection, regardless of the exact characterisation of familiarity, or tbe 
relationship between familiarity and recollection. Thus, whilst they do so for different 
reasons, tbe dual process models discussed above all reject a unitary view of 
recognition memory.
Of central interest here is the question of bow dual process models account for the 
findings from tests of associative recognition. As was discussed earlier, single process 
models are unable to account for dissociations between item and associative 
recognition, and it is has been suggested that performance on tests of associative 
recognition cannot be supported by familiarity. Whilst global memory theorists favour 
a distinction between item and associative information in terms of the information 
content or representation in memory, ratber than in terms of the retrieval mechanism or 
process. However, it should be clear that dual process models generally distinguish 
between item and associative information in terms of both retrieval content and 
mechanism. Recollection provides contextual Information and is a slow effortful 
process, whereas familiarity provides non-contextual information and is a faster, more 
automatic process. Given the formulation of dual process models, it should be clear 
they are ideally placed to account for tbe dissociations In performance on tests of item 
and associative recognition.
An explicit attempt to account for the dissociation between item and associative 
recognition has been made by Yonelinas (1997; see also Yonelinas, 1994; Yonelinas et 
al., 1996) in the context of a recent dual process model. This ‘mixed’ model 
Incorporates both signal detection and threshold theory - combining aspects of the
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models described above. By this account familiarity is described as an equal-variance 
signal detection process4, whereas recollection is a threshold process. The basis for this 
model is the assumption that when subjects recollect information about specific study 
episodes they are in a discrete memory state (they either do or do not retrieve), whereas 
judgements that a study item is familiar are assumed to be continuous in nature. 
Recollection based responses are viewed as always being highly confident, whereas 
familiarity based responses can vary from low to high confidence.
Support for this dual process model comes from studies using receiver operating 
characteristics (ROC curves, i.e., a plot of the probabilities of correct recognition 
against false alarms, across response confidence levels). Several studies have 
investigated the ROC curves for item memory when performance is dependent solely 
on familiarity, solely on recollection, or on a combination of the two. For example, 
Yonelinas and Jacoby (1995; see also Yonelinas et al, 1996; and Yonelinas, Kroll, 
Dobbins and Lazzara, in press, in relation to data from amnesic patients) showed that 
as performance relies more on recollection, the associated ROC curves move from 
being curvilinear asymmetrical functions, towards flat functions. Similarly, Yonelinas 
(1994) emnloyed the PDP pi'c^c^^dur^ in tandem wish an analyst oOROC turves. When 
responding was based primarily on familiarity a semmstrical ROC curve was 
pcoducsd, consistent with psrfocmance being based on an equal-variance signnl- 
deasction process. By contrast when recollection based responding was introduced (by 
reducing the length of the study list) the ROC curve became asymmetric, consistent 
with ths additional contribution of n ths- sshold process5.
Yonelinas (1997) has provided further support for ths distinction between item and 
associative recognition, based upon thces Experiments investigating theic associated 
ROC curves. It was prsdicasd, and found, that item recognition judgements lend to 
curvilinear asymmetrical ROCs. By contrast, associntivs recognition judgements where 
found to produce flat ROCs. A dual process model (incorporating familiarity and 
recollection procsssss) fitted ths item recognition data, whereas n linear threshold
4 Familiarity is used as an ‘umbrella’ term, loosely defined as memory in the absence of recollection, which may 
prove to reflect the combination of both an explicit ‘familiarity’ process and an implicit ‘priming’ processes 
(Yonelinas, personal communication).
5 Note that, alternatively, the asymmetrical ROC curve could be interpreted as evidence that the equal-variance 
assumption has been violated, and that familiarity is not normally distributed. Thus, a more complex single process
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model (representing just recollection) fitted the associative recognition data. Thus, by 
this dual process model, item and associative memory differentially engage the 
processes that are thought to underlie recognition memory, with performance on tests 
of associative recognition relying primarily on recollection - a finding that converges 
with the conclusions drawn with respect to global memory models.
As was noted above, one significant feature of threshold theories is that they assume 
subjects are able not only to recognise studied items as old, but also to actively 
recognise that unstudied Items are new. This feature of threshold theory is particularly 
appealing in the case of associative recognition. Clearly, a subject could recognise a 
single member of a test pair, and In recollecting the original study associate of this 
word, correctly conclude that the test pair was not presented at study - hence 
‘recollecting’ that a test pair was rearranged. Yonelinas was able to Investigate this 
feature of the threshold account of recollection, manipulating the difficulty of 
recollecting rearranged pairs across experiments, by presenting each Item In one or two 
pairs at study. Analysis of ROC curves suggested that recollection was not used very 
often as a basis for responding rearranged, but that when it was made easier for 
subjects to do so, subjects did use recollection as a basis for recognising rearranged 
pairs (i.e., more rearranged pairs were recollected when Items were presented In two 
rather than one pairing at study). Thus, Yonelinas’ data provide support for the idea 
that associative recognition is based upon recollection, and moreover, that recollection 
is well characterised as a threshold (all-or-none) process. Subjects both recollect that 
the majority of same pairs were studied together, and also recollect that a smaller 
proportion of rearranged pairs were not studied together.
Finally, it is worth noting that several earlier experiments investigated recognition 
memory for associative information Itself, further stressing the Importance of relational 
(contextual) infonnation In supporting this form of memory. For example, Humphreys 
(1976, 1978) had subjects study word pairs, and at test subjects made old/new 
judgements to same, rearranged, and new, pairs. Humphreys found a recognition 
advantage for same compared to rearranged pairs, and similar effects were found in a 
forced choice test comparing just same and rearranged pairs, even when confidence
model could be proposed to account for the data, incorporating a skewed familiarity distribution, without modelling 
recollection as a separate threshold process.
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judgements were used instead of a yes-no response. Moreover, the differential 
recognition advantage for same pairs was larger when relational Information was 
stressed in Instructions, compared to when Item Information was stressed, and the 
recognition advantage for same pairs held regardless of whether associatively related 
or randomly formed word pairs were employed (e.g., see Underwood, 1974).
Summary
The discussion of memory presented In this chapter covers considerable ground. The 
Initial discussion of the fractionation of memory highlighted the important distinctions 
that have been drawn between forms or kinds of memory. In doing so, several 
important issues were addressed, Including debate over the significance of different 
kinds of evidence in drawing distinctions between forms of memory, and concern that 
Individual tasks cannot be assumed to be ‘process pure’. Nonetheless, it is clear that 
memory is not a unitary phenomenon, and that distinctions can and must be drawn 
between different forms of memory.
The following section provided a brief account of tbe neuroanatomical memory 
systems that are thought to underlie episodic memory, that is, conscious memory for 
specific prior experiences. Tbe core role of the medial temporal lobe memory system 
as a ‘relational’ processor was discussed, along with tbe suggestion that the frontal 
lobes may also play a part in supporting episodic memory. Notably, the frontal lobes 
are thought to be associated with strategic aspects of performance, rather than with the 
retrieval of information per se.
The final section addressed current models of recognition memory, reviewing both 
single and dual process models of memory. Data from studies of item and associative 
recognition memory were shown to be difficult for single process models to account 
for, necessitating a distinction between Item and associative recognition in terms of the 
content (representation) of information in memory, and/or the processes engaged at 
retrieval. A number of dual process models were described and compared, highlighting 
the many differences between the models (e.g., differing in terms the proposed 
relationship between tbe retrieval processes), but also revealing some consensus 
regarding tbe characterisation of recollection - tbe explicit retrieval of contextual 
information about specific prior study episodes. More significantly for present
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purposes, dual pcocsss models of memory converge with global memory models in 
suggesting that associative recognition tests cannot be performed on ths basis of 
familiarity; successful performance requicss that subjects retrieve contextual 
(relational) infocmation about the specific prior episodes in which stimuli were
expscisncsD.
Thus, from the perspsctive of Dual process models, memory foe item and associative 
recognition differ in teems of both infocmation content and retrieval process. 
Associative recognition is based upon recollection, whereas item recognition can be 
based upon either familiarity or recollection. Notwithstanding the significance of this 
finding in relation to current models of rscognition memory, the importance of this 
finding can be best appceciated in relation to ths findings from ERP studies of explicit 
memory retrieval that ars central to the experimental work presented in the pcessnt 
Thesis. Prior to a discussion of the relevant ERP literature however, the following 
chapter introducss ths ERP methodology as n tool for Snvestignting cognition.
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Chapter 2.
EVENT-RELATED POTENTIALS
The human electroencephalogram (EEG), a pattern of changing voltage over time, is 
recorded by placing two electrodes on the scalp and connecting them to a differential 
amplifier. EEG is a product of the summation of electrical activity occurring within the 
brain, activity that Is conducted to the scalp, producing an electromagnetic field. The 
working brain constantly generates EEG, which, when recorded from normal healthy 
subjects, has an amplitude that varies from -100 to 4100 microvolts and a frequency 
that ranges from DC up to and beyond 40Hz (Coles and Rugg, 1995). Early 
investigations of scalp recorded EEG by Berger (1929) demonstrated the sensitivity of 
on-golng EEG to changes in mental activity, perhaps the best known example being 
the different patterns of EEG that accompany different stages of sleep. It is possible to 
examine EEG in a more analytic way however, experimentally isolating fractions of 
the on-going EEG (the event-related potential) that are time-locked to the onset of 
specific identifiable events (such as the presentation of a stimulus).
An event-related potential (henceforth ERP) is a record of the scalp-recorded electrical 
activity associated with a specific occurrence (Plcton, Lins and Scherg, 1994). ERPs 
can be characterised on a continuum ranging from ‘exogenous’ to ‘endogenous’ 
(Donchln, Ritter and McCallum, 1978), going from activity that is obligatorily
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generated by external events (e.g., experimental variables), to activity that is more 
sensitive to internal events (e.g., cognitive variables). Endogenous ERPs are of 
particular interest, because they are assumed to be a measurable correlate of mental 
processing, and as such they allow the non-lnvasive study of the neural correlates of 
higher cognitive processes. As Kutas and Dale (1997, pl97-198) note, ERPs “can be 
used within the context of psychological experiments to assess the brain’s sensitivity to 
various experimental manipulations, and thereby to constrain psychological theories of 
various cognitive and behavioural phenomena”. Before explaining how ERPs can be 
used in this way, it is necessary to discuss some of the complexities surrounding the 
origins of the ERP, methods of recording and extracting the signal, and the different 
ways in which ERP components can be identified. Hopefully, in doing so, some light 
will be thrown on the issues and assumptions underlying the research presented in this 
thesis.
As noted above, the main aim of this chapter is to look closely at tbe ERP technique. 
Before doing so however, It is worth briefly considering how It relates to other 
neurolmaglng techniques - In particular the haemodynamic methods of PET (positron 
emission tomography) and fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging). Table 1 
Illustrates the major strengths and weaknesses of the electrophysiological and 
haemodynamic methods. As Churchland and Sejnowski (1991) point out, these 
methods should not be regarded as being in competition with one another. Rather, they 
provide different kinds of information about how cognitive processes are Instantiated 
in the brain, and should therefore be seen as complimentary methods for investigating 
the neural basis of cognitive functioning.
Table 1. The complimentary strengths and weaknesses of electrophysiological and haemodynamic 
neuroimaging methods. Adapted from Rugg (in press).
Electrophysiological
STRENGTHS
Provides a direct measurement of neural activity
Provides high temporal resolution
Data can be analysed contingent upon performance
WEAKNESSES
Measures only a fraction of the total neural activity 
Provides poor spatial resolution
Haemodynamic
WEAKNESSES
Provides an indirect measure of mura 1 activity
Provides poortemporal resolution
Difficult to analyse data according to performance
STRENGTHS
Measoras mural activity moer homogeneoulty 
Pl■ovidas highspatial rarolution
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There nee Two aspects of ths ERP Technique that are particularly advantageous foe Those 
interested in investigating higher order cognitive functions such as memory. Firstly, 
ERP Data provides a real-time recocd of nsurnl activity; the Temporal resolution of 
electrophysiologicnl data is at least an order of magnitude better than that provided by 
haemodynamic methods. This is because the tempocnl resolution of haemodynamic 
methods is inherently limitsd by the relatively slow response time of The cerebcnl 
vasculature (cf. Raichle, 1998). Consequently, ERPs provide considsrably more 
information about the Time course of processing Than either PET or fMRI.
Ths second advantage of electrophysiological methods liss in the ability to average the 
data contingent upon subjects’ performance (i.e., in an event-relaTsd manner). As will 
be made clear in chapter 3, many of the conclusions that have been drawn on the basis 
of ERP studies rely on the fact that ths data can be analysed according to subjects’ 
responses to diffecsnt classes of stimuli. Similar ‘svent-relnted’ methods are cucrently 
being Developed for use with fMRI (s.g., sse Buckner, Bandsttini, O’Crnven, Savoy, 
PaTsrson, Rnichle and Rosen, 1996; Josephs, Turner and Fciston, 1997; Rosen, 
Buckner and Dale, 1998; Dale and Bucknsr, in press), but this techniques have not 
been as extensively employed as trnditional methods.
Finally, table 1 also indicntes ths major weakness of ths electrophysiological methods. 
Perhaps the most secious eisaDvantngss of the ERP technique are the fncT That iT 
samples an unknown fraction of brain activity, and its’ relatively poor spatial 
resolution (discussed in more detail below). Haemodynamic methods pcovids spatial 
information that is in the orDsc of millimstres, and sample bcain activity relntively 
homogensously. By contrast, without ths aid of modelling techniques ERP dntn does 
not provide any information about the exact sources of nsurnl activity. As will be made 
clear in the following discussion, ths ERP technique is not ideal if ons is primarily 
Sntersstsd in localising the sources of neucal activity.
Electrogenesis
Whilst ths exact relationship between what goes on in ths brain and whaT is recorded nt 
the scalp is not fully understood, some discussion of ths origins of the ERP is 
instructive in understanding the data. At n csllulnr lsvsl the change in voltage (i.e., The 
electrical potential) measured between two electrodes is ultimately due to ionic current
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flow occurring across the membranes of active nerve cells, which produces localised 
electromagnetic fields (see Wood and Allison, 1981; Wood, 1987). The physics of 
electrical field theory means that local current sources summate to produce a well 
defined, mathematically unique, electrical field (the so-called ‘forward problem’, 
Kutas and Dale, 1997). Moreover, the electrical potential that is recorded at any 
particular point in time reflects only activity occurring at that point in time, i.e., the 
propagation of activity is Instantaneous (e.g., see Nunez, 1981; Kutas and Dale, 1997). 
As will be made clear in the following discussion, electrophysiological methods offer a 
real-time record of on-going neural activity, but the electrical potential that is recorded 
at the scalp is heavily dependent upon factors such as the geometric organisation and 
synchrony of the active nerve cells. Electrogenesis, the origins of the signal, can be 
considered both at the level of individual cells, and of groups of cells.
Individual cells
There are two sources of ionic current flow at the level of individual cells; action 
potentials, that are all-or-none transmissions along nerve cell axons, and post synaptic 
potentials, that are graded In magnitude. Whilst both sources of activity contribute to 
the extracellular potential, it is thought that post-synaptic potentials (both excitatory 
and inhibitory) are the principal contributors to the scalp recorded potential (e.g., see 
Allison, Wood and McCarthy, 1986). Indeed, Cooper, Osselton and Shaw (1980) argue 
that their relatively slow time course and column like structure (e.g., consider 
pyramidal cells radiating from upper to lower layers of cortex) makes the summation 
of post synaptic potentials more likely than the summation of action potentials. 
However, as Wood and Allison (1981) note, in some circumstances highly 
synchronous action potentials can also influence the scalp recording.
The principles of ionic current flow (and the resultant electrical potentials that are 
generated) are reviewed in Wood and Allison (1981). They note that the nature of the 
scalp recorded potential depends upon both the location of the electrodes and the 
location of the active tissue. For example, If the distance between electrode and active 
tissue varies then so will the amplitude of the EEG. Similarly, the polarity of the EEG 
is dependent upon both electrode placement and the source of the current flow (e.g., 
see Wood et al., 1986). In sum, the polarity of scalp-recorded EEG provides
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information that is ambiguous about the cellular events Involved. Notably, it does not 
allow one to distinguish between excitatory and inhibitory post-synaptic potentials.
Groups of cells
Activity arising from different sources throughout tbe brain summates linearly, hence 
the local electromagnetic fields generated by individual neuronal events undergo
spatial summation. Physical variations between neurons (e.g., differences in the 
numbers, shape and size of dendrites and axons) can influence the flow of current, and 
thus influence tbe recorded potential (Wood, 1987). More significantly however, the 
structural organisation of the neurons, as a group, plays a major role in determining the 
scalp recorded potential. Lorento de No (1947) investigated the principles of volume 
conduction (i.e., how current passes through a space) in relation to extracellular 
potential fields, demonstrating that different cellular field configurations give rise to 
either ‘open’ or ‘closed’ electrical fields (see also Kutas and Dale, 1997).
The physical arrangement of neurons in ‘open’ field structures means that tbelr 
electromagnetic activity can be recorded at a distance. For example, where cell bodies 
and dendrites are orientated in the same parallel direction current flows along the axis 
of orientation, resulting in a potential field akin to that produced by a charge dipole (a 
field with positive and negative charges between which current flows). This kind of 
structure is found in groups of pyramidal and Purkinje cells within tbe neocortex, 
Hippocampus and cerebellum (Wood, 1987), thus the activity of such structures is in 
principle measurable from tbe scalp. However, If the orientation of the cells in such a 
field is not all the same, then the summation of electrical potentials can be radically 
altered. For example, if alternate parallel neurons bad opposite orientations to each 
other, then the field would be ‘closed’; electrical potentials would sum to zero, 
preventing measurement of activity at the scalp. A second example of a closed field 
structure is when cell bodies are clustered centrally, with dendrites radiating outward. 
This physical arrangement means that current flows Inwards, towards the centre of the 
group of neurons, and tbe potential measured outside the structure Is zero. This kind of 
configuration is not unlike that in nuclear structures, and only recording with 
electrodes placed witbin sucb a structure would reveal any activity (Wood, 1987).
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Synchronicity
As Wood and Allison (1981) note, the effect of cellular geometry has important 
implications when ERPs are being interpreted. Any given nsurnl activity may or may 
not be msasucnble at the scalp depending upon ths organisation of cells. Hence, the 
absence of activity at the scalp does not mean that no activity is occurring within The 
bcnin. Unfortunately, such interpretative diffscultrss increase when one considecs ths 
summed activity of n number of neurons ovsc time. In particular, St is important to 
consider the effect of how temporally synchronous the neural activity is, because this 
can influence both the amplitude and latency of ths summated potential. The foregoing 
discussion of The effects of geometric organisation was based upon the assumption of 
synchronous neural activity, but in reality temporally asynchronous activity is likely to 
occur. Wood and Allison (1981) note thnT ths summation of potentials from individual 
neurons is critically dependent upon how synchronous that activity is; going from 
rapid to slow voltage bursts, there is n reduction in the probability of surmnntion, thus 
gceatec synchrony is requiced foe summation to occur.
Volume conduction
As noted above, ths voltage differences That are recorded between electrodes nt the 
scalp are due To the summed activity of voltage changes occurring within groups of 
synchronously active neurons distributed throughout the bcain. These electrical 
potentials can only be recorded because The brnin and its coverings act as volume 
conductors, resulting in nsurnl activity being projected onto the scalp. However, There 
is some variability in volume conduction throughout ths brain tissue, skull nnD scalp. 
For example, Robinson, Bryan and Rosvold (1965) produced n sliding scale (of least- 
To-most conductive material), going from whits matter, through grey mnttec, to blood. 
Moreover, diffscences in the thickness of the skull and scalp across electrode sites can 
influence ths potential recorded at each site. Hopefully, new Techniques such as finite 
element dsblurring (which estimates and removes the effects of spatial smearing 
produced by conduction tlirough ths cscebrnl meninges, skull and scalp) should 
eventually become available to counter this problem (e.g., see Cooper et nl. 1980; 
Gevins et nl. 1995; Picton st nl, 1994).
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Clearly, the electrogenesis of the ERP is a complex phenomenon. Neural activity 
occurring within the brain can only be recorded from the scalp if a number of 
conditions are met. Active neurons must be organised In a (non-radlally) symmetric 
manner, and they must be synchronously active. As Kutas and Dale (1997) point out, 
the main brain structure to satisfy these conditions is the neocortex' (cortical mantle). 
The neocortex consists mainly (about 70%) of pyramidal cells, which are organised in 
column-like groups, orientated perpendicular to the surface of the cortex. It is activity 
of these neurons (en masse), that is believed to be the primary source of scalp recorded 
ERPs.
Recording the signal
Having described the origins of the EEG it is possible to discuss the actual recording 
process. There are two crucial issues here, where should the electrodes be placed, and 
which electrodes are the electrical differences to be measured between? These issues 
are discussed in turn below. For further discussion of these issues (and related 
technical details, such as different types of electrodes, and amplification systems), see 
Cooper et al. (1974), Plvik et al. (1993), and Picton et al. (1994).
The Placement of Electrodes
As is the case In the research reported in this thesis, ERPs are generally recorded from 
a number of electrodes, and electrode placement is usually based on Jasper’s (1958) 
‘international ten-twenty system’ (see figure 6, chapter 4, for the electrode montage 
used in the present studies). The ten-twenty system Is aimed at ensuring a standard 
placement of electrodes, to facilitate comparisons of data across laboratories. It 
specifies a set of standard points and also provides a method for adding as many extra 
points as Is required. As Coles and Rugg (1995) note however, whilst the brain area 
that it sits over can (nominally) be used to specify an electrode site, this does not mean 
that the activity it records comes from just that brain area. Whilst the scalp recorded 
potential is more sensitive to activity the closer the generators of that activity are to the 
recording site, the principles of volume conduction mean that activity generated at one 
location can be projected and recorded at another, possibly distant, location.
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Regardless of questions about the source of the ERPs relative to tbe electrodes 
(discussed in more detail below), the ten-twenty system is primarily aimed at removing 
any uncertainty about the placement of electrodes. Yet, Binnie (1987) argues that the 
ten-twenty system fails to achieve even this, because it rests on the assumption of 
cranial symmetry for accurate electrode placement. Binnie, Dekker, Smit and Van Der 
Linden (1982) show that cranial symmetry is not the norm, rather, individuals usually 
exhibit both asymmetrical circumference and plaglocephaly (i.e., frontal and occipital 
regions being larger on one side than the other). Similarly, Homan, Herman and Purdy 
(1987) found that there is considerable cranial asymmetry and variation In cerebral 
structure underlying each electrode site. Given the lack of suitable alternatives 
however, and the original justification for a standardised system, the ten-twenty system 
seems to be a reasonable, if not ideal, compromise. It is clear though that increasing 
attempts to relate ERPs to brain systems will lead to the use of increasing numbers of 
electrodes (for example, Tucker, 1993, discusses tbe geodesic net, an alternative 
system that covers a larger area of the cortex, using 64, 128 or even 256 electrode 
sites).
Methods of Rrfrrrnctng
To determine the electrical field across the scalp, tbe recording from each electrode site 
are taken with respect to a common reference point. As Binnie (1987) makes clear, this 
produces relative measures of potential difference, not absolute measures of electrical 
activity. This is an Important point. For example, it is often tempting to state that 
differences In activity across the scalp reflect positive or negative potentials arising in 
specific locations, whilst in practice one area is simply relatively more negative or 
positive, which could be due to changes in electrical activity at either, or both, 
locations. This is nol simply a linguistic or terminological issue. The fact that the
measures are relattve means that the use of different reference prints will produce
different patterns of activity (providing, one would tbink, justification for tbe use of a 
standard system ffr referencing similar to tl^^t for electrode placemen)) . Note,
however, that whiiat the reference electrode bas a impact upon the absolute
amplitude of activity measured at each electrode, the relative distribution of amplitudes 
across a set of electrodes is reference independent.
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The research reported here employs the most widely used method, ‘common reference’ 
recording, whereby each scalp electrode is connected to the same reference, and the 
difference In electrical potential is measured between each site and that reference 
(Coles and Rugg, 1995). Whilst almost any position can be chosen for the reference 
(e.g., the tip of the nose), the aim is to minimise the Influence of the ‘signal of interest’ 
upon the reference, whilst maintaining the same background activity. This method 
typically involves using either a single electrode (e.g., placed on the right or left 
mastoid bone) or, as In the studies presented here, double electrodes (e.g., ‘linked 
mastolds’, based on the average of the left and right mastolds). Several alternative, less 
widely used, reference techniques do exist. For example, average reference derivations 
use the average of all the recording sites as the reference for each site, whereas source 
derivation uses the weighted average of electrodes surrounding the site of Interest, as 
the reference for that site (both methods eliminating the need for a separate reference 
channel). Cooper et al. (1980) note however, that whilst all these methods are 
electrically equivalent, different methods can appear to give different patterns of 
activity. Any comparisons of data across research laboratories must therefore take 
account of the derivation methods used.
Extracting the signal from noise
Having discussed the origins of the electrical activity and the methods of recording, it 
is now possible to address the way in which the actual ERP is extracted from the on­
going EEG (see Pivlk, et al., 1993; Plcton et al, 1994; Rugg and Coles, 1995; Kutas 
and Dale, 1997). The electrical activity recorded from the scalp is not a pure record of 
the signal of interest; many other on-golng electrical potentials are also present (i.e., 
background noise). The signal of Interest is the ERP (time locked to the beginning of 
the recording epoch), whilst background noise consists of both residual brain activity 
and extra-cerebral potentials, notably artifacts such as muscle activity and eye 
movements. As Coles and Rugg (1995) note, the signal of Interest is small in relation 
to the noise (microvolts to tens of microvolts respectively). Thus, a crucial element in 
the recording of ERPs is the extraction of the signal from the background noise. As 
with electrode placement and referencing, a number of techniques are available. For 
example, Picton (1987) discusses frequency based techniques, such as ‘dynamic time­
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warping’, which involve creating n template (based on previous data) of expected 
activity within ths recording epoch and searching for any sign of ncTivity that matches 
this template. However, ths experiments reported within this thesis are based upon 
signal averaging, ths most commonly used method.
Signal averaging
Signal averaging rsquices the cepstition of experimental trials, allowing repeated time- 
lockeD epochs of EEG to be recorded, which nee then averaged together. Given the 
assumption that the signal of interest is invnesnnt across Trials, but that background 
noise is random, the nvsrnging procedure reduces The prominence of background noise 
and cevenls any activity That is Time-locked to ths experimental Task. Clearly, ths 
greater ths number of trials used, the higher Ths signal-to-noiss ratio becomes. Coopec 
et al. (1980) show that Ths averaging proceduce actually decreases the noise by n factor 
of the square root of the number of trials used. Ths signal to noise cntio of ERP dntn is 
not usually reported explicitly in the cognitive ERP literature. Rnthsc, to ensure an 
acceptable signal to noise ratio, it is common pcactics to set n criteria specifying ths 
minimum number of trials from which an ERP can be formed - n proceduce that is 
employed in ths cssencch presented in this Thesis. Such procedures assume however 
That the background noise is ‘white noise’, i.e., containing nil frequencies, and the 
introduction of large transients (artifacts such ns eye blinks), can seciously unDermine 
the signal to noise reduction. To avoid this problem trials that contain artifacts are 
typically removed from ths averaging process (discussed below).
Unfortunately, data nvecnging has drawbacks. The averaged signal is not n dicect 
measure of the electrical activity occurring on individual tcinls, nnD thus ths nvecngeD 
waveform may actually show little relation to that of indiviDunl trials. Such distortion 
through averaging can IsaD to serious difficulties as to how ERP findings should be 
interpcsTsd. For example, consider two averngsd ERPs thnT contain the same effect (n 
specific component), except that the effect is larger in one case Than the other. The 
Difference between the two averaged ERPs coulD be taken to reflect the presence of an 
underlying neural pcocsss that is graded, i.e., with greater processing in one case than 
ths other. This need not necessarily follow however. Rathsc, the avecagsd ERPs coulD 
reflect ths activity of the same all-or-none neural process (producing an effect of the
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same size in both cases), with the difference between the ERPs lying in the proportion 
of teials Ie which tbe effect is present.
Consider a second example, where the averaging ptocess has an impact In tbe temporal 
domain. If individual trial-by-trial waveforms Have a bimodal distribution (e.g., two 
peaks with differing latencies), this will be observed as a unimodal distribution (i.e., 
one perk, with latency somewhere between the twr that are present in tbe individual 
waveforms). This phenomena is called ‘latency jitter’, and can be countered using 
analytic procedures, sucb as cross correlating each trial against the average, and 
shifting the latency rf each trial to best fit that average, then re-averaging, to give a 
more accurate average (Woody, 1967). An alternative way in which latency jitter can 
be estimated is via reaction time data. If the experimental task employed in a study 
allows the collection of reaction time data, thee tbe distribution of reaction times on 
trials making up ae ERP can provide ae estimate of the amount rf jitter. Whilst this is 
not as rigorous a method as using analytic procedures, it does provide a useful, if rough 
and ready, estimate ofjitter.
Analogue to digital conversion
Traditionally EEG was written onto paper as it was recorded. However, modem 
equipment converts EEG from an analogue to digital signal. The analogue signal is 
sampled at regular Intervals, and the amplitude at each point In time is stored in digital 
form, and used to recreate the EEG waveform. Thus, the signal averaging procedure 
described above Is performed oe a time-point by time-point basis. Clearly this 
digitising process has the effect of making the accuracy of recording dependent on the 
frequency of sampling, i.e., tbe time between points. A particular problem with 
digitising is ‘aliasing’, the appearance of spurious low frequency components due to 
sampling with long point to point intervals. Tbe theoretical maximum temporal 
resolution of averaged data is half of tbe sampling rate (e.g., for a sampling rate of 50 
points per second, only frequencies below 25Hz can be Identified). Tbe sampling rate 
must therefore be set so as to capture all frequencies containing activity of interest, 
including any extra-cerebral activity that must be filtered from the signal (see Nilssoe, 
Panizza and Hallett, 1993).
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Artifacts
As noted above, one element of background noise is transient artifacts (including eye 
movements, muscle effects, alpha waves, and pulse artifacts), which can be a major 
influence on the ERP if they are not removed. One of the first means of removing 
artifacts is through filtering the signal, which can improve the signal to noise ratio, and 
removes any artifacts that have a different frequency than the ERP. For example, mains 
electrical activity is removed by using low-pass amplifier filtering. Secondly, the 
signal averaging method discussed above relies upon the assumption that such noise is 
random, whilst the signal of interest is not. Thus, averaging over a large number of 
trials will reduce the Influence of random artifacts (such as muscle activity and alpha 
waves), as well as general background noise, on the averaged signal. As with the 
removal of general noise this means that the more trials are averaged, the clearer the 
signal. As Plcton (1987) notes however, this method does not remove any artifacts that 
are temporally related to the stimulus, and it cannot entirely remove the effects of 
artifacts with very large amplitudes (of which eye blinks and eye movement are the 
prime example). For this reason, some artifacts are dealt with more directly.
As is the case in the studies reported here, electro-ocular artifacts are normally 
monitored using a separate recording channel. Techniques have been developed to 
calculate the influence EOG has on each recording site, allowing the EOG to be 
subtracted from the ERP recording at each site (e.g., see Picton, 1987; and Berg and 
Scherg, 1994). Once again however, these approaches are not widely used at present. 
The more common approach (again, the method used in the work presented in this 
thesis) is to monitor and reject all trials that show evidence of the artifact. This 
involves recording EOG activity, in order to identify and remove (from the averaging 
process) those trials in which eye movements exceed a pre-set criterion. Rugg (1992) 
notes that this can make averaging impossible in subjects who find restricting their eye 
movements difficult (as too many trials are likely to be rejected), and may prevent 
ERPs being formed for a particular experimental condition if only a few trials are 
available. Furthennore, in order to reduce the number of trials that must be rejected, 
this method generally involves asking subjects to perform the extra task of monitoring 
and consciously controlling their eye movement and blinking. Clearly, whilst such
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procedures are far from ideal, St is necessary to remove such artifacts from The ERP
waveform.
Defining ERP components
Ths preceding discussion illustrates some of ths difficulties inherent to the process of 
recording and extracting ERP Data. However, ths question of How ERP components 
can be iDentsfssD nnD used pcessnts an even mors Daunting challenge. Figure 1 shows 
an example of two cognitive ERP waveforms, rscordsd from n single electrode site. 
The x-axis indicnTss time (in milliseconds), time zero indicating The onset of The 
experimental stimulus, whilst the y-axis indicates voltage (in microvolts), plotted 
posiTive-up. Figure 2 shows a topographic map (analogous to n contour map of terrain 
oc temperature). Ths topographic maps presented in this thesis are based upon 
subtraction waveforms (ths Difference between two ERPs), and illustrate ths 
Distribution of activiTy across the scalp, showing ths position of the maximum and 
minimum amplitude diffecencss. The map is shown as if looking Down onto the top of 
the head, with relative levels of voltage shown using a greyscale. The use of mapping 
rsquices three-dimensional Data to be plotted into n two-DSmsnsionnl picture, and the 
Data between Ths actual recording points must be interpolated from the Data recorded at 
each electrode sits. The topographic maps employed in the work presented here nee 
produced using a spherical spline algorithm (sse Perrin, Pemiec, Bertrand, Ginrd, and 
Echallier, 1987; although other methods are available, s.g., using the nencsst neighbour 
algorithm; sse Picton et nl., 1994, foe more details).
Peak Picking
The traditional approach to ERPs focuses upon the morphology of ths waveform; 
vacintions in polarity, latency, amplitude, and distriOution are used to iDentify specific 
Deflections within n waveform. This approach is typified by a Descriptive 
nomenclature, Based on the time course, polarity and Distribution of inDiviDunl peaks 
and Troughs, s.g., a wnvsfonn that is negative going, maximal over centro-parietal 
electcoDss, and has a latency peaking at 400 ms, would Oe called a centco-parsetnl 
N400. This basic approach is based upon research findings thnT demonstrate how 
particular peaks and troughs are sensitive to Diffscent experimental manipulations (e.g.,
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see Kutas and Dale, 1997, for a recent review). There ate seiims problems with this 
approach though. As Picton, Lins and Scherg (1994) note, this is a simplistic and often 
misleading approach to identifying tbe components of ae ERP.
Kutas and Dale (1997) describe a typical misunderstanding that can arise from tbe use 
of the peak picking approach. If a peak is thought to reflect a specific process, then it is 
tempting to assume that variations in the latency of that peak at different locations on 
the scalp reflect some form of propagation of that process across the scalp. Kutas and 
Dale demonstrate however that such cbaeges in the latency of a peak across the scalp 
can also result from the activity of multiple (but fixed) generators, each of which bas a 
different (but overlapping) time course. Clearly, to label a specific deflection as a 
component, with functional and physiological significance, Ignores the possibility 
(indeed, the higb probability) that at a neural level It may be a combination of several 
individual components, varying in either (or both) location and time course.
Accepting the difficulties Inherent to the peak picking approach, interpretations of ERP 
data can be viewed as stemming from attempts to understanding either their 
psychological (functional) or physiological (neural) significance (e.g., see Johnson, 
1995; Rugg and Coles, 1995; and Kutas and Dale, 1997). Psychological approaches 
attempt to identify the different cognitive processes that cause variation in the activity 
of tbe generators of the waveform, whereas physiological approaches attempt to 
identify the specific neural generators, or sources, responsible for the waveform. Note, 
however, that researcbers rarely make an explicit choice between the two approaches, 
rather (as In the research presented Here) they compromise somewbere between the two 
approaches to component identification - although see Donchin (1981) and Naatanen 
and Picton (1987) respectively, for extreme examples of the psychological and 
physiological approacbes.
Psychological components
The aim of the psychological approach is to identify specific functional (cognitive) 
processes that are associated with ERP components. As Kutas and Dale (1997) point 
out, at the extreme of this approach the fact that the brain generates ERPs can be 
considered as hrelevrnt. From tbls perspective it is simply necessary to be able to 
isolate specific variations in the ERP. As Doecbie, Ritter and McCallum (1978) note, a
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component can simply be defined as a “source of controlled, observable variability”. 
One way in which such an approach can be aided is by using analytic techniques such 
as Principle Components Analysis (PCA). This is a general statistical technique that 
can be used to identify common sources of variance within data sets (see Picton, et al., 
1994; Wood and McCarthy, 1984; Collet, 1989; and Donchin, 1989, for debate on the 
utility and appropriateness of the PCA method for ERP research). Whilst the details of 
PCA are beyond the scope of this chapter, it is instructive to consider that the 
technique simply identifies sources of variance (orthogonal components) and it is up to 
the researcher to interpret them. Consequently, an analysis of behavioural performance 
and a proper understanding of the functional significance of the experimental 
manipulations are required if one wishes to correctly interpret the ERP data.
Physiological components
The aim of the physiological approach is to identify the anatomically circumscribed 
neural generator (or set of generators) that give rise to the scalp recorded ERP. There is 
considerable interest in identifying the neural sources of ERP components, and 
numerous methods have been devised to aid attempts to identify the neural generator(s) 
of ERPs. One of the most straightforward means of improving information about the 
sources of ERPs is to increase the number of recording channels, and hence increase 
the resolution of the scalp field. Gevins et al. (1995) point out however that it is only 
when over 100 electrode chamiels are used that fine enough spatial information exists 
to distinguish the contribution to the scalp recorded ERP of small discrete cortical 
generators. Yet, whilst attaining high levels of spatial sampling is important, even this 
does not provide unequivocal information, due to the distortion of discretely generated 
sources during volume conduction. A number of analytical techniques have been 
developed however, such as finite element deblurring (described earlier) and dipole 
source modelling, to aid the search for the sources of scalp recorded ERPs.
Some discussion of source modelling is instructive in understanding the difficulties 
presented by a purely physiological approach to ERP research. Wood and Allison 
(1981) note an early attempt at source modelling by Wilson and Bayley (1950). They 
applied the principles of volume conduction to a model of the brain and scalp, to 
formulate an equation that described a given scalp recorded electrical field in terms of
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the activity of a single dipole, specifying both the location and orientation of the 
dipole. Clearly, in order to model the sources of an ERP numerous assumptions must 
be made. For example, Kutas and Dale (1997) explain the physics underlying why the 
generators of scalp recorded ERPs can be represented as an electrical ‘charge dipole’. 
Other, less realistic assumptions have also to be made, for example about how one 
models the shape and conductive properties of the brain and its coverings.
Unfortunately, a more serious difficulty exists. Even if one has an appropriate (i.e., 
sufficiently realistic) model, the problem of identifying the neural generators of a given 
scalp recorded ERP is mathematically ill posed (see Gevins et al., 1995; Coles and 
Rugg, 1995; Kutas and Dale, 1997). This is the ‘inverse problem’ (opposite to the 
‘forward problem’ noted earlier), which states that for any given pattern of scalp 
activity there is no unique solution in terms of generators; rather there are a number of 
possible sources or combinations of sources that could account for the observed data. 
Although the seriousness of the inverse problem should not be underestimated, the set 
of possible solutions can be constrained by ‘adding-in’ information from other sources. 
For example, information from intracellular recording, animal experiments, lesion 
studies, and other neuroimaging techniques can all be employed (but see Donchin and 
Coles, 1991, for a critique of the use of information from animal models).
Despite the considerable problems involved, Johnson (1995) argues that modem 
versions of source modelling, such as brain electrical source analysis (BESA, Scherg, 
1990), can nonetheless provide highly accurate localisation estimates. For example, 
Miltner, Braun, Johnson, Simpson and Ruchkin (1994) show that the spatial accuracy 
of source models is fine enough for it to be used in conjunction with PET and fMRI. 
Yet, as Scherg (1990) suggests, the search for scalp distribution models simply shifts 
the problem of component definition, as researchers now have to select appropriate 
latencies for which simple source configurations can be created. As recent attempts to 
co-register the data from ERP and PET studies show, source modelling that is 
constrained by neuroimaging data may produce a solution that is more accurate for one 
latency region than another (e.g., Mangun, 1997).
Clearly, there are various techniques that can be used to obtain greater information 
about the sources of ERP activity. Ultimately, these methods should allow both the 
time course, and origin of activity to be identified with increasing accuracy. In
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particular attempts to co-register information from electromagnetic and haemodynamic 
techniques seems likely to continue (e.g., see Mangun, Hopfinger and Heinze, 1998). It 
should be remembered however that there are limits to the information provided by 
scalp recorded ERPs. As Scherg (1990) states, neither the activity of single neurons, 
nor the activity of distinct cortical layers, can be distinguished. It is only the summated 
activity within different brain regions that can be distinguished using these techniques. 
Whilst better source localisation may be possible by combining methods such as finite 
element deblurring and source dipole modelling, alternative methods must be 
employed if one wishes to obtain very high resolution information about the neural 
sources of scalp recorded activity (see Vaughan, 1987; and Snyder, 1991, for further 
discussion of source modelling).
Psychophysiological inferences
Coles et al., (1990) consider the component definition approaches discussed above as 
different means of establishing the validity of ERPs as an index of cognitive 
processing. As Rugg (1994) points out however, most researchers do not explicitly 
state their philosophical perspective, and moreover, the two approaches do not 
necessarily have to produce equivalent results. For example, they will not do so if 
activity from different neural (physiological) sources can produce the same functional 
(psychological) effects. In essence, the two approaches will only provide equivalent 
results if there is an invariant, isomorphic mapping (i.e., that is a straightforward one- 
to-one relationship) between the cognitive and neural levels of analysis. Before 
considering the nature of the inferences that can be drawn in ERP research, it is 
instructive to briefly examine this assumption.
The invariance assumption
Opinions differ widely concerning the appropriate view of the relationship between the 
neural and functional levels of analysis. For example Rugg and Coles (1995) consider 
the ‘invariance assumption' as a simple, defensible and parsimonious assumption that 
follows from the (standard) materialist view that cognitive processes are caused 
exclusively by physical activity in the nervous system. They note however, that whilst 
this assumption is necessary if one is to make even simple inferences on the basis of
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ERP data, It is an assumption that Is open to empirical refutation. At the opposite 
extreme, Kutas and Federmeler (1997) explicitly state that there is no isomorphism 
between cognitive functions and neural processes. Yet, strangely, they do not offer an 
alternative account. Rather, they argue that psycbophysiological methods (when used 
ie combieation with one another) can nonetheless provide useful insight into the nature 
of the relationship between cognition and physiology.
Mesulam (1990) presents a more convincing rejection of the invariance assumption, 
offering a clear alternative account, namely that there Is a ‘one-to-many’ and ‘many-to­
one’ mapping between the neural and cognitive levels of analysis. This view is based 
upon a neural network approach to cognition, wbereby the mapping from anatomy to 
behaviour is considered to be both localised and distributed. Any given behaviour is 
viewed as being represented across multiple neuroaeatomical sites, with each of these 
sites playing multiple functional roles. By tliis view multiple networks interact to 
produce (emergent) behaviours, and a given behaviour cannot be localised to an 
individual neueoanatomical substrate. If correct, sucb a view could seriously 
undennine the utility of neuroimaging techniques (including ERPs), because 
knowledge about neural states would not provide any Information about corresponding 
functional states.
Mehler, Morton and Jusczyk (1984) provide a similarly sceptical view. They argue that 
there is simply eo empirical justification for making the invariance assumption. 
Indeed, they suggest that the exact relationsbip between the cognitive and neural levels 
of analysis is precisely what Is under ievestigatioe ie the cognitive neurosciences. 
They note that the mapping between the different levels of analysis can take a variety 
of forms (e.g., one-to-one, oee-to-many, maey-to-ree, or many-to-many), and It is not 
necessarily clear exactly what elements at each level are to be mapped on to each other 
(e.g., the neural level can be considered at various different grain sizes, from individual 
neurons, through networks, to whole cerebral hemispberes). Thus, Mehler et al. argue 
that it is premature to assume a one-to-one mapping, and that making such an 
assumption may ultimately impede scientific progress. Moreover, as they point out, 
localisation of activity at tbe neural level does not necessarily constitute, or even 
contribute to, an explanation of behaviour at the psychological level.
81
Whilst that the invariance assumption is clearly open to refutation, and under attack 
from some quarters, it is by no means untenable. As Rugg (in press) points out, there is 
no empirical evidence against it. However, it is certainly true that the levels at which 
the cognitive and neural elements are defined is under constant change (i.e., as 
psychological theories evolve, and imaging techniques develop). Thus, at the very 
least, considering the relationship between the cognitive and neural levels of analysis 
as fixed would be unwarranted. A more profitable perspective is proposed by 
Churchland and Sejnowski (1991; see also Churchland, 1986). They argue for a ‘co­
evolutionary’ approach, whereby investigations at one level constrain and guide 
investigations at another, in a reciprocal manner. This does not mean that cognitive 
models of memory can be simply reduced to neuroanatomical accounts of processing, 
but rather that research will lead to the refinement of our understanding of both the 
cognitive and neural levels of analysis, and of the relationship between them. A similar 
point is made by Sarter, Bemtson and Cacioppo (1996 pl6), who state that “the 
optimal development of cognitive neuroscience will require a progressive tuning of 
concepts derived at both the cognitive and neuronal levels of analysis”.
Interpreting ERP data
Notwithstanding the concerns about the invariance assumption discussed above, the 
research presented in this thesis is (loosely) predicated on this assumption. At the very 
least it is assumed that there is some form of systematic relationship between the 
neural and cognitive levels of analysis, a relationship that is amenable to scientific 
investigation. Following Rugg and Coles (1995), the research presented here draws on 
elements of both the psychological and physiological approaches to ERPs discussed 
above. Critically, the work rests upon the use of inferential statistics to draw 
conclusions on the basis of ERP data (like that shown earlier in figures 1 and 2). As 
will be made clear however, the inferential status afforded ERPs is highly constrained 
by their inherent limits, as discussed earlier in terms of their electrogenesis, recording 
and extraction.
As a framework within which to discuss the inferences that can be made on the basis of 
ERP data, consider an experiment in which ERPs are recorded in two experimental 
conditions associated with a given cognitive task (note that analogous arguments can
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be applied to the ERP for a single task analysed over successive time periods). 
Inferential statistics (such as Analysis of Variance) can be used to establish if there are 
any reliable differences between the waveforms for each condition. Remember that, 
necessarily, a given neural generator (or set of generators) produces a well defined, 
mathematically unique, electrical field (the forward problem). Consequently, the 
presence of differences between ERPs strongly suggests that there are differences in 
the neural correlates associated with each condition and, therefore, that there is some 
form of concomitant difference in the cognitive processing associated with the 
performance of each experimental condition.
In comparing ERPs inferential statistics can provide evidence of differences that are 
either ‘quantitative’ or ‘qualitative’ in nature (i.e., in degree, or in kind, respectively). 
In terms of ERPs, a qualitative difference can be demonstrated by revealing a change 
in the topography (distribution) of the scalp fields associated with two experimental 
conditions (or in one condition over two latency periods). If qualitatively distinct 
patterns of neural activity are found this must reflect differences in the underlying 
generator(s). This is taken as evidence that the experimental conditions engaged 
functionally distinct cognitive processes. Again, note that this conclusion rests on the 
invariance assumption. It is assumed that a given cognitive process cannot be 
instantiated in multiple ways at the neural level of analysis, and therefore cannot give 
rise to multiple neural correlates; conversely, multiple neural correlates must reflect 
multiple cognitive processes.
Even if the ERPs associated with two experimental conditions are not found to differ 
qualitatively, they may nonetheless be found to differ quantitatively. A quantitative 
difference can be demonstrated by revealing differences in the magnitude (amplitudes) 
of the waveform for each condition, in the absence of differences in distribution. In this 
instance, the same neural generator (or set of generators) is active, but to differing 
degrees in each case. Thus, if differences in the magnitude of activity are found, this is 
taken to suggest that the experimental conditions engage functionally equivalent 
cognitive processes, but that these processes are engaged to a different degree in each 
condition. Once again, this conclusion rests squarely on the invariance assumption - a 
single neural correlate is assumed to correspond only to a single cognitive process.
83
The foregoing discussioe of the way in which ERPs can provide evidence of 
quantitative and qualitative differences Is, oe tbe face of it, relatively straightforward. 
There are serious constraints to tbe inferences that can be made however (cf. Rugg and 
Coles, 1995; Sarter et al., 1996; Kutas and Federmeler, 1998). A crucial point here 
regards the use of the null hypothesis in contrasting two experimental conditions (or 
two time periods). If differences in tbe ERPs associated with two experimental 
conditions are found thee there is a strong basis for Inferring some (either quantitative 
or qualitative) difference ie processing between two experimental conditions. By 
contrast tbe absence of a significant difference (tbe null result) Is not a solid basis for 
making the opposite conclusion, i.e., that there are absolutely no differences in brale 
activity.
As noted above, much distortion and atteeuatioe of activity occurs due to variations in 
the syncbroeicity of active tissue, and variatioes ie tbe volume conduction to the scalp. 
If this is considered alongside the fact that both open and closed electrical fields exist 
witbin any given brain area, thee it is clear that an unknown quantity of neural activity 
Is bidden from all scalp recording. Thus, in practice, tbe absence of differential activity 
in the scalp recorded potential may be due to the inseesitivity of tbe ERP method to 
particular kinds of neural activity, despite Its presence within tbe brain. Moreover, the 
ability to detect a difference may in practice depend upon the precise methods used. 
For example, Increasing tbe number of recording sites increases the spatial resolution 
of the data, and therefore iecreases tbe likelihood of observing differences ie 
distribution.
Coles and Rugg (1995) consider the fact that ERPs represent a subset of tbe total 
intracranial neural activity as having both positive and negative Implications. Whilst it 
means that there will often, if not always, be neural activity that is not recorded, they 
argue that the remaining measure should be less complex aed thus more aealysable. As 
should be clear however, tbls can make the scalp recorded ERP more difficult to 
interpret, not less (even disregarding issues surrounding the Invariance assumption). As 
Johnson (1995) points out, the Inseesitivity of the ERP measure to some forms of 
neural activity means that it is even difficult to draw straightforward conclusions about 
the temporal order of processing, tbe domain in which ERPs are most sensitive. If two 
ERP components occur In succession this can be taken as evidence for two stages of
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processing, but it cannot be interpreted as evidence for two successive processing 
stages, because other additional processing may have occurred that simply cannot be 
recorded at the scalp.
Consider a second example, whereby the time course of the difference between two 
conditions is examined (again using inferential statistics, such as multiple t-tests). 
Typically, this involves stating a time by which the waveforms, and by implication the 
underlying processing, begins to differ. Yet, ERPs do not provide a definitive index of 
the timing of processing, they can only provide an upper bound on the timing of any 
differences. As Rugg (1995) points out, because the ERP method measures an 
unknown subset of the total intercranial activity, evidence of a point in time when 
observable differences are present does not mean that the cognitive processes do not 
differ prior to this point in time.
Clearly, the conclusions that can be drawn on the basis of a null result are constrained 
by the inherent limits of the ERP method. As Rugg (in press) notes however, the 
significance of positive findings (both quantitative and qualitative differences) is 
usually dependent upon the particular theoretical context in which the research is 
performed. In terms of quantitative differences, exactly what it means to posit 
differences in the degree or amount to which a cognitive process is engaged is not 
necessarily clear. For example, it does not follow that graded changes in the 
engagement of a cognitive process (as indexed by improvements in performance) are 
simply due to in increased activity of a single neural generator (or set of generators). 
Rather, the improvement at a behavioural level may be attributable to the recruitment 
of additional processes. Similarly, it is not clear to just how (qualitatively) different 
neural activity must be to warrant the conclusion that functionally distinct operations 
have been engaged. For example, the topography of effects may be similar in terms of 
its gross distribution (with clear commonalties) but still differ statistically in relatively 
subtle ways.
Finally, there are also circumstances where qualitative dissociations would be expected 
but would nonetheless be considered relatively uninteresting or uninformative from a 
psychological perspective. For example, the effects of priming in different modalities 
can be viewed as relying on functionally equivalent processing from a cognitive 
perspective, yet the instantiation of priming could still be expected to arise in
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qualitatively different brain areas for each modality, giving rise to qualitative 
differences in the associated ERPs. In essence then, the fimctional interpretation that is 
applied to a given ERP component must take into account the particular circumstances 
in which it is elicited. Without a proper appreciation of the psychological factors 
involved, ERP research is unlikely to reveal anything other than a confused picture of 
the neural basis of cognitive functioning.
Summary
Whilst there is not the space to consider the philosophical issues in great detail, it 
should be clear from the foregoing discussion that ERP research is based upon strong 
assumptions about the mapping between the neural and cognitive levels of analysis. 
Whilst these issues are not unique to ERP research (i.e., they are common across 
cognitive neuroscience research in general), the present chapter also illustrates the fact 
that the way ERPs can be defined and used is further constrained by issues surrounding 
the electrogenesis, recording and extraction of ERP data. Despite these constraints 
however, information can be derived, both about quantitative and qualitative changes 
in the ERP, and this information can be used to constrain interpretations of the 
cognitive processes under investigation. Whilst ERPs do not always provide 
unequivocal information, they provide a useful means of investigating the possible 
neural bases of higher order cognitive processes such as memory.
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Figure 1. Two ERP waveforms, recorded from r single electrode (Fz). The 
scale bar indicates a 10p,V range, plotted positive up. Zero Indicates the onset 
of the experimental stimuli. Note that the waveforms do not diverge until 
approximately 300 msec pott-ttimulut.
Figure 2. A topographic map, Illustrating the scrip distribution of the 
differences between two ERPs. The map is shown as If looking down onto 
the top of the head. The scale bar to the right of the map indicates the 
maximum and minimum of the voltage range, and electrode locations are 
Indicated by small squares.
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Chapter 3.
ERPS AND MEMORY
Whilst the ERP technique is not the best known of brain imaging methods, it has a 
relatively long history, extending over 30 years of research into the 
electrophysiological correlates of sensory, perceptual, motor, and cognitive processes 
(for recent reviews see Rugg and Coles, 1995; Kutas and Dale, 1997). In particular, 
several areas of memory research have been supplemented by ERP studies, including 
implicit memory, short-term (working) memory, and encoding in long term memory 
(e.g., see Rugg, 1994, 1995a,b; Johnson, 1995). Central to the research reported here 
are ERP studies of explicit retrieval from long-term memory, primarily employing 
direct tests of explicit memory including recognition and cued recall.
The research presented in the present thesis follows directly from the ERP studies 
reviewed in the present chapter. Indeed, the experiments were explicitly designed to 
test the theoretical interpretations of the findings discussed below. Clearly, a careful 
consideration of previous work is necessary to provide an appropriate context in which 
to understand and evaluate the significance of the work presented in this thesis. The 
following review is also intended to indicate the way in which the ERP findings have 
developed, highlighting the changing nature of this research, both in methodological 
and theoretical tenns. The review is selective however. Recent research published after
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the experimental work was undertaken, is not reviewed here, but will instead be
considered in the discussion sections.
The left parietal old/new effect
The basic experimental finding, from studies employing old/new recognition memory 
tests, is the ERP ‘left-parietal old/new’ effect (e.g., see Johnson, 1995; Rugg, 1991, 
Rugg, Cox, Doyle and Wells, 1995; Smith, 1993; Palier, Kutas and Mclssac, 1995; 
Wilding, Doyle and Rugg, 1995; Neville, Kutas, Chesney and Schmidt, 1989). The 
effect is shown in figure 3; it is a modulation in the ERP waveform that takes the form 
of a positive shift in ERPs for items are correctly recognised as old (hits) compared to 
those rejected as new (correct rejections). In studies of item (old/new) recognition the 
effect has typically been found to emerge around 300-400 msec post-stimulus, to be 
temporally restricted to a 400-600 msec latency region, and to be maximal over left 
temporo-parietal electrodes.
Crucially, the left parietal old/new effect is not found in the ERPs for old words which 
are not recognised (misses), or new words incorrectly identified as being old (false 
alarms), indicating that the effect is associated with the veridical retrieval of 
information from memory. That is, the fact that the effect is not found in the ERPs to 
misses indicates that it does not simply reflect the fact that a given item has been 
repeated (the subject must be able to consciously report having experienced the item 
before). Similarly, the absence of the effect in the ERPs to false alarms indicates that 
the effect does not simply reflect the fact an ‘old’ decision has been made (the subject 
must veridically remember having experienced the item before).
Methodological issues
Before discussing the various interpretations of the left parietal old/new effect, it is 
important to note a number of methodological issues. Clearly, there are limitations to 
the use of ERPs in investigations of the neural correlates of memory. For example, if 
one wished to study free recall, uncertainty would arise over what ‘event’ the 
ERPs should be time locked to. Moreover, a range of methods and procedures has been 
used across different experiments. For example, Bentin, Moscovitch and Heth (1993) 
collapsed their ERPs across hit and miss responses, and simply compared ERPs to old
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and new words at test, regardless of the accuracy of recognition judgements. Such 
differences can make comparisons of data sets across different experiments difficult (if
not impossible).
One problem that derives from the developing nature of the ERP method is variation in 
the number of recording sites employed in different studies. Recent investigations 
generally employ lateral and midline electrodes (up to 64 electrode sites), allowing the 
distribution of effects to be well characterised, and in the case of old/new effects, 
highlighting any hemispheric asymmetries. Because most early research only 
employed midline sites, it can be difficult to establish if the ERP effects found in 
recent studies are equivalent to those found in earlier experiments. Finally, methods of 
analysis also vary widely across different research laboratories. For example, a recent 
study by Duzel, Yonelinas, Mangun, Heinze and Tulving (1997) reported topographic 
differences in the pattern of old/new effects in the ERPs associated with Recollection 
and Knowing judgements. As will become clear below, such a finding would be of 
considerable interest if it were sustainable. However, Duzel et al. performed their 
topographic analyses without first rescaling their data - a practice that calls into 
question their interpretation of the findings (cf. McCarthy and Wood, 1985; discussed 
in more detail in chapter 4).
Initial investigations
Research into the functional significance of the left parietal old/new effect initially 
focused on attempts to dissociate the effect from potential confounding factors, 
including modulations of the ‘classic’ ERP components (e.g., the P300), and implicit 
memory effects associated with repetition priming. For example, Rugg and Nagy 
(1989; see also Johnson, 1995) reported that there are two distinct components to the 
ERP old/new effect, with different scalp distributions and time courses; the ‘early’ and 
‘late’ components respectively. The two components could be functionally dissociated 
by manipulating the lag between the first and second presentation of the test items. The 
early effect was found to be sensitive to item repetition only when the delay between 
study and test presentation was relatively short, whereas the late part of the effect 
remained even after a delay of 45 minutes. Thus, the functional characteristics of the 
early effect make it an unlikely correlate of long-term memory. Moreover, Rugg,
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Roberts, Potter, Pickles and Nagy (1991) showed that whilst the late recognition 
related effect was attenuated in temporal lobectomy patients, the early repetition 
sensitive effect was not. As Rugg et al. (1991) note, their data suggests that the two 
effects likely arise from different intra-cerebral generators (issues surrounding the 
generators of effects are discussed in more detail below). Given the functional and 
neural differences described above, investigations concerning the early and late effects 
have diverged, with the two areas of research having little impact upon each other (see 
Rugg and Doyle, 1994, for more on the early ERP repetition effect).
As noted above early studies also investigated the possible contribution of the classical 
ERP components to the left parietal old/new effect. The old/new effect overlaps 
temporally with the P300 and N400 components, and these components are known to 
be influenced by factors such as stimulus and subjective probability, ‘targetness’, and 
response requirements (e.g., see Donchin and Coles, 1988; Johnson, Pfefferbaum and 
Kopell, 1985; and Kutas and Dale, 1997, for reviews). For example, the P300 (or P3b) 
is functionally related to various cognitive factors that could potentially distinguish the 
old and new items in a recognition memory task. Notably, the amplitude of the P3b is 
inversely related to the relative probability of the class of stimuli that evokes it (the 
rarer the stimulus, the larger the amplitude of the P3b becomes), whilst the peak 
latency of the component appears to be related to the time which subjects require to 
categorise the eliciting stimuli.
Given the functional characteristics of the P300 it is easy to see why the left parietal 
old/new effect could appear to be, at least in part, a reflection of this ERP component. 
If subjects take different amounts of time to categorise the old and new stimuli, or if 
the relative proportion of old and new responses differed, then the left parietal old/new 
effect would indeed be confounded with the P300. Experimental manipulations suggest 
however that these factors do not account for the presence of the left parietal old/new 
effect. For example, Smith and Guster (1993) reported that the left parietal effect is 
present even when the subjective probability of experiencing an old item is much 
higher than that for new items, a circumstance that should lead to a larger P3b 
component in the ERPs to new items. Research also suggests that the old/new effect 
does not reflect variation in stimulus probability (Friedman, 1990) or decision 
confidence (Karis, Fabiani and Donchin, 1984). Moreover, the old/new effect has been
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shown to have a different scalp distribution to both the P300 and N400 components 
(e.g., Friedmae, 1990; and Smith aed Guster, 1993).
In sum, the left parietal old/new effect cannot simply be accounted for In terms of 
modulations of the classic ERP components, and it also appears to be distinct from the 
ERP effects associated with repetition priming. The dissociations discussed above, in 
terms of the functional properties aed scalp distributions of the various ERP effects, 
provide evidence that tbe left parietal effect is specifically related to processes 
associated with memory retrieval. There are unresolved issues however; for example It 
is debatable whether many of the studies discussed above employed sufficient 
recording sites to satisfactorily determine the scalp distribution of the various ERP 
effects. Nonetbeless, the research discussed below is based upon the assumption that 
the left parietal effect reflects brain activity contributing to, or contingent upon, the 
retrieval of information required to make accurate recognition memory judgements (ae 
assumption that is predicated upon the findings reviewed above).
The Familiarity explanation
Having accepted that the left parietal old/new effect is closely related to processing 
associated with successful recogeition, a more precise functional account of the effect 
was clearly required. Debate about the functional role of the effect was influenced by 
dual process models of recognition memory (discussed in cbapter 1). To recap briefly, 
according to dual process theories of recogeition memory (cf. Atkinson and Ju^a, 
1974; Mandler, 1980; Jacoby and Dallas, 1981) there are two retrieval mechanisms 
upon which retrieval ere be based - subjects may be able to recollect Having studied an 
Item, or the item may simply be familiar. As was noted in cbapter 1, recollection is 
clearly defined as tbe ability to remember coetextual information about prior study 
episodes, whereas tbe precise formulation of tbe familiarity process is less clear 
(particularly concerning its relationship to implieit fones of memory sueh as priming, 
e.g., see Mayes, 1992).
Debate initially centred on whether the old/eew effect reflected proeessing associated 
with either familiarity or recollection. Several early studies of the left parietal effect 
were interpreted as providing evidence in support of a familiarity account (i.e., that the 
effect refleeted processes assoeiated with or coetingeet upon a familiarity process; cf.
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Friedman, 1990; Potter, Pickles, Roberts and Rugg, 1992). For example, Rugg and 
Doyle (1992) provided supported in favour of the familiarity account. They tested 
recognition memory using low versus high frequency words, and found that only low 
frequency words elicited a left parietal old/new effect. The prominence of the left 
parietal old/new effect in the ERPs to low frequency words was interpreted as evidence 
in support of a familiarity account. Crucially, this interpretation of the ERP findings 
was based on an explanation of the well-known recognition memory advantage for low 
frequency words, i.e., that a greater relative increase in familiarity occurs between 
study and test for low frequency words than for high frequency words (e.g., Mandler, 
1980; Mandler, Goodman and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1992; Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby and Dallas, 
1981; discussed in chapter 1). Thus, Rugg and Doyle (1992) interpreted the 
prominence of the left parietal effect in the ERPs for low frequency words as a 
reflection of the greater increase in familiarity that was thought to occur for these 
items.
As noted above, Rugg and Doyle’s account of the left parietal effect was predicated on 
the assumption that the low frequency recognition memory advantage was due to 
changes in relative familiarity between study and test. However, this account of the 
old/new effect was seriously undermined by a series of behavioural studies, which 
suggested that the word frequency effect reflects the superior recollection of low 
frequency items (e.g., see Gardiner and Java, 1990; Guttentag and Carroll, 1994, 1997; 
Chalmers, Humphreys and Dermis, 1997). These later behavioural findings suggested a 
re-interpretation of the ERP findings; by this account, the presence of the left parietal 
effect in the ERPs to low frequency words reflected the fact that these items were more 
likely to be recollected than were high frequency words.
Support for the ‘recollection account’ of the left parietal effect was provided by a 
further study comparing the ERP old/new effects for high and low frequency words. 
Rugg, Cox, Doyle and Wells (1994) found that the left parietal effect was more 
prominent in the ERPs for low frequency words, replicating the findings of Rugg and 
Doyle (1992). However, Rugg et al. also demonstrated that low frequency items were 
associated with more confident responses, and were more accurately assigned to their 
study context, than were high frequency items. Based upon the assumption that 
subjects would not have been able to accurately report the study context of the old
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items if performance was based upon familiarity, these findings were judged to be 
more consistent with a recollection, than familiarity, account of the low-frequency 
recognition advantage. Thus, Rugg et al., concluded that the ERP old/new effect most 
likely reflected processes associated with recollection rather than familiarity.
Several other ERP investigations also suggest that the old/new effect reflects processes 
associated with recollection rather than familiarity. A crucial indication that the 
familiarity account was wrong was provided by Rugg, Doyle and Wells (unpublished, 
cited in Rugg, 1995a) in a further replication of the word frequency experiment of 
Rugg and Doyle (1992). Rugg et al. employed the R/K response procedure (discussed 
in chapter 1; cf. Tulving, 1985; Rajaram, 1993) as an alternative means of isolating the 
functional locus of the word frequency effects. At test subjects were asked to judge 
whether each item was old or new, and if an item was judged old, to report whether 
they could consciously Remember the item (i.e., recollect the study episode), or 
whether they just Knew that it must be old. Contrary to expectations based on Rugg 
and Doyle’s (1992) study, the low frequency recognition memory advantage was only 
found for items receiving Remember responses. Furthennore, the left parietal old/new 
effect was more prominent in the ERPs to low frequency words, despite the fact that 
ERPs were only formed for items receiving Remember responses. Even given doubts 
over the extent to which the R/K procedure accurately isolates recollection based 
responding (see below), these findings provide little support for a familiarity account 
of the old/new effects.
A second study employing the R/K procedure also provided little support for the 
familiarity account. Smith (1993) recorded ERPs using the R/K procedure with a 
study-test recognition task, and found an old/new effect for recognition accompanied 
by both Remember and Know judgements. Whilst the effect was present in the ERPs 
associated with both class of judgement, it was almost twice as large for Remember 
than Know responses, a fact that Smith interpreted as evidence that the old/new effect 
reflected the degree to which subjects recollected the prior study episodes. Whilst the 
data are clearly inconsistent with a familiarity account, they do not unambiguously 
support a recollection account either. By Smith’s account the difference between the 
ERPs to remember and know responses would have been expected to be qualitative, 
not quantitative in nature, with the left parietal effect only present in the ERPs to R
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responses. Given the finding of an old/new effect for Know responses (when no 
recollection is meant to have occurred) ae Interpretation in favour of a recollection 
account need not necessarily be eorreet. Smith’s leterpretation is plausible, but only if 
it is accepted that the R/K judgements are eot ‘process pure’ (cf. Gardiner and Java, 
1993), and thus that Know responses are to some extent eontamleated with 
recollection, resulting in ae attenuated old/new effect for Know responses. However, 
given that the rationale for employing tbe R/K procedure was to separate the two 
processes, process impurity reeders It a less than satisfactory technique for isolating 
tbe locus of the ERP old/new effect.
Two alternative investigations, wblcb are eot based on phenomenological self-reprets, 
also count against the familiarity aeeount of tbe left parietal old/eew effect. First, 
Paller and Kutas (1992) investigated tbe old/new effects in the context of an indirect 
memory test - perceptual ideetlfleatlrn. A depth of processing manipulation was 
employed at study (rtthograpHle versus imaging tasks) and at test subjects had simply 
to ideetlfy old aed new items (words were presented too briefly for performance to be 
highly accurate), but not make overt old and eew judgemeets. As expected. Paller and 
Kutas found that tbe depth of processleg manipulation had little effect on perceptual 
identlficatloe. However, the ERPs exhibited ae old/new effect that was larger for items 
that were deeply encoded (Imaged). Whilst both classes of old item were equally well 
primed (as Indexed by tbe behavioural performance), words from tbe deep eecodlng 
task were nonetheless associated with tbe larger old/new effect. Thus, Paller and Kutas 
argued that tbe old/new effect provides ae index (or ERP signature) of conscious 
recollection, even under conditions were explicit memory is not directly assessed.
Paller and Kutas’ findings are Important, in that they provide support for tbe idea that 
the old/new effect does not simply reflect the requirement to overtly discriminate 
between old and new items. The conclusion that the effect reflects processes associated 
with recollection does not necessarily follow however, unless it is assumed that deeper 
encoding facilitates reerllectloe but leaves familiarity unaffected. As with Rugg and 
Doyle’s word frequency study and Smith’s R/K study however, it is not necessarily 
clear how the experimental manipulation employed by Paller and Kutas should be 
Interpreted. Specifically, Allan, Wilding and Rugg (In press) criticise the Paller aed 
Kutas study on the grounds that depth of proeessleg does not selectively influence
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recollection. In support of their critique they cite Toth (1996), who suggests that
measures of recollection and familiarity based responding are both influenced by depth
of processing.
The evidence in support of Allan et al.’s critique is itself open to question however. In 
Toth’s depth of processing studies a response-deadline manipulation was employed to 
separate processes associated with recollection and familiarity. When a long response 
deadline was provided it was assumed that responding could be based on the slower 
recollection process, whereas a short deadline was assumed to only allow faster 
familiarity based responding. Toth suggested that by employing the response deadline 
procedure provided it was possible to show that depth of processing manipulation 
influenced both familiarity and recollection based responding. Yet, the findings were 
based upon experiments in which the critical response deadline manipulation was 
performed using a between-subjects experimental design, rather than the standard 
within-subjects design (e.g., see Hintzman and Curran, 1994, for a relevant example). 
Given the sensitivity of memory retrieval effects to this form of alteration in 
experimental design (cf. Greene, 1996), it is not at all clear that Toth’s findings can be 
taken at face value.
A further source of evidence against the familiarity account of the left parietal effect 
comes from Smith and Halgren (1989), who investigated the ERP effects associated 
with recognition memory. They compared left and right temporal lobectomy patients 
with matched control subjects. Smith and Halgren employed a study-test paradigm, 
which involved repeating the same 10 study words throughout 9 test blocks, 
introducing 10 new words for each block. The repetition of the same 10 study words 
across test blocks was designed to investigation the idea that the ERP old/new effect 
reflected familiarity based responding. The critical assumption was that repetition 
selectively increases familiarity based responding, and this should therefore be 
reflected in changes to the old/new effect. Smith and Halgren found that for the normal 
control subjects the repetition of items across successive test blocks did give rise to an 
increase in recognition accuracy, yet there was no concomitant alteration in the 
old/new effect as a function of the repetition of items. Results for the right temporal 
lobectomy patients showed an equivalent pattern of results. In contrast, the left 
temporal lobectomy patients showed no evidence of an old/new effect, despite the fact
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patients showed no evidence of an old/new effect, despite the fact that their (much 
poorer recognition memory performance) was sensitive to the repetition of test items.
Smith and Halgren’s findings are inconsistent with a familiarity account of the old/new 
effects in two ways. Firstly, the results for the control and right temporal lobectomy 
subjects suggest that the old/new effect was not sensitive to the familiarity of the test 
items, because whilst their behavioural performance was affected by the repetition of 
test items, there was no concomitant change in the ERP effects. Secondly, the 
relatively poor levels of performance in the left temporal lobectomy patients suggest 
that they may have been more reliant upon familiarity (or perceptual fluency) as a 
means of making recognition memory judgements. The absence of an old/new effect 
for these subjects was therefore interpreted as evidence that the effect was related to 
recollection rather than familiarity based responding.
Taken together, the studies described above demonstrate that the effect is sensitive to 
whether items in a recognition memory test have been previously studied. 
Furthermore, the findings suggest that the left parietal old/new effect may be a 
reflection of processes associated with recollection rather than familiarity (as was first 
thought). Unfortunately, they do not unambiguously reveal the functional locus of the 
effect. The Palier and Kutas, and Smith and Halgren studies both rely upon a 
representation of familiarity as an implicit (priming) process. Palier and Kutas assumed 
that a depth of processing manipulation at study would not effect familiarity, whilst 
Smith and Halgren assumed that the repetition of stimuli would influence familiarity. 
As noted above however, it is not clear what relationship exists between familiarity 
and priming. Similarly, the studies of both Rugg and Doyle (1992), and Smith (1993) 
were based on the R/K procedure, a technique that is intended to measure the 
phenomenological experience of subjects, rather than the underlying memory process 
themselves (cf. Gardiner, Java and Richardson-Klavehn, 1996).
It is not always necessarily clear how particular experimental manipulations should be 
interpreted. One reason for this is that the interpretations often rely heavily on the 
behavioural literature. For example, the interpretation of the ERP findings from the 
studies comparing the old/new effects for low and high frequency words were reliant 
upon current behavioural accounts of the low frequency recognition advantage. As 
behavioural findings lead to a shift from a ‘relative familiarity’ to a ‘recollection’
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account of tbe low frequency recognition advantage, aeeounts of the left parietal 
old/new effect changed accordingly. Given these difficulties it should be clear that an 
alternative means of isolating recollection based respoedlng was needed. The study of 
Rugg, Wells and Doyle provides perhaps the first example of an alternative approach, 
wbereby recollection was operationally defined aceordleg to subjects ability to report 
information about the prior study episodes.
Operational definitions of recollection
Perhaps the strongest evldeeee in support of tbe recollection account of the left parietal 
old/new effect comes from studies by Wilding aed colleagues, employing operational 
definitions of recolleetion. Critically, their approacb does not rely upon subjects’ 
pheeomenologieal experience, or on assumptions concerning the relationship between 
familiarity-based reeogeitioe aed priming. Rather, these studies employed source 
memory tasks as a means by which recollection eae be operationally defined, allowing 
ERPs to be separated aecording to tbe likelihood that they are associated with eplsodie 
recollection. The hallmark of this approach is tbe use of a ‘two-stage’ retrieval task, 
whereby subjects make an Initial old/new recognition judgement, and are thee required 
to make a subsequent source judgement. The use of a two-stage task allows ERPs to be 
eompared on tbe basis of subjects’ ability (given accurate reeogeitioe) to accurately 
discriminate between differeet classes of studied Item - items that differ solely in 
terms of experimentally manipulated coetextual ieformatioe. Tbe basic rationale 
behind these studies Is that it Is only possible to perform the source memory task 
aecurately if the initial recognition of an old item is associated with recollection of the 
study episode. Different elasses of old item are intended to be equally familiar, 
differing only in terms of the eoetext in which they were presented.
Wildieg, Doyle and Rugg (1995) presented words at study In either the visual or 
auditory modality, and at test preseeted Items either visually (experiment 1) or 
auditorally (experiment 2). Subjects were required to dlseriminate old from new items, 
and for items judged old, to report the modality in wbieb they had been studied. The 
critical assumption was that subjects would only be able to report the modality of study 
presentation when they Had recollected contextual information about tbe study episode, 
and not when they items were recognised on the basis of familiarity. Thus, from the
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perspective of a dual process framework, trials on which source memory was 
successful are more likely to be associated with recollection than are trials on which 
source memory was unsuccessful - the later being more likely to be based upon
familiarity.
In both experiments Wilding et al. found that, relative to the ERPs to correctly rejected 
new items, a left parietal old/new effect was present in the ERPs to items that were 
accurately recognised and for which the modality of study presentation was accurately 
reported. A weaker and less temporally extended left parietal old/new effect was also 
found in the ERPs to items that were recognised but which received inaccurate source 
judgements (experiment 2). Crucially, the topographic distribution of the old/new 
effects did not differ as a function of the accuracy of the source judgement - 
suggesting that the processes associated with the two kinds of responses differed 
quantitatively, but not qualitatively (i.e., in degree rather than in kind).
Wilding et al. interpreted their results as showing that recognition accompanied by 
incorrect source judgements was the result of partial or weak recollection (allowing 
subjects to make accurate old/new recognition judgements but not accurate source 
judgements). Unfortunately, the type of information that was used to distinguish the 
different classes of old item (half the items maintaining the same modality at study and 
test, half changing modality) introduced a possible confound. Maintaining the modality 
of presentation between study and test is thought to engender greater priming than does 
changing the modality (cf. Richardson-Klavehn and Bjork, 1988), a critical problem, 
given at least the possibility of a link between familiarity and priming (cf. Mayes, 
1992). Thus, it remained arguable that the ERP effects could simply reflect priming 
based familiarity, rather than recollection. As is discussed below however, the 
recollection account of the left parietal old/new effect received further support from the 
results of a further study of source memory (Wilding and Rugg, 1996).
The right frontal old/new effect
The study by Wilding et al. (1995) described in the foregoing paragraphs was the first 
to operationally define recollection using a two-stage retrieval task that required 
subjects to discriminate between different classes of old item. Wilding and Rugg 
(1996) employed this procedure in two further experiments that attempted to separate
99
recognition with and without the retrieval of contextual information. Importantly, these 
experiments employed a source judgement that did not involve changes in study-test 
modality; rather, words were heard at study in either a male or female voice. At test 
subjects saw old and new words, and had to make an old/new judgement, followed by 
a source (voice) judgement. Thus, these studies allowed recognition with and without 
recollection to be separated more cleanly than in the Wilding et al. study (i.e., without 
the possible confound of priming effects).
The findings from the Wilding and Rugg (1996) study are shown in figure 4. As 
expected on the basis of previous findings, a left parietal old/new effect was present, 
the magnitude of which was larger in the ERPs to source con'ect (hit/hit) than source 
incorrect (hit/miss) responses. Importantly, in contrast to previous findings (although 
see Johnson, 1995, for the first hint of a right frontal component) an additional positive 
shift is evident over frontal scalp sites. This second old/new effect was also larger in 
magnitude in the ERPs to source correct than source incorrect responses. The frontal 
effect appeared to onset at around the same time as the left parietal effect, but unlike 
the parietal effect, did not abate by the end of the recording period. Moreover, it 
exhibited the opposite asymmetry over the scalp, being larger over the right than left 
fRontal electrodes.
Several issues arise from the findings of Wilding and Rugg (1996). First, why had the 
‘right frontal’ old/new effect not been found in previous studies? The effect onsets at 
the same time as the parietal old/new effect, suggesting that it should have been seen in 
previous studies. Indeed, there was some sign of a fRontal positivity in the data of 
Wilding et al. (1995). In this study the positivity could however have simply reflected 
the contribution of the parietal old/new effect to more anterior electrodes. By contrast. 
Wilding and Rugg (1996) were able to demonstrate that the old/new effects dissociated 
into two topographically and temporally distinct components. That is, the frontal and 
parietal effects were shown to differ both in terms of their time course (the frontal 
effect continuing beyond the duration of the parietal effect) and distribution (the frc^ntzal 
effect becoming significantly larger over the right than left hemisphere from -900 
msec post-stimulus). Note that one reason for the dissociation of the old/new effect 
into two components was a change in the recording procedures employed over the four 
experiments reported by Wilding and colleagues. In their first experiment they
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employed a 13 site electrode montage and a post-stimulus recording epoch of just 904 
msec, whereas in their final experiment they employed a 19 site montage and 1434 
msec post-stimulus recording epoch.
The second question raised by the results of Wilding and Rugg (1996) concerns the 
interpretations of the findings. As is clear from figure 4, the magnitudes of both the left 
parietal and right frontal old/new effects were larger in the ERPs associated with 
correct source judgements. Thus, as in the study of Wilding et al. (1995) the difference 
between the ERPs associated with correct and incorrect source judgements was 
quantitative rather than qualitative. Consequently, Wilding and Rugg (1996) argued 
that their results supported the findings of Wilding et al. (1995) in suggesting that 
successful recognition memory engages the same processes, regardless of whether 
contextual information about prior study episodes is retrieved.
In a radical departure from earlier interpretations, Wilding and Rugg argued that the 
lack of a qualitative difference between the ERPs associated with accurate and 
inaccurate source judgements provides no support for dual process models of 
recognition memory. Rather, the effects were interpreted as being consistent with the 
view that the distinction between recognition memory with and without the retrieval of 
source (contextual) information is quantitative rather qualitative (after Moscovitch, 
1992; and Squire, Knowlton and Musen, 1995). Indeed, Wilding and Rugg 
characterised accurate source responses as primarily reflecting recollection based 
responding, and inaccurate source responses as primarily reflecting familiarity based 
responding. Thus, given that the pattern of effects associated with the two response 
categories differed in degree, rather than in kind, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
familiarity is simply weak or partial recollection (allowing accurate old/new 
recognition judgements, but not accurate source judgements, to be made).
Support for this view comes from a reinterpretation of one of the Remember/Know 
experiments discussed earlier. Smith (1993) found larger old/new effects for 
Remember than Know responses, a finding that can be interpreted as evidence for a 
single retrieval process that is weaker for Know than Remember responses. However, 
as Allan, Wilding and Rugg (in press) note, it would be unwise to interpret the ERP 
data as providing strong evidence against the dual process view of recognition 
memory. As should be clear from chapter 2, the ERP method detects only a fraction of
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the total neural aetivity occurring withie the brale. Thus, the absence of ae ERP 
erteelate of familiarity may simply be due to fact that the neural correlates of this form 
of memory are not recordable at the scalp.
A more positive conclusion can be made however. The ERP data can be taken as 
evideeee agaiest a dual proeess model In whieh recollection and familiarity are viewed 
as exclusive processes. By an exclusivity model (note that this argument applies only 
to a third person, not first person, aeeount of memory, cf. Gardiner et al., 1996) 
familiarity and recollection are distlect fueetireal processes, with distinet neural 
correlates. Moreover, ae exclusivity model eeeessltates that aecurate performance is 
only associated with either one or tbe other process. Assuming that tbe ERP old/new 
effects reflect recolleetioe, thee the effects will only be seen when performance is 
associated with recollection. Even if tbe neural correlates of familiarity were not 
registered at tbe scalp, respoeses based upon familiarity would not be assoeiated with 
the neural correlates of reeollectioe, because tbe two bases for responding are 
exclusive of each other. Thus, ae exclusivity model erenot account for Wilding aed 
Rugg’s assertion that responses based upon familiarity appear to be assoeiated with 
weak or partial recollection (as indexed by the ERP old/new effects).
Functional accounts of the old/new effects
Leaving aside argumeets about the validity of dual process models of memory, tbe 
experiments performed by Wildieg aed colleagues provided clear evidence ie support 
of a recollection aeeount of the left parietal old/new effect. The studies of source 
memory also revealed a second old/new effect, tbe right frontal effect, which was 
temporally and topographically dissoeiable from the left parietal effeet. Consequently, 
the functional account provided by Wilding aed Rugg focused on aceounting for the 
distiection between these two old/eew effects. Ie interpreting their results Wilding and 
Rugg (1996) were inspired by neuropsychological accounts of memory that distinguish 
between processes associated with tbe retrieval of episodie Information (reeollectioe), 
and ‘post-retrieval’ proeesses that are required to generate or maintain a representation 
of the study episode (such that retrieved information ean be strategically employed). 
This distinction between retrieval and post-retrieval proeesses was taken to map 
directly onto the two old/ new effects.
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Looking first at the functional account of the left parietal effect, consistent with 
previous proposals. Wilding and Rugg interpreted it as a neural correlate of the 
successful retrieval of episodic information. As discussed above, the finding that the 
effect was larger when source information was successfully remembered (relative to 
when source memory was not remembered) provides strong support for the 
recollection account; after all, the retrieval of contextual information is the defining 
feature of episodic recollection. Wilding and Rugg further argued that the quantitative 
difference in the magnitude of the left parietal effect suggested that recollection was a 
graded process (rather than an all-or-none process).
The conclusion that the left parietal effect reflects the activity of a graded retrieval 
process is puzzling for two reasons. First, the graded nature of the ERP effects could 
simply have occurred as an artifact of the averaging process (cf. chapter 2). That is, the 
magnitude differences could reflect a single (all-or-none) effect that was present on a 
larger proportion of trials for the source correct than source incorrect response category 
(rather than a graded process that was larger in the trials for the source correct response 
category). As Rugg et al. (1994) note, the ERP data only suggest that recollection is a 
graded process, if it is assumed that the averaged ERPs are representative of the single 
trials that contribute to the average.
The second reason why Wilding and colleagues interpretation of recollection as a 
graded process is puzzling is that the dual process models of memory such as that 
proposed by Gardiner and Java (1990) and Yonelinas and Jacoby (1995) represent 
recollection as an all-or-none process (as discussed in chapter 1). Although Wilding 
and Rugg concluded that their findings were not inconsistent with a dual process 
model, their characterisation of the retrieval process was nonetheless contrary to the 
dual process view. However, the contradiction between ERP and dual process accounts 
of recollection may be more apparent than real. As Rugg et al. (1994) note, although 
the experience of recollecting may be all-or-none, the information content of such 
experiences may nonetheless be graded. In sum, whilst the magnitude of the averaged 
ERP old/new effect is predictive of subjects’ ability to retrieve source information, and 
the effect may reflect a graded recollection process, the findings are not inconsistent 
with an interpretation of recollection as an all-or-none retrieval process (cf. Chapter 1).
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Turning to the right frontal old/new effect, Wilding and Rugg proposed that, like the 
left parietal effect, it too was associated with recollection. Importantly, the absence of 
the right frontal effect in previous studies of item recognition (reviewed earlier) was 
taken to suggest that the effect is less closely tied to the actual retrieval of episodic 
information than the left parietal effect is. Rather, the presence of the right frontal 
effect in the studies of source memory was thought to result from the differing task 
demands that source judgements require compared to item recognition judgements. 
That is, reflecting the requirement explicitly to retrieve contextual information about 
the study episode in which each item was first experienced. This conclusion receives 
support from a study by Senkfor and Van Petten (1995), who contrasted item and 
source memory, and showed that the ERPs associated with successful performance on 
the two tasks differed over frontal electrodes.
In interpreting the right frontal effect Wilding and Rugg suggested that it may reflect 
operations that are necessary to generate and maintain a representation of prior study 
episodes, such that recollected infonnation can be used to perform the source memory 
task. This account receives support from a study by Johnson, Kounios and Nolde 
(1996), who also investigated the ERPs associated with source memory for words and 
pictures. At study one group of subjects performed an imagery task (how easy each 
item would be to draw), whilst the other group performed a function task (how many 
functions each item could serve).
Johnson et al. found that the ERPs associated with successful source memory did not 
differ for words and pictures, but did differ as a function of encoding task. The ERP 
differences were particularly pronounced over frontal electrodes, consistent with the 
suggestion that frontally distributed ERP effects reflect strategic processing 
differences, related to the retrieval of different source attributes. Unfortunately, 
Johnson et al. did not report the ERPs associated with correctly recognised new items, 
making comparison with the old/new effects reported in the present review somewhat 
difficult. That is, the ERP differences associated with the different study tasks may 
have reflected general aspects of processing common to both old and new test items, 
rather than being associated with the strategic retrieval of different types of source 
information per se.
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Finally, as for the left parietal effect. Wilding and Rugg interpreted the fact that the 
right frontal effect was present to differing degrees for correct and incorrect source 
judgements as evidence that it reflected a graded ratber than all-or-none process. 
Clearly, the argument regarding tbe graded nature of left parietal effect (discussed 
above) also applies to rigbt frontal old/new effeet; tbe ERP data are consistent with 
either a graded or an all-or-none aeeouet of the proeesses associated with the right 
frontal effect.
Source memory revisited
Oee final study of source memory should also be considered. Wildieg and Rugg 
(1997a) Investigated the old/eew effect using a reeogeitioe memory ‘exclusion’ task 
(based upon the proeess dissoeiation procedure, e.g., Jaeoby aed Kelley, 1992; 
discussed in cbapter 1). Tbe study phase of this experiment was the same as in Wilding 
and Rugg (1996); subjects heard words in either a male or female voiee. Old and new 
items were presented visually at test, however rather tbae tbe previous two-stage 
response task, only a single response was required. Subjects were instructed to respond 
differently to the two classes of study item, Items spoken in one voice were designated 
as ‘targets’ and responded to as old. Items spoken In tbe other voice were desigeated as 
‘non-targets’ and, along with genuinely new items, were responded to as new. Thus, as 
in previous source memory studies, to perform the exelusion task successfully subjects 
must recollect the prior study episode of each old item - familiarity will not allow the 
old targets to be distinguished from old non-targets.
The critical experimental finding from the source memory ‘exclusion’ study was that 
the pattern of old/new effects differed for the target and eon-target Items. The ERPs to 
old items desigeated as targets elicited both left parietal and right frontal old/eew 
effects, whereas the ERPs to old non-targets elicited only the left parietal effect. The 
fact that both classes of old item elicited tbe left parietal effect provides further support 
that this effect Is closely tied to recollection. More importantly, the fact that only old 
‘targets’ elicited the right frontal effect suggests that subjeets were able to correctly 
classify old ‘non-targets’ without employing the proeesses reflected by the right frontal 
effect. This finding is significant, because assuming that it is not simply a type II error, 
it suggests that the retrieval of source Information may be necessary, but is not
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sufficient, to elicit the right fRontal old/new effect. Rather than reflecting operations 
necessary to generate and maintain a representation of study episodes per se, the data 
suggest that the right frontal old/new effect may be associated with strategic or task 
related aspects of such operations. Moreover, the use of an exclusion task revealed that 
the right fRontal old/new effects was elicited under conditions where only a single 
response judgement was required to each test item. Thus, the presence of the right 
frontal effect in tests of source memory, but not item recognition, cannot be attributed 
to the use of a two-stage retrieval task - an important finding in its own right.
Finally, Wilding and Rugg (1997a) also demonstrated the presence of an additional 
ERP component - a late onsetting, negative going shift, maximal over centro-parietal 
electrodes - that was present in the ERPs to both classes of old item. This effect was 
not associated with mnemonic processing. Rather, the magnitude of this negative going 
shift was found to correlate with the mean RT to each response category, regardless of 
the items’ study status, or subjects’ responses to each class of item, suggesting that the 
effect reflects response related processes.
Associative recall
All of the studies performed by Wilding and colleagues discussed above employed a 
source memory task as a means of operationally defining recollection. In combination 
with the development of the ERP recording procedures, the source memory approach 
allowed considerable advances to be made, providing strong evidence in support of the 
link between the left parietal effect and recollection. Moreover, the studies permitted 
the discovery of a second component, the right frontal effect, which appears to reflect 
strategic post-retrieval processing of recollected information. An alternative to the 
source memory approach has also been employed however, using the successful 
retrieval of associative information as a means of operationally defining recollection. 
Associative retrieval provides an equally powerful, if different, definition of 
recollection to that provided by the use of a source memory task.
A study employing an associative recall task performed by Rugg, Schloerscheidt, 
Doyle, Cox and Patching (1996). Subjects were presented with a series of arbitrarily 
paired words, and required to form associations between the words by forming a short 
sentence incorporating each pair. At test subjects were presented with single old and
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new words, and, as in the studies of Wilding and colleagues, a two-stage retrieval task 
was performed. Subjects were required to discriminate old from new items, and for 
items judged old, to attempt to recall the word with which it had been paired at study 
(the study associate). This procedure employed the same logic as in the source memory 
studies; recollection was operationally defined as the ability to accurately recall the 
study associate of a recognised old item. Familiarity based responding would not allow 
subjects to report the study associate, and thus items that were recognised, but for 
which the study associate was not recalled, must have been recognised either on the 
basis of familiarity or weak (partial or incomplete) recollection. Moreover, Rugg et al. 
(1996) were able to make specific predictions regarding the right frontal old/new 
effect. If the effect was simply associated with successful recollection, then it should 
be present in the ERPs to successfully recognised items in the study of associative 
recall. By contrast, if the effect reflects processing that is more sensitive to the specific 
tasks demands imposed by tests of source memory, then it should be absent in the 
ERPs for associative recall (as is the case in studies of item recognition).
The ERP findings from this study are illustrated figure 5, shown for the same electrode 
sites as for the source memory data (see figure 4). As can be seen from the figure, 
relative to the ERPs for correctly rejected new items, the ERPs to old items that were 
recognised, and for which the associate was successfully recalled, elicited a left parietal 
old/new effect. By contrast, a much smaller (and statistically non-significant) left 
parietal old/new is evident for the ERPs to words that were recognised but for which 
the study associate was not recalled. Note, however, that from approximately 800-900 
msec post-stimulus the left greater than right parietal asymmetry is characterised by a 
right-sided negative going shift.
Although the negative going effect had been seen in the previous studies of source 
memory, the present study provided additional information about it. As Rugg et al. 
(1996) note, the fact that the magnitude of the negative going shift did not differ 
between the two old response categories suggests that it is dissociable from the left 
parietal effect. Thus, whilst the two effects may be temporally overlapping, they appear 
to be functionally distinct, consistent with the suggestion that the negative going shift 
is linked more closely to response- than memory-related processes (cf. Wilding and 
Rugg, 1997, discussed above).
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Significaetly, tbe associative recall data revealed eo sign of the right frontal old/eew 
effect In the ERPs for eitber class of recognised old item (cf. figure 5). Careful 
examination of the data does reveal a small transient positive-going shift, maximal 
over ffonto-eenttaa eleetrode sites. However, even with targeted analyses Rugg et al. 
found that tbis was eot statistically slgeificaet (M. D. Rugg, personal communication). 
Thus, Rugg et al. concluded tbat, as in studies of item recogeition, tbe generators of the 
right frontal old/new effeet were eot active ie the case of associative recall. Tbis 
finding is important because it provides further evidence tbat the left parietal and rigbt 
frontal effects are dissociable, supporting the suggestion that the left parietal effeet Is 
more closely tied to recollection than is the right frontal effect.
The findings of Rugg et al. also provide further evidence about the functional 
characteristics of tbe rigbt frontal old/new effect. Tbe fact that the rigbt frontal effect 
was not elicited by successful associative reeall adds weight to the suggestioe made by 
Wilding and Rugg (1997a) tbat tbe effeet is particularly seesitlve to task related 
factors. As Rugg et al. note, one of the Important differences between tests of source 
memrey aed associative recall lies in the nature of the infonnatlon tbat Is retrieved in 
each task. Subjects are required to retrieve episodie (eontextual) information in both 
tasks. Moreover, in both cases, contextual information tbat Is recollected must be used 
to meet the demands of the task.
Crucially, the associative recall task requires the retrieval of contextual information 
that is intrinsic to each study episode, whereas for source memory tbe ieformatioe is 
extrlnsie to each episode. Tbat Is, tbe contextual ieformation retrieved in tests of 
associative reeall is trial unique (i.e., integral to individual study episodes), whereas in 
source memory the ieformatioe is background context (i.e., common to a whole classes 
of study episodes, sucb as items preseeted two different voices). Thus, Rugg et al. 
(1996) suggested that the right frontal effect reflects post-tetrievaa operatioes tbat are 
engaged seleetively, depending on the type of contextual ditcrimieatioe tbat is required 
to perform source Memory tasks (i.e., by tbe retrieval of extrinsic, but not Intrinsic, 
context). Clearly, tbis coeclusioe fits well with the idea tbat tbe post-retrieval 
operations are employed to generate a representation of the prior study episode, 
allowing retrieved ieformation to be used Ie a strategic, goal directed, way.
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Identifying the generators of the old/new effects
An issue that has not been addressed so far concerns the possible intracerebral 
generators of the old/new effects. As was discussed in chapter 2, scalp recorded ERP 
data do not, in themselves, provide much information about the location of ERP 
generators. Consequently, as Allan et al. (in press) note, much of the discussion of the 
sources of the effects has been inspired by the functional accounts of the effects, and 
should be considered as little more than informed speculation at present.
As noted above, by Wilding and Rugg’s account, the left parietal effect indexes the 
functioning of the medial temporal lobes to the retrieval of episodic information. Some 
support for this hypothesis comes form the study hy Smith and Halgren (1989) 
discussed earlier, in which it was found that the old/new effect was absent in left 
temporal lobectomy patients (although see Rugg, et al., 1991, who found that the 
old/new effect was attenuated in both left and right temporal lobectomy patients).
Certainly, the fact that the effect is lateralised to the left hemisphere is at least 
consistent with the finding that it is absent in left, but not right, temporal lobectomy 
patients. The generators of the left parietal effect are unlikely to be located within the 
medial temporal lobe memory system itself however, because scalp recorded ERPs are 
insensitive to activity within the hippocampus and related parahippocampal structures 
(cf. Rugg, 1995d). Nonetheless, studies employing depth electrodes placed within the 
medial temporal lobes suggest that activity within these structures is sensitive to the 
repetition of items during recognition memory tasks (e.g., see Smith, Stapleton and 
Halgren, 1986; Guillem, N’Kaoua, Rougier, Claverie, 1995). Consequently, Wilding 
and Rugg (1996) suggested that the effect might index cortical activity that is caused 
by the cortical-hippocampal interactions that are thought to result from retrieval-related 
activity of the medial temporal lobe memory system (e.g., see McClelland, 
McNaughton and O’Reilly, 1995; Teyler and Discenna, 1986).
The functional interpretations discussed above have also inspired accounts of the 
generators of the right frontal old/new effect. Wilding and Rugg interpreted the 
presence of the effect as reflecting the demands of the source task, and suggested that 
the effect may be generated by activity within the right prefrontal cortex. This 
suggestion fits well with evidence from lesion studies that show source memory to be
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disproportionately impaired by damage to the prefrontal cortex (e.g., Janowsky, 
Shimamura and Squire, 1989; Stuss, Eskes and Foster, 1994). Moreover, as Allan et al. 
(in press) note, the link between the right frontal old/new effect and activity of the 
prefrontal cortex also fits well with evidence from neuroimaging studies of memory 
retrieval employing PET.
Neuroimaging studies have consistently revealed evidence of memory related activity 
within the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (e.g., see Buckner and Tulving, 1995; 
and Fletcher, Frith and Rugg, 1997 for reviews). Whilst these findings have been 
interpreted as a sign of retrieval effort or mode (e.g., see Kapur, Craik, Jones, Brown, 
Houle and Tulving, 1995; Schacter, Alpert, Savage, Rauch and Albert, 1996), there is 
also evidence that the activity of the right prefrontal cortex varies as a function of 
whether recognition is successful or unsuccessful (Rugg, Fletcher, Frith, Frackowiak 
and Dolan, 1996). The fact that activity within the prefrontal cortex varies with 
retrieval success is significant, because otherwise there could be no corresponding ERP 
old/new effect (indexing the difference between the correct rejection of new Items and 
the successful recognition of old items). In sum, both lesion and neuroimaging studies 
provide converging evidence In support of the idea that the generators of the fRontal 
old/new effect are located in the right prefrontal cortex. Notwithstanding the 
difficulties of inferring the location of generators from scalp recorded ERP data, the 
scalp distribution of the right frontal effect is at least consistent with the foregoing 
hypothesis.
Summary
The studies reviewed in this chapter provide the context for the research presented in 
this thesis. The findings from a variety of studies suggest that there are two temporally 
and topographically dissociable ERP old/new effects, which Index dissociable memory 
processes, but which are both associated with the successful retrieval of contextual 
Information. First there is the left parietal effect, which Indexes recollection, and can 
support the ability to make simple old/new judgements concerning the prior occurrence 
of items in a memory test. Second, there is the right frontal effect, which indexes post­
retrieval processing, is thought to operate on the products of the retrieval process, and 
is associated with the recovery of contextual information. This later process supports
no
the ability to make source judgements, where subjects are required to use retrieved 
information in a strategie (task or goal directed) way, and Is not elicited in tests of item 
recognition or associative reeall. In combination, tbe functional characteristics, along 
with the topographie distribution and time course of the ERP effects, provide 
convergent evideeee in support of this framework.
It should be clear that the foregoing account of the functional significance of the ERP 
old/new effects has developed over time. Tbe ERP methods employed have also 
developed, such that significantly more Information Has become available about both 
the time course aed distribution of tbe effeets. Finally, the distinction between the left 
parietal aed right frontal old/new effect, and tbe mapping of the effeets onto a 
eeurologically Inspired account of retrieval aed post-retrieval memory processing, Has 
allowed ae explieit model of memory retrieval to be formulated. Tbe left parietal effect 
is thought to reflect the activity of tbe medial temporal lobe memory system, critical 
for the retrieval of episodie information. By contrast, tbe right frontal effect is thought 
to reflect the activity of the prefrontal cortex, critical for more strategie ‘post-retrieval’ 
aspects of memory.
Tbe research preseeted in tbis thesis follows direetly from the work reviewed here, 
investigating the functloeal interpretations of the ERP old/new that have been formed 
oe the basis of the studies of item reeogeitioe, source memory and associative reeall. 
The five experiments reported Here all employ tests of associative memory; starting 
with ERP studies of associative reeogeitioe, aed going on to compare assoelative 
reeognitlon and associative reeall.
As was discussed in cbapter 1, associative or relatioeal processing is a fundamental 
characteristic of the medial temporal lobe memory system, and assoeiatlve memory 
tasks Have been widely cited as paradigmatic tests of episodic memory (e.g., see 
Tulving, 1983, Cohen and Eiehenbaum, 1993; Gaffae, 1994). Moreover, experiments 
involving the retrieval of assoeiatlve Information memory have been important In the 
rejection of single proeess models of reeogeition memory, providing evidence in 
support of dual proeess models of recognition memory.
Finally, one advantage of testing associative memory Ie all five experiments is that the 
same study procedure is employed ie each case - consequently, any differences in the
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ERPs at test cannot be attributed to differences at encoding, rather, they must reflect 
differences at retrieval. Before the introducing experiment 1 in detail however, chapter 
4 provides details of the general methods employed in each of the subsequent 
empirical chapters.
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____HIT
l^V ____ CORRECT REJECTION
Figure 3. The ERP old/new effect: Item recognition. ERPs for correctly recognised old items (hits), and new items (correct rejections). ERPs 
are shown from the left and right parietal electrodes (LP and RP respectively), illustrating the left greater than right hemispheric asymmetry 
that characterises the left parietal effect found in studies of item recognition. Reproduced with permission from Allan (1996) unpublished
doctoral thesis.
0 600ms
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+
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WV ____ CORRECT REJECTION
Figure 4. The ERP old/new effect: Source memory. ERPs for correctly recognised new items (correct rejections) and correctly recognised old 
items receiving correct (hit/hit) and incorrect (hit/miss) source judgements. Waveforms are shown from the left and right parietal and frontal 
electrodes (LP/RP and LF/RF respectively), illustrating the differences in the time course and scalp distribution of the left parietal and right 
frontal old/new effects. Reproduced with permission from Wilding and Rugg (1996).
0 600ms 0 600ms
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+
____RECOGNISED/UNRECALLED
WV ____ CORRECT REJECTION
Figure 5. The ERP old/new effect: Associative Recall. ERPs for correctly recognised new items (correct rejections) and correctly recognised 
old items receiving correct (recognised/recalled) and incorrect (recognised/unrecalled) associative judgements. ERPs are shown from the left 
and right parietal and frontal electrodes (LP/RP and LF/RF respectively), illustrating the presence of the left parietal old/new effect, and the 
absence of the right frontal old/new effect. Reproduced with permission from Rugg et al. (1996).
Chapter 4
GENERAL METHODS
This chapter provides details of the core methods that are employed in the 5 
subsequent experiments. Of particular significance are the details of the study phase, 
and the procedures employed in the recording and analysis of the ERP data. Each 
experimental chapter will contain an additional method section, explaining any 
procedures specific to that study.
Subjects
Subjects were recruited from the student population in St Andrews, using the following
selection criteria: right handed, native English speakers, aged between 16 and 35 years 
old, with normal (or corrected-to-normal) vision. Subjects were also screened for a 
history of neurological or psychiatric illnesses, and recent drug or alcohol use. Subjects
were paid either £3.50 per hour (experiments 1-3), or £5.00 per hour (experiments 4 
and 5), for participating.
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Experimental materials
Stimuli were drawn from a set of 1000 medium frequency nouns and verbs (mean 19.1 
per million, range 10 to 30 per million, 4 to 8 letters in length) selected from the 
Francis and Kucera corpus (Francis and Kucera, 1982). These words are provided in 
appendix A. In each experiment this word list was manipulated to produce a set of 
semantically and associatively unrelated word pairs (see individual methods sections 
for details of the procedures used to create study-test lists).
All experimental stimuli were presented as pairs in central vision (separated by 
approximately 0.7 degrees), just above and below a central fixation point. Stimuli were 
displayed in white capital letters against a black background, subtending a maximum 
vertical visual angle of approximately 0.7 degrees and a maximum horizontal angle of 
approximately 2.0 degrees.
Experimental tasks and procedures
Subjects were initially fitted with an ERP recording cap (described below). It was then 
explained that they were taking part in a memory experiment, and that the aim of study 
task was to ensure that they remembered word pairs. The study phase was identical in 
all 5 experiments, and involved a self-paced ‘sentence generation’ task. All aspects of 
the study procedure were kept constant, except that subjects were given slightly more 
time in experiments 4 and 5 (shown in square brackets below).
For each trial an initial fixation character (!) was displayed, signalling that the subject 
could initiate the beginning of a trial. When the appropriate response button was 
depressed this character was replaced with a second fixation character (+) for a 
duration of 500 msec [800 msec for experiments 4 and 5]. This character was replaced 
with a word pair, displayed for 500 msec [1000 msec for experiments 4 and 5], 
followed by the original fixation character. Subjects were instructed to read each pair 
as it was presented, and then to generate and say out loud a short sentence that 
incorporated the two words. Subjects were then free to begin the next trial.
In all experiments, prior to the test phase subjects were instructed to relax, maintain 
fixation, minimise body and eye movement, and blink only when an exclamation
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character (!) was present on the monitor. It was stressed that these instructions were 
intended to reduce the number of ERP trials containing artifacts (see below).
ERP recording and data processing
Scalp EEG was recorded from 25 tin electrodes embedded in an elasticated head cap 
(Electro-Cap International). The recording montage, illustrated in figure 6, was based 
on the International 10-20 system (Jasper, 1958). Midline sites were Fz, Cz and Pz. 
Left and right hemisphere sites were: Fpl/Fp2; F3/F4, F7/F8, LF/RF (frontal, 75% of 
the distance between Fz and F7/F8); C3/C4, T3/T4, LT/RT (anterior temporal, 75% of 
the distance between Cz and T3/T4); P3/P4, T5/T6, LP/RP (parietal, 75% of the 
distance between Pz and T5/T6); and 01/02.
Figure 6. Electrode montage, viewed as if looking down onto the top of the head. All 25 electrodes are 
shown (shaded electrodes are those employed in the subsidiary analyses performed in each experiment).
A
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An additional channel recorded EEG from the right mastoid. AH EEG channels were 
recorded with respect to an electrode placed on the left mastoid, but were re-referenced 
off-line to represent recordings with respect to linked mastoids. EOG was recorded 
bipolarly from electrodes positioned above the supra-orbital ridge of the right eye, and 
adjacent to the outer canthus of the left eye. Inter-electrode impedance levels were kept 
below 5kGl, and EEG and EOG were each amplified with a bandwidth of 0.03Hz to 
35Hz (3dB points).
In experiment 1 signals were sampled for 1536 msec, at a rate of 6 msec per point. 
Sampling began with a 102 msec pre-stimulus baseline, allowing a total post-stimulus 
recording epoch of 1434 msec. In experiments 2-6 the post-stimulus recording epoch 
was extended to 1944 msec (sampling at 8 msec per point, for 2048 msec with a 104 
msec pre-stimulus baseline).
ERPs were fonned only for the selected response categories in any given experiment 
(see individual method sections for details). Response categories were defined by the 
type of item presented (e.g., old vs. new words presented at test) and the response 
made to those items (e.g., correct vs. incorrect old/new judgements). When forming 
ERPs trials were excluded if there was substantial EOG activity (i.e., if base-to-peak 
EOG amplitude exceeded 98|lV), or if one or more channels exhibited excessive drift 
fRom baseline (i.e., if the difference between first and last data points exceeded 60pV 
(experiments 1 to 3) or 55pV (experiments 4 and 5)). These two constraints ensured 
that any trials containing large artifacts did not contribute to the averaged ERP.
To ensure an acceptable ERP signal/noise ratio, a minimum of 16 artifact-free trials 
was required in each critical response category, from each subject. Subjects that did not 
contribute sufficient ERP trials to each critical response category were excluded. Prior 
to EEG averaging the DC offset (pre-stimulus baseline drift) was removed fRom each 
recording channel. This required subtracting the mean amplitude of the pre-stimulus 
baseline fRom the voltage measure at each sample point, resulting in the pre-stimulus 
baseline being normalised to zero (as can be seen in the grandaverage ERPs). Finally, 
averaged ERP data were smoothed, using a 5-point binomial filter'.
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Data Analyses
Behavioural and ERP data were analysed using repeated measures ANOVA. Unless
otherwise stated, post hoc contrasts were performed with the Newman-Keuls test, and 
employed a significance threshold of p < 0.05.
To reduce the probability of a Type-I error in the analysis of the ERP data the 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction for non-sphericity was used, and associated F ratios are 
reported with corrected degrees of freedom where necessary (Howell, 1992). This 
correction is necessary because ANOVA model assumes that the data being analysed 
exhibits sphericity, i.e., that the variance within the levels of a factor, and covariance 
between factors, are homogenous. The ANOVA model is robust in the face of minor 
violations of this assumption, however, when applied to ERP data this assumption is 
usually broken. For example, the amount of variance shared by any two electrodes is 
highly dependent upon their location relative to one another; generally the closer they 
are the greater variance they share. Thus, in any analysis involving a number of 
electrode sites the covariance between each pair of electrodes is unlikely to be 
homogenous (e.g., data measured from two anterior electrodes is likely to share more 
variance with each other than with data measured from a posterior electrode). The 
Greenhouse-Geisser procedure provides an estimate of the degree to which the 
assumption of sphericity is violated, and reduces the degrees of freedom accordingly.
In each experiment analysis of the ERP data typically involved comparing the ERPs 
for each pair of critical response categories (e.g., correct rejections vs. correct 
recognition), over a series of latency regions. ANOVAs were conducted on the mean 
amplitude of the averaged ERPs, relative to the mean amplitude of the pre-stimulus 
baseline. There were two elements to the analyses of each data set, comparison of the 
magnitudes (size) of effects, and comparison of the topographies (scalp distribution) of 
the effects.
Magnitude analyses
The magnitude analyses were performed to elucidate any differences in the amplitudes 
of the ERPs, beginning with a global ANOVA, employing the factors of response 
category and site (all 25 electrodes, cf. Figure 6). The global ANOVA was then
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followed by targeted subsidiary ANOVA, employing a subset of sites. In experiments 
1 to 3 these were lateral electrodes over left and right, frontal and temporo-parietal, 
scalp (i.e., chains of 3 sites in each of four locations, highlighted in figure 6) and the 
ANOVAs employed the factors of location (anterior vs. posterior), hemisphere (left vs. 
right) and site (inferior vs. mid-lateral vs. superior). In experiments 4 and 5 the 
analysis was performed separately for anterior and posterior chains, employing the 
factors of hemisphere (left vs. right) and site (inferior vs. mid-lateral vs. superior). In 
each experiment the results of these subsidiary magnitude analyses are reported in a 
table. Only significant effects involving the factor of response category are reported, 
because interest lies solely in differences between response categories (i.e., old/new 
effects).
Topographic analyses
Following the analyses of the magnitude of effects, additional analyses were performed 
to investigate the scalp topography of any old/new effects that were found. The 
structure of the topographic analyses typically followed the same pattern as that for the 
magnitude analyses. However, the topographic analyses were performed on ‘difference 
waveforms’ (i.e., the difference between the ERPs to old and new response categories), 
allowing the distribution of the old/new effects to be compared across latency regions, 
and across response categories. Importantly, prior to the topographic analyses these 
data were ‘rescaled’.
Rescaling the data is necessary because of a second disparity between the properties of 
scalp recorded ERPs and the assumptions of the ANOVA technique (McCarthy and 
Wood, 1985). Any change in the degree to which a generator is active has a 
multiplicative effect upon voltage measurements made at the scalp. As applied to ERP 
data however, the ANOVA model assumes that a change in the activity of a generator 
would have an additive effect at the scalp. Thus, analyses performed upon raw data can 
misrepresent (quantitative) changes in magnitude as (qualitative) changes in 
distribution. ERP data must therefore be rescaled to remove the confounding effects of 
changes in the magnitude of effects, on changes in the distribution of the effects. 
Following McCarthy and Wood (1985), the data were rescaled by calculating the 
magnitude of the ERP effect at each electrode site relative to the magnitude of the
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effect at all other sites (the max-min method). This procedure was performed
separately for each response category and each latency region, transforming each data
set into a zero-to-one range, whilst maintaining the relative distribution of activity
across the scalp whilst removing differences in size.
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Chapter 5.
EXPERIMENT 1
INTRODUCTION
As should be clear from the review in chapter 1, the idea that recognition memory is 
based on two distinct processes, recollection and familiarity, is central to ‘dual process’ 
theories of recognition (cf. Atkinson and Juola, 1973; Gardiner and Java, 1993; Jacoby 
and Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980). Recollection refers to conscious retrieval of the 
original study episode in which an item (usually a word) occurred. Thus, recollection 
provides information both about the prior occurrence of an item, and the context of that 
occurrence. By contrast, familiarity-based recognition is not accompanied by 
information from specific study episodes, and therefore provides no means for making 
discriminations on the basis of contextual information. Recollection is commonly 
viewed as the outcome of a relatively slow, effortful, search-like, process which can be 
brought under conscious control, whereas familiarity is seen as reflecting a faster, more 
automatic, process (e.g., Hintzman and Curran, 1994; Jacoby and Kelley, 1992).
Dual process theory has provided the framework for the interpretation of findings from 
several recent ERP studies of recognition memory (e.g., Rugg et al., 1995; Smith, 
1993; Wilding et al., 1995; for reviews see Allan et al., in press; Johnson, 1995; Rugg
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1995). These studies have revealed a characteristic pattern of scalp-recorded neural 
activity - the ERP ‘old/new effect’ - that is associated with successful recognition. The 
old/new effect takes the form of a positive shift in the ERPs for words which are 
correctly recognised as old (hits), compared to those correctly judged new. The effect 
typically onsets between 300 and 400 msec post-stimulus, lasts for around 400-600 
msec, and is maximal over left temporo-parietal sites. The effect is not found for 
unrecognised old words (misses), or for new words incorrectly identified as old (false 
alarms). It therefore appears to be a reflection of brain activity contributing to, or 
contingent upon, the retrieval of information required to make accurate recognition 
responses.
A range of evidence supports the idea that the ERP old/new effect is an 
electrophysiological correlate of recollection (e.g., see Palier and Kutas, 1995; Palier et 
al., 1995; Rugg et al., 1995; Smith, 1993; Smith and Halgren, 1989). Perhaps the most 
convincing evidence comes from studies in which recollection has been 
operationalised as the ability to make accurate source judgements (Wilding et al., 
1995, Wilding and Rugg, 1996, 1997a). The rationale behind such studies is that items 
can be assigned to their correct source only if their encoding context is successfully 
retrieved. Hence, differences between ERPs elicited by items attracting correct and 
incorrect source judgements can be taken to be ERP correlates of recollection. In the 
experiments of Wilding and Rugg (1996), subjects heard words at study that were 
presented in either a male or female voice. At test, subjects were required to judge 
whether items were old or new, and, for each item judged old, to report the gender of 
the voice in which it had been presented at study. Wilding and Rugg found that the 
magnitude of the left parietal old/new effect was larger in the ERPs associated with 
recognition that was accompanied by an accurate source judgement than when it was 
accompanied by an inaccurate judgement.
In addition to the left parietal effect, the data of Wilding and Rugg (1996) 
demonstrated the existence of a second old/new effect, which was also sensitive to 
whether or not recognition was accompanied by recollection. This effect also onset 
around 400 msec post stimulus, but was dissociable from the left parietal effect by 
virtue of its more extended time course, and its right frontal scalp distribution. Like the
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left parietal effect, the ‘right frontal’ old/new effect was larger in ERPs associated with 
correct rather than incorrect source judgements.
Wilding and Rugg argued that the prominence of the right frontal effect in their studies 
of source memory reflected the fact that, unlike standard tests of recognition memory, 
source judgements necessitate the explicit retrieval of study context. They argued that 
the right frontal effect reflects processes, which operate upon recollected information 
to generate a representation of the retrieved episode (cf. Squire et al., 1993). They 
further argued that such representations are necessary for accurate source 
discriminations, but not for making simple old/new discriminations, hence the absence 
of a prominent right frontal effect in previous ERP studies of recognition memory.
The present experiments extend previous findings by employing an associative 
recognition task to vary the likelihood that experimental items will be recollected. 
Tests of recognition memory for associative information (associative recognition) 
involve memory for word pairs rather than individual words. At test subjects must 
distinguish pairs composed of the same words as were presented at study (same pairs) 
from pairs composed of new combinations of studied words (rearranged pairs). In 
contrast to old/new recognition (item recognition), where subjects are presented with a 
mixture of old and new words, all the words in a typical associative recognition test 
have been studied. Thus, it is memory for the relationship between the members of a 
pair that is critical for accurate performance.
As already noted, the dual-process framework proposes that accurate item recognition 
can be based on either familiarity or recollection. By contrast, it has been argued that 
associative recognition is based solely on recollection, as the recovery of information 
about word pairing is only available if memory for the original study episode is 
retrieved (cf. Clark, 1992; Hockley, 1992). Thus, according to this argument, 
familiarity-based recognition cannot support associative recognition judgements.
This argument has recently received support from the findings of Yonelinas (1997), 
who contrasted the receiver operating characteristics (ROCs) for item and associative 
recognition memory. Yonelinas found that ROC curves for item recognition were best 
fitted by a model of performance which assumes a contribution from both familiarity 
and recollection (see also Yonelinas and Jacoby, 1995), whereas the ROC curves for
125
associative recognition were best fitted by assuming that performance was based on 
recollection alone. Thus, Yonelinas’ data support the suggestion that performance on 
tests of item recognition can be based on either recollection or familiarity, but that only 
recollection can support accurate associative recognition.
Yonelinas’ findings also provide an important insight into how rearranged pairs are 
detected in an associative recognition test. Since recollection is more probable for same 
than for rearranged pairs, ‘rearranged’ responses could be made by default, whenever a 
test pair fails to engender recollection. In line with this analysis, Yonelinas’ findings 
suggest that responses to rearranged pairs are indeed more likely to made on the basis 
of a ‘default’ strategy than upon veridical recollection of a study episode.
In summary, the findings fRom behavioural studies suggest that accurate performance 
on tests of associative recognition is based predominantly on the recollection of 
previous study episodes. Associative recognition thus provides a means of fUrther 
investigating the putative ERP correlates of recollection. Specifically, if the ERP 
effects described by Wilding and Rugg (1996) do indeed reflect processes linked to 
recollection of specific prior episodes, the effects should be more prominent, relative to 
unstudied pairs, for word pairs that maintain their pairing between study and test than 
for those in which the pairing is changed. The two experiments reported below explore 
this hypothesis.
Experiment 1 was designed to be analogous with the source memory procedure 
employed by Wilding and Rugg (1996). To this end the standard associative 
recognition paradigm was modified by including pairs of new words (new pairs) in the 
test task, thus providing an ERP baseline equivalent to that used by Wilding and Rugg. 
At study, subjects viewed a series of unrelated word pairs and at test they were 
presented with same, rearranged, and new pairs. The test requirement was first to 
categorise each pair as either old or new, and, for pairs judged to be old, to perform an 
associative recognition judgement. According to the reasoning outlined in the previous 
paragraph, ERPs to pairs correctly judged ‘same’ should resemble those associated 
with correct source judgements in Wilding and Rugg’s study (1996). In contrast, the 
ERPs to pairs correctly judged ‘rearranged’ should show little or no sign of the ERP 
correlates of recollection.
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METHODS
Subjects
18 students participated in the experiment. Data from 2 subjects were discarded due to 
there being insufficient artifact-free trials in the critical response categories. Of the 
remaining 16 subjects, 10 were female. The mean age of the subjects was 19.6 years 
(range 17 to 23 years).
Experimental materials
The experimental design, examples of stimuli and correct responses are shown in table 
2. 800 words were selected at random from the word pool (cf. Appendix A) and used 
to form 400 semantically and associatively unrelated pairs. These pairs were then 
randomly allocated into one of two study lists. Each study list was paired with two test 
lists, each of which contained 400 critical pairs. Of these pairs 200 were drawn from 
the alternative study list, and constituted the new pairs. One hundred of the study pairs 
maintained their pairing between the study and test lists, and the remaining 100 pairs 
were repaired so as to generate the rearranged pairs. The Items that were used to form 
the rearranged pairs in one of the test lists were employed to form the same pairs in the 
other, and vice-versa.
Table 2. Experimental design, showing the different classes of stimuli, and associated correct responses.
Phase Class of Item Examule Response
Study List 200 word pairs: doll-bush
charm-glue
paint-ride
green-honey
Test List 100 same pairs:
100 rearranged pairs:
200 new pairs:
doll-bush
charm-ride
rock-steam
Old: Same
Old: Rearranged
New
By rotating study and test lists over subjects, it was possible to ensure that every word 
pair was presented equally often as old or new, and when old, equally frequently as 
same or rearranged. An extra 40 words were selected for use as filler items, forming 20
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word pairs. Four different orderings of the two study lists were created, padded by 5 
filler pairs before each set of 100 critical items. The 8 test lists were generated so as to 
have different quasi-random orderings of items and experimental conditions, and again 
contained a sequence of 5 fillers prior to each set of 100 critical pairs.
Experimental tasks, procedure and ERP recording
The experiment consisted of a single study-test cycle (details of the study procedure 
are provided in chapter 4). The test phase followed the study phase after an interval of 
approximately 10 minutes. Each test trial consisted of the presentation of a fixation 
character (!) for 2.4 seconds, followed by a second fixation character (+) for 500 msec. 
There then followed a 182 msec blank period, following which the test items were 
presented for a duration of 300 msec. The screen then remained blank until 1 sec after 
the first response, at which time a third fixation character (?) was presented for 2.5 
seconds, signalling the need to give the second response if appropriate. The original 
fixation character then returned, signalling the beginning of the next trial.
Subjects were Instructed to make an initial speeded old/new judgement to each test 
pair, responding old to pairs that contained studied words, and new to pairs of 
unstudied items. They were instructed to make this judgement as quickly but also as 
accurately as possible. The Instructions further specified that for pairs judged to be old, 
a second response should be given when cued to do so. The requirement now was to 
judge whether the words were in the same pairing as when seen at study, or whether 
the pairing had changed. The test list was administered in four blocks of 105 pairs, 
with a short rest break intervening between each block.
Responses were made with the left or right Index fingers, which rested on microswitch
response keys. The mapping of keys to responses was counterbalanced across subjects 
such that there was no correlation between hands used for positive responses for each 
of the two judgements. Details of the ERP recording procedures are provided in 
chapter 4.
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RESULTS
Behavioural data
Table 3 shows the probability of an old judgement to same, rearranged, and new pairs.
A one way ANOVA of these probabilities revealed a significant main effect (F2,30 = 
181.69, p < 0.001). Post hoc tests revealed significant differences between each pair of 
means; subjects were able to discriminate both classes of old pair from new pairs, but 
did so more accurately for same pairs.
Table 3. Mean probability (standard deviations in brackets) of an old response for the initial old/new 
judgement, and the subsequent probability of a correct associative recognition judgement, for same, 
rearranged and new pairs. For new pairs, the associative recognition score shows the probability of a 
‘rearranged’ response to false alarms.
Judgement Resnonse Same Rearranged New
OLD/NEW Old: 0.81 (0.15) 0.73 (0.12) 0.18 (0.26)
ASSOCIATIVE Correct: 0.75 (0.14) 0.84 (0.13) 0.89 (0.1)
Table 3 also shows the probabilities of correct responses for the associative recognition 
judgement (conditionalised on initial recognition performance), as well as the 
proportion of false alarms receiving a ‘rearranged’ response. Initial analysis of the 
associative recognition judgements compared the probability of a correct response for 
all old pairs (i.e., averaged across same and rearranged pairs) against the chance level 
of 0.5. This revealed that subjects were able reliably to discriminate same from 
rearranged pairs (t(15) == 15.48, p < 0.001). Responses to false alarms showed a strong 
(0.89) and statistically significant (t(15) = 11.71, p < 0.001) bias towards judging such 
pairs as being ‘rearranged’. To elucidate differences in responses to same and 
rearranged pairs, the probability of correct associative recognition responses for each 
class of pair was contrasted with the probability of making the same response to a false 
alarm. This analysis revealed that the same pairs received significantly more ‘same’ 
responses than did false alarms (0.75 vs. 0.11, t(15) = 15.45, p < 0.001), whereas 
rearranged pairs received slightly fewer ‘rearranged’ responses than false alarms (0.84 
vs. 0.89, t(15) = 2.57, p < 0.025).
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Table 4 shows mean RTs for the Initial recognition responses. These are shown 
according to the accuracy of the initial old/new recognition judgement, and also 
according to the accuracy of the subsequent associative recognition judgement. For the 
former set of RTs, ANOVA revealed main effects of word pair type and accuracy 
(Fl.44,30 = 4.57, p < 0.05; and Fl,15 = 33.70, p < 0.001, respectively). The main 
effect of accuracy reflected faster correct than incorrect responses. Post hoc tests 
revealed that the main effect of word pair type reflected significant differences In RTs 
between each pair of means. The mean RTs were slowest for the rearranged pairs 
(1788 msec), and fastest for new pairs (1645 msec), with same pairs occupying an 
intermediate position (1737 msec).
Table 4. Mean reaction times (msec) separated according both to the accuracy of the initial old/new 
recognition judgement and the subsequent associative recognition judgement.
Judgement Response Same Rearranged New
OLD/NEW Correct: 1583 1686 1574
Incorrect: 1890 1889 1716
ASSOCIATIVE Correct: 1492 1715
Incorrect: 1734 1629
ANOVA of the RTs conditionalised on accuracy of the associative recognition 
judgement revealed no main effects. However, the interaction between pair type and 
accuracy was significant (FI, 15 = 12.22, p < 0.01). Post hoc tests revealed that for 
same pairs, RTs were faster for correct than incorrect responses, whilst there were no 
such differences for rearranged pairs. In addition, for correct responses, same pairs 
received faster RTs than rearranged pairs, but no such differences were found for 
incorrect responses.
ERP data
ERPs were formed for 3 critical response categories: correctly classified new pairs 
(new pairs); same pairs correctly classified as old and same {same pairs); and 
rearranged pairs correctly recognised as old and rearranged (rearranged pairs). The 
mean number of trials contributing to the grand average ERPs in the new, same, and 
rearranged response categories were 129, 49 and 51 respectively.
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Figure 7 shows these ERP waveforms for all 25 recording sites. Figure 8 shows the 
ERP waveforms in more detail from those sites - lateral frontal and lateral parietal - 
most important for demonstrating the existence of the left parietal and right frontal 
old/new effects observed by Wilding and Rugg (1996). The figures show that the 
waveforms begin to diverge from one another approximately 600 msec post-stimulus 
onset, with the ERPs for the same and rearranged pairs becoming more positive than 
those for new pairs. For same pairs, this positive shift is larger over the left than the 
right hemisphere at posterior electrodes, but exhibits the opposite asymmetry at 
anterior electrodes. The positive shift in the ERPs to rearranged pairs is smaller in 
amplitude, more restricted in time, and confined to posterior electrodes. From around 
900 msec, it is replaced by a sustained negativity, which is maximal over the right 
centro-parietal scalp.
ERPs were quantified over three successive latency regions: 600-900 msec, 900-1200 
msec and 1200-1434 msec. These regions were chosen to allow changes in the pattern 
of effects over time to be elucidated, and to be roughly comparable with the measures 
employed by Wilding and Rugg (1996). The differences In the mean amplitude of each 
latency region between the ERPs to each category of old pair and those to new pairs 
(the old/new effects) are shown for lateral frontal and temporo-parietal electrodes In 
figure 9.
The analysis of the magnitude of effects during each latency region involved an Initial 
global ANOVA of the data from all 25 sites, followed by subsidiary analyses targeted 
at the data from lateral frontal and temporo-parietal electrodes (cf. chapter 4). 
Topographic analyses were also performed, testing for differences In the scalp 
distribution of the old/new effects associated with same and rearranged pairs, and 
asking whether the topography of these effects changed over time. These analyses 
followed the same structure as the magnitude analyses.
Amplitude analyses
For the 600-900 msec latency region, the global ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
response category (Fl.9,28.8 = 13.67, p < 0.001). For the two subsequent regions, the 
global ANOVA gave rise both to a main effect of response category (900-1200: 
F 1.7,24.8 = 9.52, p ~ 0.001; 1200-1434: FI.7,26 = 8.77, p < 0.005) and to interactions 
between category and site (900-1200: F4.7,70.2 = 2.44, p < 0.05; 1200-1434: F5.3,78.8
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= 2.90, p < 0.025). In light of these significant effects, subsidiary ANOVAs, 
contrasting each pair of response categories, were performed for each latency region. 
The results of these analyses are shown in table 5 and elucidated in the following 
sections.
Table 5. Results of the amplitude analyses, comparing each pair of response categories, over each 
latency region. Only significant effects involving the factor of response category (RC) are reported. HM 
= Hemisphere, L = Location (Anterior vs. Posterior), ST = Electrode site (Inferior vs. Mid-Lateral vs. 
Superior).
LATENCY
REGION
PAIRWISE COMPARISON
Same v New Rearranged v New Same v Rearranged
600-900 msec
RC Fl,15 = 24.58, p< 0.001 - Fl,15 = 12.84, p< 0.01
RCxST F1.2,17.3 = 16.50, p< 0.001 - Fl.l,17.0 = 12.42, p< 0.005
RCxHM Fl,15 = 8.34, p< 0.05 Fl,15 = 6.09, p< 0.005 -
RC x HM x L X ST F1.8,27.0 = 4.45, p< 0.05 - -
900-1200 msec
RC Fl,15 = 9.15,p<0.01 - Fl,15 = 21.04, p< 0.001
RCxST Fl.1,16.4 = 5.12, p< 0.05 - FI.1,17.0 = 14.18,p<0.001
RC x HM x L Fl,15 = 13.83, p = 0.005 FI,15 = 5.63, p < 0.05 Fl,15 = 5.82, p< 0.05
RCxHMxLxST F1.8,27.0 = 3.87, p< 0.05 - -
1200-1434 msec
RC Fl,15 = 9.32, p< 0.01 - Fl,15 = 16.80, p = 0.001
RCxST FI.1,16.7 = 5.10,p<0.05 - F1.4,21.3 = 20.84, p< 0.001
RC X L X ST F1.9,28.8 = 5.95, p <0.01 - -
RC X HM X L Fl,15 = 23.71, p< 0.001 Fl,15 = 11.64, p< 0.01 Fl,15 = 15.90, p< 0.001
Same vs. New: The ANOVAs comparing the ERPs to same and new pairs for the 600­
900 and 900-1200 msec latency regions revealed several significant effects, including 
four way interactions between category, hemisphere, location and site (see table 5). As 
can be seen In figure 9, in each case these effects reflect the greater positivity of the 
ERPs to same pairs. This positivity is markedly asymmetric in favour of the left 
hemisphere at temporo-parietal sites, but Is almost symmetrical frontally. The 
combination of asymmetric old/new effects posteriorly, and bilateral effects frontally, 
accounts for the involvement of the factors of category, hemisphere, and location in the 
four way interaction. Not illustrated in figure 9, but evident in figure 7, is the reason 
for the involvement of electrode site in the four way interactions. This reflects the fact 
that at both anterior and posterior sites, old/new effects were greater in magnitude at 
the electrodes nearest to the midline.
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The ANOVA comparing for the 1200-1434 msec latency region revealed a three-way 
interaction between category, hemisphere, and location, and between category, location 
and site. These interactions reflect variations across the scalp in the magnitude of the 
old/new effects for the same pairs. The interaction with hemisphere and location arose 
because the old/new effects show a left hemisphere maximum at the posterior 
electrodes, whereas at frontal sites the old/new effect exhibits a right hemisphere 
maximum (see figure 9). The interaction with location and site reflects the fact that the 
old/new effects increases in size as electrodes get nearer to the midline at anterior 
electrodes, but that this is not the case at posterior electrodes (see figure 9).
Rearranged vs. New: The ANOVA comparing the amplitudes in the 600-900 latency 
region revealed a single interaction, between response category and hemisphere (see 
table 5). As figure 9 shows, this effect reflects the fact that the ERPs to rearranged 
pairs are the more positive going, but only over the left hemisphere. By contrast, for 
both the 900-1200 and 1200-1434 msec latency regions the subsidiary ANOVA 
revealed a single significant interaction between response category, hemisphere and 
location. For both latency regions this interaction reflects the fact that, other than at left 
posterior electrodes, the old/new effect associated with rearranged pairs tends to be 
negative- rather than positive-going, an effect that is especially pronounced at right 
posterior sites (see figure 9).
Same versus Rearranged: For the 600-900 msec latency region, the ANOVA 
contrasting the ERPs to same and rearranged pairs gave rise to a significant effect of 
category, and a reliable category by site interaction (see table 5). As can been seen in 
figure 9, these effects reflect the greater positivity of the ERPs to same than to 
rearranged pairs, and the fact that this difference is smaller at lateral electrodes than at 
sites nearer to the midline. Table 5 also shows that the ANOVAs for the 900-1200 and 
1200-1434 msec latency regions gave rise to several significant effects, including 
interactions between response category, hemisphere and location, and between 
category and site. In each case, the three way interaction reflects the fact that the ERPs 
for same pairs are more positive going than those for rearranged pairs, a difference that 
is larger over the right hemisphere at the frontal sites, but larger over the left 
hemisphere at temporo-parietal sites (cf. figures 7 and 9).
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'Topographic analyses
The scalp topographies of the old/new effects for the same and rearranged pairs are 
shown for each latency region in figure 10. In each case, the effects begin with left 
temporo-parietal and bilateral frontal maximum, whereas by the latest of the three 
regions, they exhibit left temporo-parietal and right frontal maxima. The global 
ANOVA comparing the topographies of the two effects across latency regions revealed 
a single effect, an interaction between latency region and electrode site (F4.8,72.7 = 
5.91, p < 0.001), and also gave rise to a marginally significant Interaction between 
response category and electrode (F3.1,46.1 = 2.59, p < .07).
The subsidiary ANOVA revealed Interactions between latency region and hemisphere, 
latency region and location, and latency region and site (Fl.6,24.4 = 3.92, p < 0.05, 
Fl.7,25.6 = 4.91, p < 0.05, and F1.7, 25.1 = 3.78, p < 0.05 respectively), along with 
three-way interactions between latency region, hemisphere and location, and between 
latency region, location and site (Fl.4,20.9 = 13.85, p < 0.001, and F2.1,31.2 = 10.43, 
p < 0.001 respectively). These results reflect a change In the topography of the old/new 
effects with time. As can be seen In figure 10, for both response categories, the effects 
at temporo-parietal electrodes maintain a strong left hemisphere maximum throughout 
the recording epoch, whereas those at frontal electrodes become more asymmetric over 
time. In addition, there was a significant interaction between response category and site 
(Fl .2,18.5 = 17.77, p < 0.001). Figure 10 shows that this effect reflects a tendency for 
the old/new effects for the rearranged pairs to be distributed somewhat more laterally 
than those for the same pairs.
Summary of results
The analyses indicate that the ERPs for same and rearranged pairs were associated with 
old/new effects which, while exhibiting similar topographies, differed markedly in 
magnitude, with the effects for the same pairs exceeding those for the rearranged items. 
For both same and rearranged pairs the distribution of the old/new effects changed over 
time. In the earliest latency region analysed, they exhibited left parietal and bilateral 
frontal maxima, whereas by the end of the recording epoch the left parietal effect was 
accompanied by a distinct right frontal maximum.
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Figure 7. Experiment 1: Grand average ERP waveforms elicited by correctly classified same, rearranged and new pairs. Plotted as in figure 
1. Electrode locations are described in chapter 4, and are shown as in figure 6.
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Figure 9. Experiment 1: Differences in mean ERP amplitude for sane minus new pairs, and 
correct minus new pairs, for the 600-900 nsec, 900-1200 nsec, and 1200-1434 nsec, latency 
regions. Amplitude measures are averaged over the electrode site indicated and the sites 
immediately inferior and superior to it (cf. Figure 6, chapter 4).
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Figure 10. Experiment 1: Topographic maps illustrating the distribution of the differences between ERPs to correctly classified same and new pairs (upper row), and 
between ERPs to correctly classified rearranged and new pairs (lower row), for the 600-900 msec, 900-1200 msec, and 1200-1434 msec, latency regions. The scale bar to 
the right of each map indicates the maximum and minimum of the voltage range. Electrodes shown as in figure 6.
DISCUSSION
In agreement with previous findings (cf. Underwood, 1974) recognition memory was 
better for same than for rearranged pairs. The dual-process model of Yonelinas (1997) 
easily accommodates these results. According to this model, the probability of 
familiarity-based recognition should have been equivalent for both types of pair, 
whereas the probability of recollection would be greater for same than for rearranged 
pairs. Consequently, recognition memory for same pairs should exceed that for 
rearranged pairs.
The finding that reari'anged pairs were more likely to receive a correct associative 
recognition judgement than were same pairs may appear paradoxical in light of the 
foregoing argument. However, the advantage for the rearranged pairs is only an 
apparent one. The asymmetry in the associative recognition judgements made to false 
alarms (new pairs falsely judged old) Indicates that a strong bias operated in favour of 
the ‘rearranged’ response option. Subjects were highly successful in opposing this bias 
when making associative judgements to same pairs, as would be expected If ‘same’ 
responses are made whenever a word pair engenders strong recollection of the prior 
study episode. By contrast, the finding that similar proportions of ‘rearranged’ 
judgements were made to false alarms and to rearranged pairs is consistent with the 
proposal that such judgements usually reflect a ‘default’ decision made in the absence 
of recollection.
As expected (see Introduction to experiment 1), same pairs elicited sizeable, robust 
old/new effects very similar In character to those elicited by ‘recollected’ items in 
previous studies of source memory (Wilding, et al., 1995; Wilding and Rugg, 1996, 
1997a). The ERPs elicited by rearranged pairs elicited qualitatively similar, but 
markedly smaller effects. The effects for the rearranged pairs were relatively short­
lived however, especially at left posterior electrodes, where they reversed in polarity 
fom 900 msec onwards.
The findings for the rearranged pairs most likely reflect the summation of small 
positive-going old/new effects with another, temporally overlapping component that 
also distinguishes recognised from new pairs. This component is a slow, posteriorly 
distributed negative wave that was also evident In several previous studies (Rugg et al.
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1996; Wilding and Rugg, 1996, 1997a,b). The functional significance of this 
component is unknown, but the available evidence suggests that it reflects processes 
more closely associated with response-related factors than with memory for the 
eliciting items (Wilding and Rugg, 1997b). As evidenced by the similarity of the scalp 
distributions of the old/new effects for the same and rearranged pairs, the influence of 
this component differed little according to pair type. Thus, its relative prominence in 
the ERPs to rearranged pairs most probably reflects the fact that the small positive­
going old/new effects elicited by these pairs exerted less of an offsetting influence than 
did the much larger effects associated with same pairs.
As noted in the previous paragraph, the scalp distributions of the old/new effects for 
the two classes of old pairs were similar to one another, in each case being 
characterised by a left parietal maximum that was maintained throughout the recording 
epoch, and a frontal effect that became progressively more right-sided with time. The 
topographies of the two effects were not entirely equivalent however, the rearranged 
pairs exhibiting effects that were distributed more laterally and diffusely than those for 
the same pairs. In light of the relatively small size of the effects for the rearranged 
pairs, this result should be treated with caution, as it may reflect little more than the 
fact that the distribution of these effects was more susceptible to the distorting 
influence of noise.
The existence of left parietal and right frontal old/new effects for both the same and the 
rearranged pairs suggests that, so far as can be Judged from scalp recorded neural 
activity (cf. Rugg and Coles, 1995), successful recognition of these items was 
accompanied by activation of the same, or at least strongly overlapping, neural 
populations6. The old/new effects for each type of word pair did however differ in their 
magnitudes, those for the same pairs greatly exceeding those elicited by the rearranged 
pairs. On the assumption that these effects are indeed markers for recollection (see 
Introduction to experiment 1), this finding converges with the behavioural results to 
suggest that same pairs are more likely tc engender recollection during tests of item or 
associative recognition than are rearranged pairs.
6 Despite the need for caution in its interpretation, the finding of a response category by site interaction in the 
topographic analyses means that there is a possibility that the two classes of old/new effect reflect the activity of at 
least partially distinct neural generators. In light of the fact that both effects exhibited similar left posterior and 
right frontal maxima, it is assumed that if this is the case, the generators of the effects for the two classes of word 
pair are nonetheless likely to be related to one another both anatomically and functionally (cf. Chapter 2).
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The finding that the old/new effects for same pairs exceeded those for rearranged pairs 
is reminiscent of the difference between ERPs elicited by words attracting correct or 
incorrect source judgements reported by Wilding and Rugg (1996). Wilding and Rugg 
interpreted their findings in light of the proposal that the magnitude of old/new ERP 
effects might be proportional to the amount of information retrieved from memory 
(Rugg et al., 1995). They suggested that the larger old/new effects for items correctly 
assigned to source reflected the greater amount of information retrieved about such 
items relative to those for which the source could not be recollected.
Viewing recollection as a graded rather than an all or none process suggests one 
possible explanation of the differences between the old/new effects elicited by same 
and rearranged word pairs in the present experiment. By this argument, rearranged 
pairs were associated with partial or weak recollection on many trials. For instance, the 
presentation of a rearranged pair may elicit recollection about the prior occurrence of 
an individual word, but not about the item with which it was associated.
An alternative, and arguably more parsimonious, explanation of the differences in the 
magnitudes of the old/new effects for the two classes of word pair is also possible. This 
account is motivated by the proposal that associative judgements to same pairs are 
based almost exclusively on recollection, whereas those to rearranged pairs are made 
largely by ‘default’, due to the failure to recollect (Yonelinas, 1997). According to this 
proposal, the ERPs to rearranged pairs would have been formed from a mixture of the 
few trials on which recollection did occur and the great majority of trials on which it 
did not. By this argument, therefore, the attenuated old/new effects seen for rearranged 
pairs do not reflect the occurrence of a small effect on most trials, but result instead 
fRom the dilution of an infrequent ‘fUll-blown’ effect by trials on which there was no 
effect at all.
These two accounts are not mutually exclusive however; both of the proposed 
mechanisms may contribute to the differences in the magnitude of the old/new effects 
for same and rearranged pairs. Although it is impossible to determine the relative 
contributions of the two mechanisms, both accounts imply that recollection is, on 
average, stronger or more complete for same than for rearranged pairs.
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The present findings provide additional information about the frontally distributed 
old/new effect first described by Wilding and Rugg (1996), in that they suggest that the 
effect comprises at least tv/o temporally and topographically dissociable components. 
This dissociation is seen most clearly in the ERPs elicited by the same pairs, where 
cld/new effects were at their largest. As is evident from figures 7 and 10, the frontal 
effects initially exhibited a bilateral distribution, which only shifted to a right 
hemisphere maximum after approximately 1200 msec post-stimulus. A similar pattern 
of effects is evident in the data of Wilding and Rugg (1996), although those authors did 
not comment on it. However, in a further study of source memory (Wilding and Rugg 
1997b) the same authors demonstrated that the dissociation between these two frontal 
effects was statistically reliable.
The interpretation of the data from Wilding and Rugg’s studies (1996, 1997b) is 
complicated by the fact that the shift in the distribution of the frontal effect coincided 
with the decline of the left parietal effect. Thus, the shift may merely have reflected a 
reduction in the contribution of the left parietal effect to anterior electrodes over the 
left hemisphere, rather than changes in the activity of the generators responsible for the 
frontal effects. In the present experiment the left parietal effect onset around 600 msec 
and persisted until the end of the recording epoch. During the same interval, the frontal 
old/new effect nonetheless shifted from a bilateral tc a right-sided distribution. This 
shift cannot therefore be due to a decline with time in the influence of the left parietal 
effect.
The functional significance of these frontal old/new effects is unclear. Wilding and 
Rugg (1996) argued that the effects (they did not discriminate between the bilateral and 
asymmetric components discussed above) reflect ‘post-retrieval’ processes that operate 
on the products cf retrieval to generate an episodic representation capable of 
supporting accurate source discrimination. On the basis cf a study (Wilding and Rugg, 
1997a) in which the right frontal effect was found partially to dissociate from source 
recollection, Wilding and Rugg further proposed that recollection may net be a 
sufficient condition for the emergence of the effect. They suggested that, in contrast to 
the precesses reflected by the left parietal old/new effect, those reflected by the right 
frontal effect may be under a degree of strategic control.
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The characterisation of frontal old/new effects as reflections of strategic post-retrieval 
processing has not been directly tested. The present findings are consistent with this 
characterisation, in that the imposition of the associative recognition judgement forced 
subjects to retrieve and make use of contextual (associative) information. Similarly, in 
the experiments of Wilding and Rugg, the imposition of a source judgement required 
explicit, task-related post-retrieval processing. If the prominent frontal effects observed 
in experiment 1 are indeed a consequence of task demands that emphasise the explicit 
processing of contextual information, then the effects should be attenuated or absent 
when there is no explicit requirement to make associative recognition judgements.
Before testing Wilding and Rugg’s account of the frontal old/new effects (see 
experiment 3), a more pressing issue must be addressed. There is an important caveat 
to the preceding discussion, by virtue of the fact that there is a plausible alternative 
account of the findings from experiment 1. Whilst subjects may have discriminated 
between same and rearranged pairs (the associative judgement) on the basis of 
recollecting associative information, the experimental paradigm does not necessitate 
that this be the case. Because same and rearranged pairs were compared to new pairs, it 
is possible that subjects were able to accurately perform the initial old/new recognition 
judgement by recognising just one word from each pair. If this were the case, the ERP 
trials contributing to the averaged ERPs to the same and rearranged response 
categories would differ in terms of the quantity of information retrieved, regardless of 
how subjects performed the associative judgement. Thus, the ERP findings from 
experiment 1 need not necessarily reflect the neural correlates of the recollection of 
associative information.
If performance in experiment 1 was based on the recognition of one versus two words, 
the inteipretation of the ERP effects discussed above would be seriously undermined. 
Rather than reflecting the recollection of associative information, the difference 
between the ERPs to same and rearranged pairs could simply reflect the difference 
between recognising one or two items. That is, the difference might reflect variation in 
the quantity of information retrieved from memory, based upon a simple familiarity or 
strength process, rather than in the probability of recollection. However, if the effects 
observed in experiment 1 are a consequence of the use of a ‘one vs. two words’ 
strategy, then the effects should be absent when this strategy is no longer available.
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Experiment 2 was performed to test this predicticr, prior tc the further investigation of 
the functional significance cf the old/new effects in experiment 3.
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Chapter 6.
EXPERIMENT 2
INTRODUCTION
As discussed previously, it is important to demonstrate that the findings from 
experiment 1 did not simply reflect the fact that subjects employed a ‘one vs. two 
words' strategy. To prevent this possibility, the new pairs used in experiment 1 can be 
exchanged for pairs consisting of one old and one new word (henceforth old-new 
pairs). This means that the initial old/new judgement can be made only on the basis of 
recognising both words in an old pair, and thus the subsequent associative judgement 
(discriminating between the same and rearranged pairs) can only be made on the basis 
of the recollection of associative information. Merely knowing that both words were 
old would not allow subjects to accurately discriminate between the two types of old 
pair. Experiment 2 therefore provides a test of the claim that the ERP effects seen in 
experiment 1 do not reflect the differential recollection of associative information.
I
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METHOD
Subjects
18 subjects were employed. Data from 2 subjects was discarded due tc insufficient 
artifact-free trials in the critical response categories. The remaining subjects had a 
mean age of 21.8 years (range 18 to 28 years), and 4 of them were female.
Experimental materials
The experimental design, examples of stimuli and correct responses are shown in table 
6. 640 randomly selected words (from the word pool in appendix A) were used to form 
300 critical word pairs and 20 filler word pairs. Each subject was presented with 150 
critical word pairs at study and 300 pairs at test. At test a third of the studied pairs 
maintained their pairing between study and test (‘same’ pairs), a third were randomly 
re-paired (‘rearranged’ pairs), and a third were re-paired with new items (‘eld-new’ 
pairs). To generate ‘old-new’ test pairs, studied pairs were separated, and each word 
was re-paired with an unstudied word. The position cf the old and new item in ‘old- 
new’ pairs was counterbalanced (half old-new, half new-old) to prevent subjects from 
anticipating the location of the old item.
Table 6. Experimental design, showing the different classes of stimuli, and associated correct responses.
Phase Class of Item Example Response
Study List 150 word pairs: doll-bush
charm-glue
paint-ride
green-honey
Test List 75 same pahs:
75 rearranged pahs:
150 old-new pairs:
doll-bush
charm-ride
green-steam
Old: Same
Old: Rearranged
New
Eight study-test lists were formed, each presented to 2 subjects. The lists were formed 
such that, across lists, each word pair was used equally frequently as an cld and new 
item (i.e., the unstudied items that were used tc form ‘old-new’ pairs in one test list 
were study items on another, and vice-versa). Similarly, the use of word pairs as
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‘same’ or ‘rearranged’ was also counterbalanced across lists (i.e., studied items that 
acted as rearranged pairs in one test lists were employed as same pairs in another, and 
vice-versa). Item order within each list was also randomised.
The resulting study-test lists were padded with additional filler items (20 pairs), 
generated according to the same procedure as for the critical items. A sequence of 10 
filler pairs was located before every 150 critical items (10 at study and 20 at test).
Experimental task, procedures and ERP recording
The study phase was identical to that in experiment 1 (cf. Chapter 4), other than for the 
number of items presented. The sequence of events on each test trial was also identical 
to that in experiment 1, other than for the number of items presented and the task 
instructions on the initial old/new recognition judgement. Subjects were instructed to 
make a speeded old/new judgement to each test pair, responding ‘old’ to pairs that 
contained two studied words, and ‘new’ to pairs containing one old studied and one 
unstudied item. They were instructed to make this judgement as quickly and as 
accurately as possible, then to wait for a cue to make a second response for any pairs 
judged to contain two old items. As in experiment 1, the second judgement required 
subjects to judge whether the words were in the same or a rearranged pairing compared 
to their pairing at study. The test list was administered in two blocks of 160 pairs, with 
a short rest break intervening between each block.
The procedure for recording the ERPs was the same as in experiment 1, other than for 
the lengthening of the post-stimulus recording epoch to 1944 msec, see chapter 4). 
This modification was motivated by the fact that in the previous experiment neither the 
parietal nor the frontal old/new effects had declined to baseline by the end of the 1434
msec post-stimulus recording epoch.
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RESULTS
Behavioural data
Table 7 shows the mean probability of an old judgement to same, rearranged and old- 
new pairs, A one way ANOVA comparing these probabilities revealed a significant
effect (F 2,30 = 118.71, p < 0.001). Post hoc tests revealed significant differences 
between each pair of means. Subjects were able to discriminate both classes of old pair 
from the old-new pairs, and did so more accurately for same than for rearranged pairs.
Table 7. Mean probability (standard deviations) of an old response for the old/new judgement, and the 
subsequent probability of a correct associative judgement, for same, rearranged and old-new pahs. For 
old-new pairs, the associative score shows the probability of a ‘rearranged’ response to false alarms.
Judgement Response Same Rearranged Old-New
OLD/NEW Old; 0.85 (0.08) 0.66 (0.11) 0.38(0.15)
ASSOCIATIVE Correct: 0.71 (0.16) 0.81 (0.16) 0.93 (0.07)
Table 7 also shows the probabilities of a correct response on the associative
recognition judgement (conditionalised on initial recognition performance), as well as 
the proportion of false alarms (to old-new pairs) that received a ‘rearranged' response. 
Analysis of the associative recognition judgements compared the probability of a 
correct response (averaged across same and rearranged pairs) against chance (i.e., 0.5). 
As in experiment 1 this comparison revealed that subjects were able to discriminate 
same from rearranged pairs (t(15) = 7.32, p < 0.001). As was also the case in 
experiment 1, analysis of the responses to false alarms showed a strong (0.93) bias 
towards judging such pairs as being ‘rearranged' (t(15) = 24.31, p < 0.001). Following 
the analysis of experiment 1 the probability of correct associative recognition 
responses for each class of pair was contrasted with the probability of making the same 
response to a false alarm, elucidating any differences in responses to same and 
rearranged pairs. This analysis revealed that same pairs received significantly more 
‘same' responses than did false alarms (0.71 vs. 0.07, t(15) = 12.33, p < 0.001),
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whereas rearranged pairs significantly fewer ‘rearranged’ responses than false alarms 
(0.81 vs. 0.93, t(15) = 3.37, p < 0.005).
Table 8 shows the mean RTs for responses on the initial recognition judgement, shown 
according to the accuracy of that judgement, and also according to the accuracy of the 
subsequent associative judgement. A two-way ANOVA on the data separated 
according to the initial old/new judgement revealed main effects of word pair type and 
accuracy (F2,30 = 19.74, p == 0.005; and F 1,15 = 23.28, p < 0.001, respectively) and an 
interaction between the two (F2,30 = 8.03, p < 0.005). Post hoc tests revealed that, for 
both the same and rearranged pairs, RTs to correct responses were significantly faster 
than those to incorrect responses, but no such difference was present in the RTs for 
responses to old-new pairs.
Table 8. Mean reaction times (msec) separated according both to the accuracy of the initial old/new 
recognition judgement and the subsequent associative recognition judgement.
Judgement Response Same Rearranged Old-New
OLD/NEW Correct: 1801 2083 2120
Incorrect: 2247 2269 2114
ASSOCIATIVE Correct: 1669 2002
Incorrect: 1978 1865
Table 8 also shows the RTs conditicnalised according to the accuracy cf the 
associative judgement. ANOVA revealed no significant main effects, but did reveal a 
significant interaction between pair type and accuracy (FI, 15 = 9.07, p < 0.01). Post 
hoc tests revealed that correct responses were associated with significantly faster RTs 
for same than rearranged pairs, whereas no such difference was found for incorrect 
responses, and that whilst the RTs for same pairs were faster for correct than incorrect 
responses this was not the case for rearranged pairs.
ERP data
ERPs were formed for 3 critical response categories: correctly classified old-new pairs 
(henceforth old-new pairs); same pairs correctly classified as cld and same (same 
pairs); and rearranged pairs correctly recognised as old and rearranged {rearranged
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pairs). The mean numbers of trials contributing to each category of ERPs were 80, 40,
and 36 respectively.
Figure 11 shows the grand average ERP waveforms for all 25 recording sites, and 
figure 12 shows the ERPs from the left and right frontal and parietal sites only. The 
figures show that the ERPs for same pairs become more positive than those for both 
the old-new and rearranged pairs from approximately 600 msec post stimulus onset. 
This effect is small in size, and appears to be largest over fronto-polar electrodes 
initially. However, over time the effect develops a clear left hemisphere maximum 
over posterior sites and the opposite right hemisphere maximum over anterior sites. By 
contrast, the ERPs to rearranged pairs show little sign of a positive shift relative to the 
old-new pairs, rather, they exhibit a negative going shift that is largest over right 
centro-parietal electrodes.
As in experiment 1, the magnitude of ERP effects was quantified by calculating the 
mean amplitude (relative to the 102 msec pre-stimulus baseline) of the waveforms over 
successive latency regions. These regions were 600-900 msec, 900-1200 msec, 1200­
1500 msec and 1500-1944 msec, the final region covering the extension to the 
recording epoch employed in experiment 1. As was discussed in the introduction to 
experiment 2, analysis of these data aimed to demonstrate that the differences seen 
between the ERPs to same and rearranged pairs in experiment 1 were not simply a 
function of subjects employing a ‘one vs. two words’ strategy. Consequently, the 
amplitude analyses involved a series of planned ANOVAs, comparing the same vs. 
old-new and same vs. rearranged response categories, to demonstrate whether the 
pattern of effects seen for the same pairs remained when this strategy was not 
available. Topographic analyses were also performed, investigating possible changes in 
the distribution of effects for the same pairs over time.
Amplitude analyses
Initial global ANOVA of the 600-900 msec latency region revealed an interaction 
between response category and site (F5.1,76.9 = 2.40, p < 0.05). For each of the 
remaining regions the global ANOVA revealed a main effect of response category, and 
an interaction between response category and site (900-1200 msec: FI.9,28.7 = 7.90, p 
< 0.005 and F5.7, 86.0 = 3.64, p < 0.005; 1200-1500 msec: FI.6,24.5 = 6.82, p < 0.01 
and F5.9,88.8 = 3.39, p = 0.005; 1500-1944 msec: FI.8,26.3 = 4.14, p < 0.05, and
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F5.1,76.3 = 3.21, p < 0.05 respectively). The results of the subsidiary ANOVAs 
between the same vs. old-new, and same vs. rearranged response categories can be 
seen in table 9, and are elucidated below. The differences in the mean amplitude of the 
ERPs between are shown in figure 13, over each latency region, for lateral frontal and 
temporo-parietal electrodes.
Table 9. Results of the amplitude analyses, over each latency region. Only significant effects involving 
the factor of response category (RC) are reported. HM = Hemisphere, L = Location (Anterior vs. 
Posterior), ST = Electrode site (Inferior vs. Mid-Lateral vs. Superior).
LATENCY REGION PAIRWISE COMPARISON
Same v Old-New Same v Rearranged
600-900 msec
RCxST - F1.3,19.9 = 4.74, p< 0.05
RCxHM - -
RC X HM X L Fl,15=7.13,p<0.05 Fl,15 = 8.32, p< 0.05
900-1200 msec
RC - Fl,15 = 17.04, p = 0.001
RC x ST - F1.2,18.7 = 19.76, p< 0.001
RCxHM - -
RC x HM X L Fl,15=18.48, p = 0.001 Fl,15 = 23.85, p< 0.001
1200-1500 msec
RC - Fl,15 = 24.31, p< 0.001
RCxST - F1.4,20.3 = 14.98, p< 0.001
RCxHM - Fl,15 = 9.22, p< 0.01
RC x HM x L Fl,15=20.70,p< 0.001 Fl,15 = 12.50, p< 0.005
1500-1900 msec
RC - Fl,15 = 10.54, p< 0.005
RCxST - F1.6,23.7= 15.61, p< 0.001
RCxL - Fl,15 = 6.26, p< 0.05
RCxHM Fl,15 =13.72, p< 0.005 -
RC x HM x L Fl,15 = 29.43, p< 0.001 Fl,15 = 5.64, p< 0.05
RC X L x ST F1.6,23.3 = 4.87, p< 0.05 -
Same versus Old-New: Table 9 shows that for each latency region the analysis 
revealed an interaction between category, hemisphere, and location. This reflects the 
same pattern of effects in each latency region; compared to the ERPs to old-new pairs, 
the ERPs to same pairs exhibit a left greater than right asymmetry at temporo-parietal 
sites, and the opposite asymmetry in favour of the right hemisphere at frontal sites. As 
figure 13 shows, the effects are very small in size during the initial 600-900 msec 
epoch, but are considerably larger during each of the subsequent latency regions. Table 
9 also shows that the ANOVA for the 1500-1900 msec latency region revealed an
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additional significant three way interaction, between category, location and site. As can 
be seen in figure 11, this reflects the greater positivity In the ERPs for same pairs 
compared to those for old-new pairs, a difference which increases in size as electrodes 
get closer to the midline at anterior, but not posterior, scalp sites.
Same versus Rearranged: For each latency region the ANOVAs contrasting the ERPs 
for rearranged and same pairs revealed a significant interaction between response 
category and site, along with a significant three-way interaction between category, 
hemisphere and location (see table 9). These effects reflect greater positivity in the 
ERPs to same pairs compared to those for the rearranged pairs. As can be seen in 
figure 13, for each latency region the tbree-way interaction reflects that fact that this 
difference is larger over the right than the left hemisphere at anterior electrodes, 
whereas the positive shift is bilaterally distributed at posterior electrodes. By tbe 1500­
1900 msec latency region however, tbe effect Is larger over the left than right 
hemisphere at posterior electrode sites. In addition, for each latency region the 
Interaction between category and site reflects tbe fact that the difference between the 
ERPs is larger nearer to the midline (see figure 11).
Topographic analysis
As discussed above, tbe primary aim of this experiment was to investigate whether the 
effects seen fcr the same pairs In experiment 1 were due to subjects discriminating 
between these two classes cf stimuli simply on tbe basis of recognising two versus one 
words. Consequently, the topographic analysis was aimed at elucidating tbe pattern of 
effects seen for the same pairs. The effects in tbe 600-900 msec latency region were 
small in size However, reducing tbe validity of any topographic analysis that could be 
performed upon these data. Hence, the topographic analyses were restricted tc the 
larger and more reliable effects found in the remaining three latency regions. 
Topographic maps illustrating tbe distribution of tbe effects over successive latency 
regions (the differences in amplitude between the ERPs to same and old-new pairs) can 
be seen in figure 14. In each latency region tbe figure clearly indicates tbe presence of 
left parietal and right fi*ontt^il maxima over left temporc-parletal and right fi-oi^t:al scalp 
sites respectively.
To investigate whether the topography of the effects changed over the course of the 
recording epoch, the topographies cf the effects in each latency region were compared
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using ANOVA, employing the data from all 25 sites. This ANOVA revealed no 
significant interaction between epoch and site, suggesting that the distribution of 
effects did not differ over time. Subsidiary ANOVA, employing the factors of 
category, hemisphere, location (frontal vs. temporo-parietal), and site (inferior vs. mid­
lateral vs. superior) also revealed nn significant effects involving epoch, supporting the 
conclusion that the scalp distributions were not significantly different over time. This 
analysis did give rise to one significant interaction however, between hemisphere and 
location (Fl,15 = 5.14, p < 0.05). This interaction confirms the presence of left parietal 
and right frontal effects, but the findings suggest that unlike in experiment 1, the scalp 
distribution of these effects did not change over time.
Summary of results
As in experiment 1, relative to the ERPs to old-new and rearranged pairs, those to the 
same pairs were associated with positive going old/new effects that were larger over 
the left than right hemisphere at posterior electrodes but larger over the right than left 
hemisphere at anterior electrodes. In contrast to the findings of experiment 1 these 
effects were small in size during the initial 600-900 msec latency region, becoming 
more sizeable and robust during the remainder of the recording epoch. In accordance 
with the findings of experiment 1, same pairs were associated with topographically 
dissociable left temporo-parietal and right frontal old/new effects, but, unlike in the 
first experiment, there was no evidence of a change In the lateral distribution nf the 
frontal effects over time.
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Figure 12. Experiment 2: Grand average ERP waveforms for same, rearranged and old-new response categories from left and right lateral 
frontal (LF, RF) and lateral parietal (LP, RP) electrode sites.
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Figure 13. Experiment 2: Differences in mean ERP amplitude for same minus new pairs, and 
correct minus old-new pairs, for the 600-900 msec, 900-1200 msec, 1200-1500 msec and 1500­
1944 msec latency regions. Amplitude measures are averaged over the electrode site Indicated 
and the sites immediately lateral and superior to it.
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Figure 14. Experiment 2: Topographic map illustrating the distribution of the differences between ERPs to correctly classified same and old-new pairs for the 600-900 
msec, 900-1200 msec, 1200-1500 msec and 1500-1944 msec latency regions. Scale bars and electrodes are shown as in figure 10.
DISCUSSION
As in experiment 1, recognition memory performance was superior for same than 
rearranged pairs, consistent with a dual process model of performance (e.g., Yonelinas, 
1997). Performance on the old/new recognition judgement was not identical to that in
experiment 1 however. Notably, the old/new recognition advantage for ‘same pairs’ 
was larger (primarily due to a lower hit rate to the rearranged pairs), and the false 
alarm rate to ‘new pairs’ was substantially larger (38% compared to 18%). Neither of 
these findings is surprising, given the particular experimental manipulation employed 
in experiment 2. Replacing the new pairs with old-new pairs is likely to induce a 
higher level of false alarms in and of itself, because subjects would inevitably 
recognise some of these items as being old. As discussed previously, the initial 
old/new recognition response to rearranged pairs in experiment 1 may have depended, 
to some extent, upon the recognition of just a single member of each pair. To the 
degree that this was no longer a viable basis upon which to respond in experiment 2, 
recognition of the rearranged pairs would be expected to be lower than in experiment 
1.
Behavioural performance on the associative judgement was very similar to that in 
experiment 1. Subjects were clearly able to perfonn the associative judgement 
accurately, despite the fact that it was no longer possible for them to employ a ‘one vs. 
two word’ strategy (cf. Introduction to experiment 2). As in experiment 1, despite the 
presence of an old/new recognition memory advantage for the same pairs, the 
reaiTanged pairs were more likely to receive a correct associative response. Again, this 
can be accounted for by the strong bias towards responding ‘rearranged’ to false 
alarms. Consistent with the interpretation of performance in experiment 1, subjects 
appear to accurately recognise same pairs whenever a word pair engenders the 
recollection of a prior study episode, sufficient to overcome the response bias towards 
responding ‘rearranged’. Moreover, although subjects must have been able to 
recognise both members of a rearranged pairs as being old, as in experiment 1 the 
associative judgements to these pairs appears to reflect a ‘default’ decision made 
largely in the absence of recollection.
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In sum, the behavioural results are consistent with the suggestion that, in experiment 1, 
subjects may have recognised some proportion of the rearranged pairs as heing old on 
the basis of recognising just one item from each pair (as evidenced by the changes in 
performance on the initial old/new judgement). Nonetheless, performance on the 
associative judgement appears to have depended upon the veridical recollection of 
associative information (as evidenced by the accurate discrimination of same fRom 
rearranged pairs on the associative judgement). Thus, It seems unlikely that the 
findings of experiment 1 can be explained by a ‘one vs. two words' account of 
performance (cf. Discussion of experiment 1, and Introduction of experiment 2).
Looking at the ERP data, the critical question addressed by the present experiment was 
whether the ERP effects seen in experiment 1 would remain when the possibility nf 
subjects relying on a ‘one vs. two word' strategy had been ruled out. In light of the 
behavioural findings discussed above it would be expected that the ERP data should 
reveal a similar pattern of results to those found In experiment 1. The effects would not 
be expected to be entirely equivalent however, because the ERP baseline consisted of 
correctly rejected old-new pairs (rather than the correctly rejected new pairs employed 
in experiment 1). When Interpreting the ERP data this change in baseline must be 
taken into account; to the degree that subjects recollected the old item contained within 
each old-new pair, the pattern of old/new effects would be attenuated (as explained 
below).
Relative to the ERPs to correctly rejected old-new pairs, the ERPs to same pairs gave 
rise to statistically reliable old/new effects in each latency region. As figure 14 shows, 
these effects are similar to those found in experiment 1, exhibiting left parietal and 
right fRontal maxima. The effects are not identical to those seen In experiment 1 
however; the effects were small in size during the initial 600-900 msec latency period, 
and the distribution of the old/new effects did not change with time. These differences 
can be accounted for In terms of the change In the ERP baseline noted above. If some 
proportion of trials contributing to the ERP baseline were associated with the 
recollection of old items, then some signs of the ERP old/new effects would likely 
have been present In the ERP correct rejection baseline. This is perhaps best thought of 
as a ‘raised' baseline, resulting in the observed attenuation of the old/new effects 
during the 600-900 msec latency region.
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The fact that the distribution of the old/new effects did not change over time is a 
consequence of the attenuation of the effects during the 600-900 msec latency region. 
In experiment 1 the frontal old/new effects were bilaterally distributed during the 
initial 600-900 msec latency period, becoming asymmetric from 900 msec onwards. 
Thus, the absence of a change in distribution over time in experiment 2 is not 
surprising, given that the topographic analyses were restricted to the data from 900 
msec onwards (due to the small size of the effects in the 600-900 msec latency region).
Finally, comparison of the ERPs to the same and rearranged response categories also 
suggests that the results of experiment 1 were not just a reflection of subjects 
remembering one versus two words. The findings were similar to those in experiment 
1, the ERPs to same pairs being more positive going than those to the rearranged pairs. 
This finding is important; if the difference between the ERPs to same and rearranged 
pairs found in experiment 1 simply reflected memory for two versus one items, then 
the difference would have been absent in experiment 2. The difference was not 
identical to that found in experiment 1 however. First, the difference between the ERPs 
to the same and rearranged pairs was smaller in experiment 2 than 1, particularly 
during the initial 600-900 msec latency region. Like the attenuation of the old/new 
effects found for the same pairs, this is not surprising in itself. As discussed above, the 
behavioural results suggest that a small proportion of rearranged pairs were recognised 
on the basis of one item in experiment 1. The removal of these trials from the averaged 
ERP for the rearranged pairs in experiment 2 would likely result in the observed 
attenuation of the difference between the same and rearranged pairs.
More puzzling than the reduction in the size of the difference between the ERPs to 
same and rearranged pairs however is a change in the asymmetry of the difference. 
Consistent with the results of experiment 1, the difference between the ERPs is larger 
over the right than left hemisphere at frontal electrodes. By contrast to the results of 
experiment 1 however, the difference is bilaterally distributed at temporo-parietal 
electrode sites. The reason for this change in the asymmetry at parietal sites is unclear. 
One possible explanation is that the effects are slightly delayed and more jittered in 
time. Support for this account can be found in the RT data; mean response times were 
somewhat longer in experiment 2 than in experiment 1. Moreover, the difference 
between the ERPs to same and rearranged pairs was asymmetrically larger over the left
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than right hemisphere at parietal electrodes during the final 1500-1944 msec latency 
region (a region that was not present in the data fRom experiment 1).
In sum, both the behavioural and ERP findings from experiment 2 suggest that the 
findings of experiment 1 cannot simply be accounted for in terms of subjects 
employing a ‘one vs. two word' strategy. Rather, the results are consistent with the 
alternative interpretation, i.e., that the ERP old/new effects are a reflection of processes 
contributing to, or contingent upon, the recollection of associative information. 
Experiment 2 also makes a further contribution, in that it highlights one of the 
difficulties inherent to the use of the subtraction procedure (that is, in contrasting pairs 
of ERPs). As was discussed above, because of the experiment manipulation employed 
in experiment 2, the ERP baseline was not equivalent to that employed in experiment 
1. In the present case the consequence of changing the ERP baseline was relatively 
straightforward to interpret. However, this example illustrates how important it is to 
take such differences into account when making comparisons of data across different 
studies.
161
Chapter 7.
EXPERIMENT 3
INTRODUCTION
Having demonstrated that the findings of experiment 1 reflect memory processes 
associated with the recollection of associative information, rather than the recognition 
of one versus two words, it is possible to further investigate the functional significance 
of the ERP old/new effects. As noted in the Discussion of experiment 1, the functional 
significance of the right frontal old/new effect is unclear. To recap briefly, Wilding and 
Rugg (1996) argued that the effect reflects strategic ‘post-retrieval’ processes that 
operate on the products of retrieval. The findings of experiments 1 and 2 are consistent 
with this characterisation, in that the imposition of the associative recognition 
judgement forced subjects to retrieve and make use of contextual (associative) 
information. However, Wilding and Rugg did not directly test this characterisation of 
the frontal old/new effects.
The aim of experiment 3 was to investigate whether the requirement to engage in 
explicit, task related, ‘post-retrieval’ processing of associative information is a 
necessary condition for the emergence of the frontal old/new effects found in 
experiments 1 and 2. This was achieved by modifying the design employed in
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experiment l7, such that subjects made only a single old/new judgement to each pair. 
The removal of the associative judgement eliminates the requirement to use associative 
information to meet the demands of the task. It therefore provides a test of the proposal 
that the frontal old/new effects observed in the previous experiments are a reflection of
this strategic task requirement.
7 The return to the use of entirely ‘new pairs’ (as in experiment 1) was motivated by the fact that when ‘old-new’ 
pairs were employed (in experiment 2) behavioural performance levels were poorer, and the size of the old/new 
effects was somewhat smaller.
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METHOD
Subjects
18 subjects were employed. Data from 2 subjects was discarded due to Insufficient 
artifact-tree trials in the critical response categories. The remaining subjects had a
mean age of 24.6 years (range 17 to 34 years), and 5 of them were female.
Experimental materials
Experimental lists were generated in exactly the same way as in experiment 1, but the 
number of critical items employed at study and test was halved. Thus, the lists were 
constructed fRom 400 words, which had been selected randomly from the pool of 800 
words used in the first experiment. Each study list contained a total of 110 word pairs 
(100 critical pairs and 10 fillers), whereas each test list totalled 220 pairs (100 new, 50 
same and 50 rearranged and 20 fillers).
Experimental procedure and ERP recording
Details of the study procedure are provided in chapter 4. The sequence of events on 
each test trial was identical to that employed in experiment 1, with one exception. The 
‘?’ character that served as cue for the second response In experiment 1 was replaced 
by the ‘ !' fixation character. The ‘ !' was, therefore, displayed on each, trial for 4.9 
rather than 2.4 sec. Subjects were instructed to respond to each test pair, depressing 
one response button for pairs judged to be old pairs, and the other button for those 
judged as new.
See chapter 4 for details of the procedures used for recording the ERPs.
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RESULTS
Behavioural data
Table 10 shows the mean probability of an old judgement to same, rearranged and new 
pairs. An ANOVA comparing these probabilities revealed a significant effect (F 2,30 = 
421.39, p < 0.001). Post hoc tests revealed significant differences between each pair of 
means. Thus subjects were able to discriminate both classes of old pair from new pairs, 
and did so more accurately for same than for rearranged pairs.
Table 10. Mean probability (standard deviations) of an old response for the old/new judgement, shown 
for same, rearranged and new pairs.
Judgement Response Same Rearranged New
OLD/NEW Old: 0.87 (0.09) 0.69 (0.13) 0.22 (0.12)
Table 11 shows the mean RTs for same, rearranged and new pairs, separated according 
to the accuracy of the recognition response. ANOVA revealed a significant effect of 
accuracy (Fl,15 = 56.33, p < 0.001), and an interaction between word pair type and 
accuracy (F2,30 = 11.61, p < 0.001). Post hoc tests revealed that correct responses 
were faster than incorrect responses for same and rearranged pairs, but not for new 
pairs. In addition, the RTs for correctly classified pairs differed from one another, same 
pairs attracting the fastest responses, and new pairs the slowest.
Table 11. Mean reaction times (msec) on the old/new recognition judgement, separated according to 
accuracy of response.
Response Same Rearranged Old-New
Correct: 1308 1522 1608
Incorrect: 1954 1746 1603
ERP data
ERPs were formed for three response categories: correctly classified new pairs, same 
pairs correctly identified as old (same pairs), and rearranged pairs correctly identified
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as old (rearranged pairs). The mean numbers of trials contributing to each category of 
ERPs were 67, 37, and 30 respectively. Figure 15 shows these grand average ERP 
waveforms for all 25 recording sites, and figure 16 shows the ERPs from the left and 
right frontal and parietal sites only. The figures show that the ERPs for same pairs 
become more positive than those for new and rearranged pairs from approximately 600 
msec post stimulus onset. This effect exhibits a left hemisphere maximum at posterior 
sites, and a later-onsetting right hemisphere maximum anteriorly. The ERPs to 
rearranged pairs show little sign of an equivalent effect, but become more negative 
than the new pairs from around 900 msec onwards.
As in experiment 2, the magnitude of ERP effects was quantified over 600-900 msec, 
900-1200 msec, 1200-1500 msec and 1500-1944 msec latency regions. Analysis of 
these data followed the same rationale and procedures as in experiments 1 and 2, and 
the results of these analyses are reported in table 12. The scalp topographies of the 
old/new effects were also analysed. These analyses, conducted on the differences in 
amplitude between the ERPs to old and new pairs, were employed to test whether the 
topography of the old/new effects changed over time.
Amplitude analyses
The global ANOVAs of the 600-900, 900-1200 and 1200-1500 msec latency regions 
each revealed a main effect of response category (Fl.7,26.1 = 10.16, p < 0.01; F2,30 = 
10.96, p < 0.001; and Fl.9,29.2 = 15.04, p < 0.001 respeetively). For the final 1500­
1944 msec rsgion, The ANOVA revsalsd a main effect of response category, and an 
interaction between responss category and sits (Fl.9,29 = 17.63, p < 0.001, nnd 
F5.8,86.8 = 3.61, p < 0.01, respeciively). Ths rssults of the subsidiary ANOVAs 
comparing each pair of response categories can be seen in table 12, and are elucidaisd 
belrwo
Same versus Nsw: The ANOVA foe the 600-900 msec latency region revsalsd several 
significant effects, including an interaction bsiwssd category, hemisphere, location, 
add siis. These effects reflect the greater positivity of the ERPs to same pairs (see 
figure 17). The involvement of hemisphere and location in ths four way interaction 
reflect the fact Thai this positive sHift exhibits a left Hemisphere asymmetry at temporo­
parietal sites, and a smaller asymmetry in favour of the right Hemisphere at frontnl
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sites. The reason for the involvement of site in the four way interaction is that these 
effects are larger at electrodes positioned nearer to the midline than they are laterally.
Table 12 shows that, in each case, the ANOVAs for the remaining latency regions 
revealed a significant interaction between category, hemisphere and location. As figure 
17 shows, this pattern of effects reflects the greater positivity in the ERPs for same 
pairs compared to those for correct new pairs, a difference which is larger over the left 
hemisphere at temporo-parietal sites, but which predominates over the right 
hemisphere at fRontal sites.
Table 12. Results of the amplitude analyses, comparing each pair of response categories, over each 
latency region. Only significant effects involving the factor of response category (RC) are reported. HM 
= Hemisphere, L = Location (Anterior vs. Posterior), ST = Electrode site (Inferior vs. Mid-Lateral vs. 
Superior).
LATENCY
REGION
PAIRWISE COMPARISON
Same v New Rearranged v New Same v Rearranged
600-900
RC Fl,15 = 24.62, p< 0.001 - Fl,15 = 11.96, p< 0.005
RCxST F1.2,18.6 = 10.90, p< 0.005 - F1.6,24.6 = 12.87, p< 0.001
RC x HM X L - Fl,15 = 4.28, p = 0.056 -
RC X L x ST - F1.3,20.2 = 3.73, p = 0.057 -
RC X HM X L X ST Fl.7,251 =6.07, p< 0.01 - -
900-1200
RC Fl,15 = 17.81, p< 0.001 - Fl,15 = 20.12, p< 0.001
RCxST FI.2,18.1 =7.34, p< 0.05 - F1.5,21.8 = 16.71, p< 0.001
RC x HM x L Fl,15 = 7.71, p< 0.005 FI,15 = 7.10,p<0.05 -
1200-1500
RC Fl,15 = 19.40, p< 0.001 - Fl,15 = 25.36, p< 0.001
RCxST F1.2,17.4 = 6.17, p< 0.05 - F1.7,25.6 = 22.91, p< 0.001
RC x HM X L Fl,15 = 7.80, p< 0.05 Fl,15 = 10.05, p< 0.005 -
1500-1944
RC Fl,15 = 16.92, p< 0.001 - Fl,15 = 27.31, p< 0.001
RCxST F1.2,17.4 = 7.63, p< 0.05 - F1.7,25.7 = 39.30, p< 0.001
RCxL - Fl,15 = 5.14, p< 0.05 -
RC X HM X L F1.2,17.4 = 11.82, p< 0.005 Fl,15 = 20.09, p< 0.001 -
Rearranged versus New: The ANOVA for the 600-900 msec revealed only marginally 
significant effects. The analyses of the 900-1200 and 1200-1500 msec latency regions 
revealed a significant Interaction between category, hemisphere and location. The 
reasons for this interaction can be seen in figure 17, which shows that at right temporo­
parietal sites the ERPs for rearranged pairs are more negative-going than those for new 
pairs, whereas at right frontal sites the rearranged pairs are more positive-going. The
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ANOVA for the final latency region revealed significant interactions between category 
and location, and between category, hemisphere and location. These findings reflect 
the fact that over temporo-parietal sites the ERPs for the rearranged pairs exhibit a 
negative shift, maximal over the right hemisphere, whereas little difference between 
the response categories is evident at frontal sites.
Same versus Rearranged: For all four latency regions, the ANOVAs contrasting the 
ERPs for rearranged and same pairs revealed a significant effect of response category, 
and an interaction between response category and site (see table 12). In each case these 
effects reflect the facts that the ERPs to the same pairs are more positive-going, and 
that this difference is larger nearer to the midline (see figure 15).
Topographic analysis
Because of their small size, and their marginal reliability in the 600-900 msec latency 
region, the results of a topographic analysis of the old/new effects associated with the 
rearranged pairs were considered to be of questionable worth. The analysis of scalp 
topography was therefore confined to the larger and more robust effects associated 
with the same parrs. Figure 18 illustrates the scalp topography of these effects over 
successive latency regions. The figure indicates that the old/new effects for same pairs 
are remarkably similar across all four latency regions, consisting of two 
topographically distinct maxima, over left temporo-parietal and right fRontal scalp sites 
respectively.
To investigate whether the topography of the old/new effects evolved over the course 
of the recording epoch, the topographies of the effects in each latency region were 
contrasted by ANOVA, employing the data from all 25 sites. This revealed a 
marginally significant effect of electrode site (F3.9,58.)= 2.32, p < .07), but no sign of 
a site by epoch interaction. A follow-up ANOVA was conducted employing the factors 
of latency region, hemisphere, location (frontal vs. temporo-parietal), and site (inferior, 
mid-lateral, superior). This ANOVA gave rise to a main effect of site (Fl.8,27.5 = 
7.59, p < 0.005), along with interactions between hemisphere and location (FI, 15 = 
13.97, p < 0.005), and hemisphere and siie (Fl.7,26.2 == 6.43, p < 0.01), but to no 
effects of latency region (maximum F = 1.89). These findings confirm thr coexistence 
of left parietal and right fRontal effects in these data, but suggest that, unlike in 
experiment ), these effects did not change over time.
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Summary of results
As id sxperimsnt 1, the same pairs wees associatsd with sizeable and robust old/new 
effects. The old/nsw effects associated with rsnreanged pairs were, However, small in 
magnitude, unreliable over the earliest latency region, and supplanted at many 
electrode sites by a negative-going effect. Again id accordance with the findings of 
experiment 1, same pairs were nssociatsd with two topographically dissociabls 
old/new effects, a left temporo-pneietal maximum nnd a right frontal maximum. Unlike 
id experiment 1, however, there was no Evidence of a change id the laternl distribution 
of ths frontal old/nsw efficis with iims.
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DISCUSSION
As in experiments 1 and 2, there was a significant advantage in recognition memory 
performance for same pairs, despite the fact that the task no longer required memory 
for associations established at study to be retrieved explicitly. This finding can be 
interpreted as fUrther evidence for the proposal that same pairs benefit from 
recollection to a greater extent than do rearranged pairs. The magnitude of the 
recognition advantage for the same pairs was somewhat larger in the present 
experiment than in experiment 1, indicating that the absence of the associative 
recognition requirement did not cause subjects to reduce their dependence on 
recollection as a basis for responding to the old/new recognition judgement.
In light of these behavioural findings, it would be expected that the ERPs elicited by 
same and rearranged words pairs would, as in experiment 1, differ with respect to the 
magnitude of any ERP correlates of recollection. As a result of the removal of the 
associative recognition judgement, however, the magnitude of these recollection- 
related ERP effects would likely be smaller than those identified in the first 
experiment, since it is no longer possible to separate recognised same parrs according 
to whether or not their study episode was accurately recollected (as was the case in 
experiment 1). Thus, the ERPs elicited by such pairs in the present experiment include 
a higher proportion of trials on which recollection failed than was the case in 
experiment 1, leading to a relative ‘dilution’ of the ERP correlates of recollection.
Turning to the ERP data, the critical question posed by the experiment was whether the 
right frontal old/new effect found in experiments 1 and 2 would remain, despite the 
removal of the explicit requirement to make an associative recognition judgement. The 
ERPs to recognised same pairs exhibited statistically reliable right fRontal old/new 
effects similar in character to the right fRontal effects found in the previous 
experiments. Thus, the findings of experiment 3 suggest that the explicit requirement 
to discriminate between different classes of recognised item is not a necessary 
condition for the emergence of this fRontally distributed old/new effect. Rather, in the 
context of the recognition of arbitrarily associated word pairs, the engagement of the 
cognitive operations reflected by the right frontal effect appears to be relatively 
obligatory in nature.
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Unlike in experiment 1 howrvrr there was no evidence to suggest that the right frontal 
effect became more asymmetric over time. Thr reason for this difference between thr 
findings of the two experiments is unclear. One possibility is that it reflects the change 
from a test procedure requiring serial responses to one in which only a single response 
must be made. A similar suggestion was made by Wilding and Rugg (1997b), who 
noted that the bilateral effect evident in thrir data was absent in an earlier study of 
source memory in which only a single response was required to each test item 
(Wilding and Rugg 1997a). This account does nothing however to elucidate the 
fimctional significance of thr bilaterally distributed fRontal effect. Moreover, thr 
frontal effect did not breome more asymmetric over time in experiment 2, where a 
serial rather than single response was required. Subsequent discussion of thr functional 
and neurological significance of thr frontal old/new effects will therefore be confined 
to thr asymmetric component (the right fRontal effret), which was equally evident in all 
3 experiments.
Finally, as expected, both left parietal and right frontal old/new effects were greater in 
magnitude in the ERPs to same than to rearranged pairs. As in experiment 1, at 
temporo-parietal sites the old/new effect for rearranged pairs became increasingly 
negative-going over time, reflecting the contribution of the posteriorly distributed 
negative component discussed earlier (see Discussion of experiment 1). Unfortunately 
the small and unreliable old/new effects for the rearranged items precluded the 
Comparison of their topography with thr topography of the effects for same pairs.
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Chapter 8
INTERIM DISCUSSION 1
In all 3 experiments old/new recognition was better for same than for rearranged pairs. 
In addition, for the associative recognition judgement in experiments 1 and 2, subjects 
were able to overcome a strong bias towards responding ‘rearranged’ and classify the 
great majority of the same pairs correctly. As already discussed, these findings are 
consistent with the proposal that same and rearranged pairs are equally likely to be 
recognised on the basis of familiarity, but that same pairs are more likely to engender 
recollection.
It is important to acknowledge however that while the behavioural findings are 
consistent with a dual-process account, they do not in themselves necessitate such an 
account. The findings are equally compatible with a single process model in which 
words in same pairs engender stronger and more complete recollection of their 
encoding episodes than do words in rearranged pairs, as might be expected on the basis 
of general principles of memory function such as ‘encoding specificity’ (Tulving and 
Thomson, 1973) and ‘transfer appropriate processing’ (Morris, Bransford, and Franks, 
1977).
Likewise, the ERP findings are consistent with both dual- and single-process accounts 
of recognition. Notably, as was the case in the studies of Wilding and Rugg (1996,
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1997b), there was no evidence for an ERP correlate of familiarity based recognition. 
Such evidence would have taken the form of ERP old/new effects that were either of 
equivalent magnitude in the ERPs to same and rearranged pairs, or were larger in the 
ERPs to the rearranged pairs. Although it should be stressed that the absence of such 
findings cannot be taken as evidence against the proposal that recognition can be based 
on processes other than recollection, it is evident that the present results provide no 
support in favour of such a proposal.
Nonetheless, the present findings clearly demonstrate that the electrophysiological 
correlates of recognition memory for word pairs differ markedly according to whether 
associations formed at study are maintained or are broken at test. These differences are 
found in the magnitudes of two topographically dissociable old/new effects. In respect 
of their scalp distributions and functional properties, these effects closely resemble two 
previously identified correlates of successful memory retrieval: the left parietal and 
right frontal old/new effects (e.g., see Allan et al., in press). Thus, the present findings 
lend support to previous proposals (cf. Allan et al. in press, Wilding and Rugg, 1996, 
1997a,b) that these ERP effects reflect functional distinct processes engaged during the 
recollection of prior episodes.
Neuropsychological evidence (e.g., see Mayes, 1988) indicates that recollection 
depends critically upon the hippocampal formation and associated medial temporal and 
diencephalic structures (the medial temporal lobe memory system). It has been 
proposed that the role of this system is to bind or link together in memory the various 
features of an event at the time it is experienced, allowing its reinstatement in response 
to an appropriate retrieval cue (e.g., Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; Gaffan, 1994; Kroll 
et al., 1996; McClelland et al., 1995). In light of such proposals, the present findings, 
which indicate that the left parietal effect is sensitive not so much to whether test items 
are old or new, but whether they preserve information about associations formed 
during a single prior study episode, add weight to the suggestion that this effect reflects 
retrieval mediated by the medial temporal memory system (cf. Rugg et al., 1996; 
Wilding and Rugg, 1996).
The present findings also provide new information about the right fir^iNial old/new 
effect. As discussed previously, Wilding and Rugg (1996, 1997a,b) proposed that this 
effect reflects processing supported by the prefrontal cortex; specifically, task related
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post-retrieval processing performed on the products of successful recollection. This 
proposal is Consistent with neuropsychological evidence which suggests that the 
prefrontal cortex Contributes to performance on memory tasks that require the 
evaluation and employment of remembered information in a strategic, goal directed 
manner (e.g., Moscovitch, 1992, 1995).
Thr findings are consistent with the idea that the right frontal old/new effret reflects 
suecrssful rreolleetion, in that thr magnitude of thr effret was markedly larger for the 
ERPs to same pairs than it was for rearranged pairs. Contrary to what might have been 
expected on thr basis of the proposals of Wilding and Rugg, however, the effret was 
found not only in experiments 1 and 2, but also in experiment 3, when the explicit 
requirement to evaluate and employ recollected information in a goal directed manner 
was reduced considerably. This finding demonstrates that the right frontal effret is not 
restricted to memory tasks, such as sourer memory, in which the correct response is 
dictated by the content of the recollected information.
Although thr right frontal effret appears to be an obligatory correlate of the 
recollection of associative infonnation, it has not been reported in numerous previous 
studies of recognition memory for isolated words (for review see Rugg, 1995). Recent 
evidence suggests, however, that thr effect ean be found in standard old/new 
recognition tests under certain circumstances. For example, Allan and Rugg (1997) 
found a small right frontal old/new effect in the ERPs to correctly identified old words 
in a recognition memory task in which aeeuracy was very high. Similarly, 
Schloerscheidt and Rugg (1997) reported that successful recognition of pictures of 
objects was associated with a right frontal old/new effret, again in thr context of high 
levels of recognition accuracy.
Why should right fRontal effects be present in these but not in earlier studies of old/new 
recognition memory? One possible explanation is that the emergence of the right 
frontal effret is related to the richness or amount of information that is retrieved in 
response to thr test cue. By this argument, the post-retrieval processes reflected by this 
effect are obligatorily engaged whenever the amount of information retrieved from 
episodic memory exceeds some threshold, and such post-retrieval processes may 
sometimes be engaged regardless of task demands. This threshold is less likely to be 
exceeded when thr experimental task requires simple recognition memory of words,
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than when the encoded information is particularly rich (as in the present experiments), 
or when a relatively large amount of information must be retrieved in order to satisfy 
task demands (as in tests of source memory).
That said, previous evidence also suggests that the right frontal old/new effect is not a 
necessary consequence of the recollection of a prior study episode, even under 
circumstances similar to those in the present experiments. Rugg et al. (1996, and see 
Tendolkar et al., 1997, for similar findings) employed a study task very similar to the 
one used here, but at test presented only one member of each study pair. For each item 
judged old, subjects were required to recall the word with which it had been associated 
at study. As would be expected on the basis of the present findings, Rugg et al. (1996) 
found that the left parietal old/new effect elicited by recognised words for which 
associative recall was successful was larger than the effect elicited by recognised 
words for which the associate could not be recalled. By contrast, there was no sign of a 
right fRontal effect in the ERPs to the ‘recollected’ items.
Thus, although associative recognition and associative recall might seem to rely upon 
the recollection of similar infonnation, the two tasks are associated with different 
electrophysiological ‘signatures’, with only recognition giving rise to the right fRontal 
old/new effect. Clearly, it is of interest to determine whether associative recognition 
and associative recall employ qualitatively different retrieval processes, or whether 
instead they differ with respect to processes that act upon retrieved information. 
According to current proposals about the functional significance of the right frontal 
effect - that it reflects processes that act upon the products of retrieval - the latter is the 
more likely possibility. By this account, additional post-retrieval processes appear to 
be engaged by associative recognition but not associative recall.
An alternative account of the relationship between associative recognition and recall 
can be found in the proposals of Koriat and Goldsmith (1996). They investigated 
differences in the role of monitoring and control process across memory tasks, and 
argued that differences in a subject’s ‘freedom to respond’ have a critical influence 
upon memory performance. For example, in a typical cued recall task subjects have no 
control over what a specific retrieval cue causes them to remember, but they can 
control what they choose to report. Thus, the ability to monitor the contents of retrieval 
allows a trade off between the frequency and accuracy of responding. In contrast, in a
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typical recognition memory task subjects are tested under forced choice conditions 
where monitoring and control processes camiot play as critical a role. Thus, within the 
framework provided by Koriat and Goldsmith, associative recall would be expected to 
be at least as dependent as associative recognition upon post-retrieval monitoring and 
control processes. In sum, it remains to be seen whether associative recognition and 
associative recall employ fundamentally different retrieval processes, or if they simply 
differ with respect to the post-retrieval processes that are performed upon retrieved 
information. Experiments 4 and 5 were designed to investigate this question.
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Chapter 9.
EXPERIMENT 4
INTRODUCTION
There is converging evidence that performance on episodic memory tasks depends 
upon a network of brain regions. Among thr most important of these regions are the 
hippocampus and adjacent medial temporal strueturrs (the ‘medial temporal memory 
system’; e.g., Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; Gaffan, 1994; Squire and Zola-Morgan, 
1991), and the prefrontal eortrx (e.g., Wheeler, Stuss and Tulving, 1995; Stuss and 
Benson, 1983; Stuss, Eskrs and Foster, 1994). Thr medial temporal system is thought 
to play an obligatory role in the retrieval of recently acquired episodic information. By 
contrast, the role of thr prefrontal eortex is generally regarded as more flexible, 
supporting a range of processes that are called into play to differing extents by 
different retrieval tasks (e.g.. Squire, Knowlton and Musen, 1993; Moscovitch, 1992).
As discussed in chapter 3, thr findings from recent ERP studies of episodic memory 
retrieval are Consistent with the foregoing framework. One ERP correlate of episodic 
memory - the ‘left parietal old/new effect’ - is Characterised by a positive shift in ERPs 
to words correctly recognised as old relative to ERPs to new words. The effret onsets 
around 400 msec post-stimulus and is maximal over the left temporo-parietal scalp.
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The findings from a variety of studies suggest that the left parietal effect is elicited 
selectively by test items that engender retrieval of their encoding episode (recollection; 
cf. Wilding, Doyle and Rugg 1995; Wilding and Rugg 1996; Palier and Kutas, 1992; 
Smith, 1993; for a recent review see Allan, Wilding and Rugg, in press). Moreover, it 
has been proposed (Wilding and Rugg, 1996) that the effect reflects retrieval processes 
associated with recollection, and that it is an indirect reflection of the contribution of 
the medial temporal lobe memory system to episodic retrieval (cf. Cohen and 
Eiehenbaum, 1993; Squire and Zola-Morgan, 1991).
A second ERP correlate of episodie memory has also been found; the ‘right frontal 
old/new effect’. To recap briefly, this effect was first demonstrated in a study of source 
memory (Wilding and Rugg, 1996), and consists of a positive shift that is maximal 
over right frontal electrodes. In that study, the effect onset at about the same time as 
the left parietal old/new effeet, but showed a markedly more sustained time course. 
Because the right frontal effect was larger in ERPs elicited by items that received 
correct rather than ineorreet source judgements, Wilding and Rugg (1996) proposed 
that it reflected processes associated with the successful recollection of prior episodes.
As discussed in chapter 3, although there seems to be a strong link between 
recollection and the left parietal effect, this link appears to be weaker in the case of the 
right frontal effect. For example, the right fRontal effect is seldom prominent in ERPs 
elicited in simple recognition memory tasks (Allan et al. in press), and Wilding and 
Rugg (1997b) identified a situation in which even successful source memory was not 
accompanied by the effect. Consequently, Wilding and Rugg (1997a,b) suggested that 
the right fRontal effeet reflects ‘post-retrieval’ processes that are recruited in certain 
circumstances to operate on the products of episodic retrieval.
Like source memory, the ability to retrieve recently learnt associations between two 
items is heavily dependent upon episodic memory. In both cases, memory for the 
familiarity of the test items per se is not sufficient to support accurate performance. 
Whereas successful source memory depends on the ability to recollect the association 
between a study item and its encoding context, associative memory requires 
Recollection of information about the specific relationship between a pair of study 
items. Notably, two different tasks can be employed to tap memory for recently 
acquired associations. Associative recall requires subjects to retrieve the associate of a
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recently studied test item presented in isolation. By contrast, associative recognition 
requires subjects to discriminate between pairs of old items that maintain their pairing 
between study and test, and pairs that have been recombined between study and test
phases.
The relationship between the ERP old/new effects and episodic recollection has been 
investigated using both associative recall (Rugg, Schloerscheidt, Doyle, Cox and 
Patching, 1996) and associative recognition (experiments 1-3). As was described in 
chapter 3, in the study of Rugg et al. (1996) subjects first learned a series of novel 
word pairs. At test one member of each study pair was presented, intermixed with new 
words. Subjects were required to judge whether each test item was old or new, and for 
each word judged old, to report its study partner. In keeping with the proposal that it 
indexes episodic retrieval, a significant left parietal effect was elicited only by those 
recognised old words for which associative recall was successful. There was, however, 
no sign of a right frontal old/new effect.
Whilst there have been several previous studies of associative recognition (experiments 
1-3), for present purposes the first of these is most relevant here. To recap briefly, the 
study phase of that experiment was identical to that of Rugg et al. At test however, new 
pairs of items were intermixed with old items, which were presented in either the 
‘same’ pairing as at study or in a ‘rearranged’ pairing. The task was to discriminate 
between old and new pairs, and for pairs judged old, to discriminate between same and 
rearranged pairs. Relative to the ERPs elicited by both new and rearranged pairs, the 
ERPs elicited by correctly classified same pairs exhibited left parietal and right frontal 
old/new effects, along with an earlier, bilateral frontally distributed old/new effect.
Taken together, the findings from the studies described above suggest that associative 
recall and associative recognition have different electrophysiological correlates. 
Whereas in both tasks recollected items give rise to a left parietal old/new effect, 
frontally distributed old/new effects were only elicited by recollected items in the 
associative recognition task.
These findings appear to be at odds with the functional account of the right frontal 
old/new effect proposed by Wilding and Rugg (1996; see above). One might take the 
view that the information retrieved on tests of associative recall and source memory is
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so disparate that the differential engagement of post-retrieval processes is to be 
expected (thr argument put forward by Rugg rt al. (1996) to account for their lack of a 
right frontal effect; cf. Chapter 3). It is difficult however to see how this argument can 
be extended to the comparison between associative recall and associative recognition. 
On the face of it, the two tasks require retrieval of the same.kind of information (novel 
associations), and there is no principled reason for supposing that recognition places 
greater demands on post-retrieval processing than dors recall.
The conclusion that there is an inconsistency between thr findings from the ERP 
studies of associative recognition and recall is however, based upon a comparison 
made between two studies that differed in many rrsprets other than their task demands. 
Thus, experiment 4 was designed to allow the ERP correlates of associative 
recognition and recall to be compared in thr same subjects when extraneous procedural 
differences between the tasks were kept to a minimum. Thr two tasks were compared 
directly, employing a randomised experimental design. ERPs were recorded from 
considerably more electrodes (25 vs. 13), and for a longer recording epoch (1944 msec 
vs. 1436 msec) than those employed by Rugg rt al. (1996). At issue is thr question of 
whether, under these conditions, thr ERP Correlates of successful associative 
Recognition and associative recall differ.
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METHOD
Subjects
20 students participated in the experiment. Data from 3 subjects was discarded due to
insufficient artifact-free trials in the critical response categories. An additional subject 
was discarded due to a technical failure. The mean age of the remaining subjects was 
20.9 years (range 18 to 31 years), 10 of whom were female.
Experimental stimuli
The 880 words were chosen from those in appendix A, and used to form 440 
semantically and associatively unrelated word pairs. Of these 400 were used as critical 
items, and the remaining 40 for training. The experimental design is shown in table 13, 
along with examples of each class of item.
Table 13. Experimental design for a single study-test block, showing the different classes of stimuli and 
the correct responses, for both associative recognition and recall.
Phase Class of Item Examule Resuonse
Study List 40 word pairs: doll-bush
charm-glue
paint-ride
green-honey
Test List
Associative Recognition 10 same pairs: doll-bush Old: Same
10 rearranged pairs: charm-ride Old: Rearranged
20 new pairs: rock-steam New
Associative Recall 20 old items: green-xxx Old: Honey
20 new items: creep-xxxx New
For associative recognition half of the old items maintained their pairing between study 
and test (‘same’ pairs), whereas the remaining half were randomly re-paired 
(‘rearranged’ pairs). For associative recall, test items comprised the first word of a 
study pair and a row of Xs. The position of the word and Xs was counterbalanced and 
the number of Xs (ranging from 4 to 8) did not correspond to the length of the words’ 
original partners.
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The 400 critical word pairs were used to generate 8 study-test lists (each of which was 
presented to 2 subjects) such that across lists, each word pair was employed equally 
frequently for each task. The use of word pairs as study items was also 
counterbalanced across lists, such that each pair served equally often as an ‘old’ or 
‘new’ test item. The items used to form ‘same’ or ‘rearranged’ pairs for thr associative 
recognition task were also counterbalanced across lists. Item order within each list was 
also randomised. Finally, each of the resulting study-test lists was separated into 5 
blocks, such that each study block Contained 40 word pairs, and each test block 
contained 80 pairs of stimuli: 20 ‘old’ items and 20 ‘new’ items for raeh task.
In addition to thr critical experimental lists, a training list was also generated, 
according to the same procedure as for the Critical items, but containing only 20 study 
pairs and 40 test items.
Experimental tasks, procedures and ERP recording
The experiment was run over five study-test blocks, preceded by thr initial training 
session. Details of the study phase procedure are provided in chapter 4. Each test phase 
followed immediately after the study phase. Subjects were told that they would have to 
perform two tasks, each task being curd with a different fixation character. The ‘*’ 
character signalled an associative recognition trial, and the ‘#’ character signalled a 
trial requiring associative recall. Each trial began with the presentation of one of these 
fixation characters, displayed for 800 msec. Following a 124 msec period during which 
the screen was blank, the test items were presented for a duration of 300 msec. The 
screen then remained blank for a fUrther 3 seconds, at which time another fixation 
Character ‘?’ was presented for 4 seconds, which signalled that the subject should 
respond. Thr next trial then began. During the test phase the interval between the onset 
of successive test items was 10 see.
By contrast with thr proerdurr employed in experiments 1-3, at test subjects were 
required to make verbal responses, which were monitored and recorded by the 
experimenter. Examples of the correct response for raeh type of test stimuli are shown 
in table 13. For the associative recognition task subjects were instrueted to make an 
initial old/new judgement for each pair, responding ‘old’ to pairs judged as studied, 
and ‘new’ to pairs judged as unstudied. For pairs judged as being old an additional
186
response was required, ‘same’ for words judged as having maintained their study 
pairing, ‘rearranged’ for words judged as being from separate study pairs, and ‘don’t 
know’ when uncertain. An initial old/new judgement was also required for the 
associative recall task. Again, for any word judged to be old an additional response 
was required, either to report the word’s original study partner, or if unable to do so, to 
respond ‘don’t know’.
Details of the ERP recording procedures are provided in chapter 4.
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RESULTS
Behavioural data
Table 14 shows the probability of an ‘old’ response to old and new items on the initial 
old/new judgement, for both associative recognition and associative recall. A t-test was
performed to compare recognition accuracy (measured as [p(hit)-p(false alami)]) 
across task revealed a significant effect (tl5 = 11.33, p < 0.001), indicating that 
performance was superior in the associative recognition task.
The hit rates on the associative recognition task were 97% and 93% for same and 
rearranged pairs respectively. A t-test comparing these hit rates revealed a significant 
effect (tl5 = 4.24, p = 0.001), confirming that performance was better for same than for
rearranged pairs.
Table 14. Mean percentage (standard deviations) of an old response on the initial old/new judgement for 
both associative recognition and associative recall. The subsequent probability of a correct associative 
recognition response is also shown for same and rearranged pairs (contingent upon a correct old/new 
recognition response)
Judgement Class of item
Old/new recognition Old New
% ‘OLD’: Recognition 94.9 (3.2) 2.3 (2.5)
% ‘OLD’: Recall 80.4 (8.1) 4.4 (3.2)
Associative recognition Same Rearranged
% ‘CORRECT’ 90.0 (5.8) 90.1 (5.5)
Table 14 also shows the proportion of correct associative recognition responses made 
to pairs that were judged old (although an option, no subjects responded ‘don’t know’ 
to these items). Not surprisingly, a t-test comparing the proportion of correct 
judgements for same and rearranged pairs revealed that these proportions did not 
differ. Subjects made too few false alarms to permit an analysis of their associative 
judgements to these items.
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Of those old words that were correctly recognised in the associative recall task, 49%
were associated with correct recall of their study partner, 43% elicited a ‘don’t know’ 
response, and the remaining 8% elicited an incorrect response.
ERP data
As the focus of interest is in the contrast between the neural correlates of successful 
associative memory on each task, analysis of the ERP data was restricted to only two 
response categories8. For associative recognition these categories were correctly 
classified new pairs (henceforth ‘new pairs’), and same pairs that were both recognised 
as old and correctly classified as ‘same’ (‘recognised’ pairs). For associative recall the 
categories were correctly classified new words (‘new words’), and recognised old 
words for which the studied associate was correctly recalled (‘recalled’ words). The 
mean number of trials contributing to the ERPs for associative recognition was 81 and 
38 for the ‘new’ and ‘recognised’ response categories respectively. For associative 
recall the mean number of trials was 79 and 35 for the ‘new’ and ‘recalled’ response 
categories respectively.
Figure 19 shows the grand average ERP waveforms for the associative recognition task 
fRom all 25 electrode sites. The waveforms diverge from approximately 600 msec post­
stimulus onset, with the ERPs for the recognised pairs becoming more positive than 
those for new pairs. This positive shift is larger over the left than the right hemisphere 
at temporo-parietal electrodes, but is more bilaterally distributed at frontal electrodes. 
The left hemisphere temporo-parietal positivity remains present (but decreases in size) 
throughout the recording epoch. From approximately 1400 msec post-stimulus the 
bilateral fRontal positivity is replaced by a right-sided effect.
Figure 20 shows the grand average ERP waveforms for associative recall, again from 
all 25 electrode sites. As was the case for the recognition data, the waveforms begin to 
diverge from approximately 600 msec post-stimulus onset, with the ERPs for recalled 
pairs becoming more positive than those to new items, and exhibiting a left greater
8 Sufficient trials were available for the formation of two additional ERP waveforms, one for each task. For 
associative recognition ERPs were formed for ‘rearranged’ responses (i.e., to rearranged pairs that were both 
recognised and correctly classified as being rearranged), and for recall ERPs were formed for ‘don’t know’ 
responses (i.e., old words for which the studied associate could not be correctly recalled). The ERPs to these 
response categories does not bear directly on the issue that this study was designed to address, thus these ERPs are 
not considered ■ in detail. For completeness however, the ERP waveforms are shown in appendix B, shown for all 25 
recording sites.
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than right asymmetry at both fRontal and temporo-parietal electrodes. At temporo­
parietal sites this positivity is replaced from approximately 900 msec by a right-sided 
negative-going effect, which continues until the end of thr recording epoch. At fRontal 
sites a right-sided effect is evident from approximately 1400 msec post-stimulus.
Rationale for the ERP analyses
As noted, the principal aim of experiment 4 is to investigate whether fRontally 
distributed old/new effects arr present in the ERPs for each task, and if so, to 
charaetrrise and compare them. Consequently, the analysis of the magnitude of effects 
focused upon lateral fRontal electrodes (F7/F8, LF/RF, and F3/F4; the same fRontal 
sites that were analysed in experiments 1-3). Thr ERPs were analysed by measuring 
the mean amplitudes of the waveform (relative to the 102 msec pre-stimulus baseline) 
over three latency regions; 600-900 msec, 900-1400 msre and 1400-1900 msec. These 
latency regions were ehosrn on the basis of visual inspection of thr waveforms, as 
those that best captured the pattern of old/new effrets as they evolved over time. 
Notably, the 1400-1900 msec epoch covers a latency region that was absent in the 
original Rugg et al. (1996) study.
Analysis was initially performed separately for each task, investigating the magnitude 
and distribution of the frontally distributed old/nrw effrets within each epoch. These 
analyses employed ANOVA with factors of response category (old vs. new), 
hemisphere (left vs. right), and site (inferior vs. mid-lateral vs. superior). The results of 
these analyses are shown in table 15. Results of thr analysis of the data fRom analogous 
temporo-parietal sites (T5/T6, LP/RP, and P3/P4) are also shown in thr table. These 
analyses are not commented upon in detail, but serve to demonstrate the presence of 
statistically significant old/new effrets over temporo-parietal electrodes, and permit a 
comparison with the findings with thr previous studies of associative recognition and 
recall (experiments 1-3 in this thesis, and Rugg rt al., 1996, respretively). Only 
significant F values arr reported, and as interest lies solely in differences between the 
ERPs associated with each response category, significant effects that do not involve 
the factor of response category are not reported. Figure 17 illustrates, for raeh task and 
latency region, the mean amplitude difference between the ERPs for old and new 
response categories.
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Magnitude analyses
Associative Recognition: As can be seen in table 15, analysis of the data from the 600­
900 msec latency region established the presence of significant differences between the 
ERPs to the recognised and new response categories over frontal scalp sites, in the 
form of a significant interaction between response category and site. Figure 21 shows 
that this interaction reflects the fact that the ERPs for recognised pairs are more 
positive going than those to the new pairs, and that this positivity increases as 
electrodes get nearer to the midline. There was however no evidence of any significant 
effects involving hemisphere during the 600-900 msec latency region.
Table 15. Results of the ANOVAs of the amplitude analyses, for each task, over each latency region. Only 
significant effects involving the factor of response category are reported. RC = Response Category (Old vs. 
New), HM = Hemisphere, ST = Electrode Site (Inferior vs. Mid-Lateral vs. Superior).
FRONTAL
RC
ASSOCIATIVE RECOGNITION
600-900 msec 900-1400 msec 1400-1900 msec
Fl,15 = 12.63, p< 0.005 Fl,15 = 10.71, p = 0.005 -
RCxHM - - Fl,15 = 6.80, p< 0.05
RCxST Fl.1,17.0 = 6.06, p< 0.05 F1.2,18.4 = 11.12, p <0.05 F1.2,17.4 = 5.29, p< 0.05
RC x HM x ST - Fl.3,19.8 = 4.03, p< 0.05 F1.5,22.4 = 4.34, p< 0.05
PARIETAL
RC Fl,15 = 9.96, p< 0.01 Fl,15 = 7.21, p< 0.05 -
RCxHM Fl,15 = 7.33, p< 0.05 Fl,15 = 8.42, p< 0.05 Fl,15 = 4.84, p< 0.05
RCxST FI.1,16.2 = 12.66, p < 0.005 Fl.2,18.5 = 7.06, p < 0.05 -
FRONTAL
RC
600-900 msec
Fl,15 = 7.29, p< 0.05
ASSOCIATIVE RECALL
900-1400 msec 1400-1900 msec
RCxHM - - Fl,15 = 17.84, p = 0.001
RCxHM xST Fl.6,23.9 = 5.68, p < 0.05 F1.4,21.6 = 7.47, p< 0.01 F1.4,20.6 = 5.68, p< 0.05
PARIETAL
RC - Fl,15 = 7.79, p< 0.05 -
RCxHM Fl,15 = 17.39, p = 0.001 Fl,15 = 19.53, p< 0.001 Fl,15 = 14.15, p< 0.005
RCxST - F1.3,18.9 = 11.99, p< 0.005 -
RC x HM x ST - F1.2,17.5 = 13.19, p = 0.001 Fl.5,23.2 = 12.99, p < 0.001
Table 15 also shows that significant old/new effects were present for the 900-1400 and 
1400-1900 msec latency regions. In both cases, the ANOVAs giving rise to three way 
interactions between category, hemisphere and site. Figure 21 shows that for the 900­
1400 msec epoch this interaction reflects a positive going shift in the ERPs to 
recognised pairs. This effect is larger at sites near to the midline, and falls off more
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rapidly over the right than left hemisphere. For the 1400-1900 msec epoch the 
interaction reflects a positive going shift that once again increases in size as electrodes 
get closer to the midline. In contrast to the pattern found in the earlier epochs however, 
the effect is largely restricted to electrodes over the right hemisphere.
Associative Recall: Table 15 also shows the results of the ANOVAs comparing the 
ERPs for recalled and new pairs. As figure 21 shows, the significant three way 
interaction for the 600-900 msec data between category, hemisphere and site reflects 
the presence of a frontal old/new which is larger over the left than the right 
hemisphere. The involvement of site in the interaction reflects the fact that -the positive 
shift is diffusely distributed across electrode sites over the left hemisphere, but is 
focused towards the midline over the right hemisphere. A similar pattern of effects can 
be seen for the 900-1400 msec region, for which there is a significant interaction 
between category, hemisphere and site. Again this reflects a positive shift in the ERPs 
to recalled items that is diffusely distributed over left hemisphere electrodes, and more 
focused towards the midline over the right hemisphere.
The results of the ANOVA for the final 1400-1900 msec region also revealed a 
significant three way interaction between category, hemisphere and site (see table 15). 
Once again, this reflects the presence of a positive going old/new effect in the ERPs for 
the recalled items. Figure 21 shows that the pattern of effects differs fRom that found in 
the earlier epochs. During the 1400-1900 msec epoch the positive going old/new effect 
is restricted to the right hemisphere, an effect that increases in size as electrodes get 
closer to the midline.
Topographic Analyses
Since there were statistically significant fRontal old/new effects for both tasks in all 
three latency regions, it was possible to compare the scalp distributions of the effects in 
each region as a function of task. These topographic analysis was conducted on the 
differences in amplitude between the ERPs to the old and new response categories (see 
figure 22). The analyses were conducted initially on the data from all 25 sites 
(employing the factors of task and site), followed by planned ANOVAs of the data 
fRom lateral frontal electrodes (factors of task, hemisphere and site).
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600-900 msec: Thr initial ANOVA comparing the distributions of the effects across all 
25 sites failed to reveal a significant task by site interaction (F < 1). Similarly, the 
planned ANOVA restricted to lateral frontal electrodes revealed no effects that 
involved thr factor of task (max F = 1.22). Thus, there was no evidence that the sealp 
distribution of the old/new effrets for recognition and recall differed during this epoch.
900-1400 msec: Thr initial ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between task 
and site (F3.4,51.3 = 4.46, p = 0.005), indicating that thr distribution of old/new effects 
varied aeeording to task. Thr ANOVA restricted to data from lateral fRontal electrodes 
also revealed a significant interaction between task and site (Fl.3,19.2 = 7.14, p < 
0.025). As can be seen fRom figure 22, this interaction reflects the fact that for recall 
the fRontal old/new effect are diffusely distributed across fRontal electrodes, whereas 
for recognition the effects are more sharply focused towards the midline.
1400-1900 msec epoch: Neither the initial nor the planned ANOVA revealed any 
effects involving the factor of task during this epoch (F = 2.20), indicating that thr 
scalp distributions of thr old/new effects were statistically equivalent across the two 
tasks (see figure 22). Importantly, thr planned ANOVA did reveal a significant effret 
of hemisphere, along with an interaetion between hemisphere and site (FI,15 = 18.56, 
p = 0.001, and Fl.4,21.3 = 18.28, p < 0.001 respretively). In demonstrating that the 
old/new effrets in this latency region were larger over thr right than left fRontal sealp 
these findings echo the results of the magnitude analyses described previously. They 
also indicate that these asymmetries, and their relative magnitudes across thr 
homotopie electrode pairs, were statistically equivalent across the two tasks (compare 
figures 21 and 22).
Summary of results
Analysis of the ERP data revealed that there were statistically significant fRontally 
distributed old/new effrets for both tasks. Thr topographic analyses revealed no 
evidence that the distribution of these old/new effects differed across task during thr 
early 600-900 and late 1400-1900 msec latency regions. Critically, the analyses 
confirmed thr presence of right fRontal old/new effrets for both tasks during the 1400­
1900 msec latency region. Thr effects were not entirely equivalent for both tasks 
however. During the 900-1400 msec epoch the old/new effrets were diffusely
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distributed across fRontal electrodes for recall, but more sharply focused towards the 
midline for recognition.
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Figures 19. Experiment 4: Grand average ERPs for the recognised and new response categories for associative recognition. Scale bar and 
electrodes are shown as in figure 7.
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Figure 20. Experiment 4: Grand average ERPs for the recalled and new response categories for associative recall. Scale bar and electrodes are 
shown as in figure 7.
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Figure 21. Experiment 4: Mrar amplitudes of thr diffrrrrer brtwrrr thr ERPs for correct old 
ard rrw responses, shown separately for recall (left) ard recognition (right) during thr 600-900 
(top), 900-1400 (middle) ard 1400-1900 (bottom) msre latrrey regions. Values are shown for 
thr lateral frontal rlretrodri employed ir thr magnitude analyses. Thr data are shown for thr left 
ard right hemispheres, with sites arranged as or thr head (irferioR-to-iuperioR or thr left, 
iuperioR-to-irferioR or thr right).
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Figure 22. Experiment 4: Topographic maps illustrating the scalp distribution of the old/new effects for associative recognition (top row) and associative recall (bottom 
row), over the 600-900, 900-1400 and 1400-1900 msec latency regions. Scale bars and electrodes are shown as in figure 10.
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DISCUSSION
As indexed by the initial old/new recognition judgement, item Recognition was highly 
accurate for both tasks. Performance was better in the recognition than recall task 
however. Thr fact that two words were presented as retrieval cues during each 
Recognition test trial (and hrner two opportunities to recognise a study item), compared 
to one word for each recall trial, provides an obvious explanation for the observed 
differenee in performance on the initial rreognition deeision.
On both components of the associative recognition task performance was substantially 
better than in the previous experiment employing this task (cf. Experiment 1). This 
differenee between thr previous and the present study is almost certainly a reflection of 
the fact that fewer study items were employed in thr present experiment (200 vs. 100 
pairs). Performance on the first component of thr assoeiative recall task was similar to 
that reported by Rugg et al. (1996), but the proportion of recognised words associated 
with correct recall was somewhat higher (49% vs. 36%). This difference too may 
reflect the employment in thr present study of shorter study lists than were employed 
previously (128 pairs in Rugg et al.).
Performance on the second component of each task indicated that, in both eases, 
subjects were able to accurately recollect a substantial proportion of the study episodes. 
In the case of associative recall the probability of reporting a study associate correctly 
by chance is vanishingly small; thus, it can be assumed that episodic recollection was 
the basis for performance on essentially every trial on which recall was successful. Of 
course, for the assoeiative Recognition task ehance responding would give rise to 
correct associative judgements on 50% of trials. Given that subjects’ judgements were 
accurate on some 90% of trials, however, it is safe to assume that guessing played only 
a small role in these judgements. Following Yonelinas (1997), it seems likely that on 
thr great majority of trials on which subjects correctly endorsed recognised words pairs 
as ‘same’, this judgement was based on the rreolleetion of the association formed at 
study.
The ERPs obtained during the assoeiative rreognition task resemble those described in 
experiment 1 quite closely. Recognised pairs elicited a sustained left parietal effect, thr 
onset of which was roughly concurrent with a bilaterally distributed fRontal positivity
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which, from approximately 1200 msec post-stimulus, evolved into a right frontal effect 
that persisted until the end of the recording epoch. Similarly, in the case of the 
associative recall task, the ERPs from the posterior scalp resemble those from the 
initial study employing that task, in that they exhibited an initial left parietal effect 
followed by a sustained, right-sided negativity.
The key question is whether, in the associative recall task, the ERPs from frontal 
electrodes resemble more closely those found previously for associative recall (cf. 
Rugg et al., 1996) or those found for associative recognition (cf. experiment 1). The 
answer is clear: the pattern of old/new effects obtained from the frontal electrodes in 
the recall task was very similar to that found for recognition, and not at all like that 
reported by Rugg et al. (1996). Frontal effects were evident from approximately 600 
msec post-stimulus, becoming increasingly right-sided with time, so as to exhibit a 
strongly right-sided asymmetry. Thus, at least in the experimental context employed 
here, successful associative recall does differentially engage the generators of frontal 
old/new effects.
How can these findings be reconciled with those of Rugg et al.? In the case of the late- 
onsetting right frontal effect observed here for associative recall, there may be nothing 
to reconcile. Rugg et al. employed a sampling epoch that terminated 1434 msec post­
stimulus, and would therefore have been unable to observe a right frontal effect 
onsetting as late (ca. 1400 msec) as the one evident in the present experiment.
By contrast to the case of the right frontal effect however, there is a clear conflict 
between the findings of the present study and those of Rugg et al. with regard to 
‘early’, bilateral frontal old/new effects. In the present study these effects onset around 
600 msec, well within the recording epoch employed by Rugg et al. There was 
however, no sign of such effects in the data from that study (see figure 5, chapter 3). 
Clearly, the present findings are inconsistent with those of Rugg et al (1996), and 
indicate that, at least in the experimental context employed here, successful associative 
recall does differentially engage the generators of the frontal old/new effects.
Finally, it should be noted that whereas the scalp distributions of the old/new effects in 
each task were statistically equivalent for the 600-900 msec and 1400-1900 msec 
latency regions, this was not the case for the intervening region, where, among other
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distributional differences, fRontal effrets were distributed more diffusely across the 
scalp in the recall task than they were in the rreognition task. This finding suggests 
that, for this latency region at least, the patterns of neural activity (and, presumably, the 
cognitive operations) engaged by thr two tasks differed, at least in part. This is 
unsurprising, given the quite different retrieval cues and demands of the two tasks. 
What is more surprising, perhaps, is the finding that, in the latency regions preceding 
and following this one, the patterns of neural activity associated with successful 
recollection in each task were so similar. Despite their procedural differences, it would 
appear that the two tasks engage many of the same Cognitive operations.
Why should the present findings br so different fRom those of Rugg et al. (1996)? One 
possible reason for thr presence of the fRontally distributed effects in the present study 
is that thr effects are sensitive to the overall ‘context’ in which the assoeiative recall 
task was performed. In thr experiment of Rugg et al. (1996) all test trials belonged to 
the same task. In thr present experiment, however, subjects were required to switch 
between tasks on a trial-by-trial basis. It is possible that the requirement to Constantly 
switch tasks was in some way responsible for thr presence of the early fRontal effects 
in the present associative recall task (cf. Johnson rt al., 1997; Shallice, 1988). By this 
account, thr fRontal old/new effrets found for assoeiative recall should not be present if 
the two tasks are Compared under conditions were subjects are not required to switch 
between tasks on a trial-by-trial basis. Experiment 5 was designed to investigate this 
possibility, prior to any fUrther discussion of thr present findings.
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Chapter 10
EXPERIMENT 5
INTRODUCTION
Experiment 5 was designed to investigate whether the presence of frontally distributed 
old/new effects in the ERPs for successful associative recall in experiment 4 was a 
result of the requirement to switch between tasks on a trial by trial basis. To remove 
this requirement the experimental design was modified so that task was now a blocked 
rather than a randomised variable. If the frontal old/new effects observed for the 
associative recall task in experiment 4 were a consequence of the requirement to switch 
between this task and associative recognition, they should be absent in experiment 5.
202
METHOD
Subjects
21 subjects participated in thr experiment, none of whom had taken part in experiment 
4. Two subjects failed to complete thr experiment due to technical failure, and the data 
from 3 other subjects were discarded due to a lack of artifact fRee trials. The remaining 
16 subjects (5 female, 11 male) had a mean age of 22.8 years (range 17 to 31 years).
Experimental stimuli
The experimental stimuli comprised thr same 440 word pairs that were employed in 
experiment 4 (400 critical pairs, and 40 practice pairs). Thr experimental procedure for 
each task was the same as those used in experiment 4, as was thr method for 
generating and Counterbalancing the study-test lists.
Thr critical difference between the present and previous experiment was in thr 
separation of the recognition and recall trials into different blocks. Each subject was 
presented with 4 study-test blocks, 2 for associative Recognition, and 2 for associative 
recall. Each study block Contained 50 word pairs, ard each test block Contained 100 
pairs. An AABB design was employed, such that half of the subjects performed the 
two associative rreognition blocks first, whereas thr rrmaining subjects performed the 
associative recall blocks first. The AABB design was chosen (rather than ABBA or 
ABAB designs) to minimise the switches between tasks.
A training block was also generated for each task, which was presented immediately 
before thr administration of the first experimental block of the appropriate task.
Experimental procedure and ERP recording
The study and test phases procedures were idrntieal to those employed in experiment 
4, except for the blocking of trials. Prior to the first training block subjects were 
provided with instructions for thr first task, and were not informed of the second task 
until immediately before the training block for that task. In all other respects the 
experimental procedures, instructions and response rrquirrmrnts were maintained fRom 
experiment 4, as were the EEG recording and analysis procedures (see chapter 8).
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RESULTS
Behavioural data
Table 16 shows the probability of an ‘old’ response to test items on the initial old/new 
judgement for each task. A t-test comparing recognition accuracy (measured as [p(hit)-
p(false alarm)]) across task revealed a significant effect (tl5 = 5.41, p < 0.001), 
confirming that performance was superior in the associative recognition task. The hit 
rates for the associative recognition task were 94% and 86% for same and rearranged 
pairs respectively. These rates were found to differ significantly (tl5 = 5.33, p < 
0.001), confirming the superior hit rate for same pairs.
Table 16. Mean percentage (standard deviations) of an old response on the initial old/new judgement for 
both associative recognition and associative recall. The subsequent probability of a correct associative 
recognition response is also shown for same and rearranged pairs (contingent upon a correct old/new 
recognition response).
Judgement Class of item
Old/new recognition Old New
% ‘OLID’: Recognition 89.7 (5.1) 2.9 (4.2)
% ‘OLD’: Recall 82.3 (7.2) 6.2 (5.8)
Associative recognition Same Rearranged
% ‘CORRECT’ 90.5 (6.8) 97.8 (8.1)
Table 16 also shows the probability of a correct associative recognition response for 
pairs judged old. A t-test comparing these probabilities revealed no significant 
difference. As in experiment 4 the ‘don’t know’ response option was not used by any 
subject, and too few false alarms were made to allow an analysis of the associative 
judgements for these items. For the associative recall task, 48% of correctly recognised 
old words were associated with correct recall of their study partner, 44% elicited a 
‘don’t know’ response, and the remaining 8% elicited an incorrect response.
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ERP data
ERPs were formed for thr same response Categories as in experiment 49. For 
associative recognition thr mean number of trials contributing to thr ERPs for each 
response category was 80 and 35 for new and recognised pairs respretively. For 
assoeiative recall the mean number of trials were 79 and 34 for new and reeallrd pairs 
respretively.
Figure 23 shows the grand average waveforms obtained for the associative recognition 
task fRom all 25 electrode sites. The pattern of effects is similar to that found in 
experiment 4 (cf. figure 19), with the ERPs for recognised pairs more positive going 
than those for thr new pairs. The positive shift is larger over the left than the right 
hemisphere at temporo-parietal electrodes, but initially exhibits a bilateral distribution 
at fRontal electrodes. The left greater than right asymmetry over temporo-parietal sites 
remains present throughout thr remainder of the recording epoch, whereas at fRontal 
sites a right sided positivity can be seen fRom approximately 1400 msec post-stimulus 
onwards.
Figure 24 shows the equivalent grand average waveforms for associative recall. As was 
the ease for the recognition data, over temporo-parietal electrodes the ERPs for thr 
recalled items exhibit a positive going shift, with a left greater than right asymmetry. 
As in experiment 4, fRom approximately 900 msec this effect is replaced by a right­
sided negative going effect, which Continues until the remainder of the recording 
epoch. The pattern of effrets found over fRontal electrodes differs somewhat fRom that 
found in experiment 4 (cf. figure 20), in that thrrr is little sign of the early fRontal 
old/nrw effrets. By contrast howrvrr, a late-onsetting, right fRontal effret is clearly 
evident fRom approximately 1400 msec post-stimulus.
The magnitudes of the ERP old/new effects were analysed in the same way as those in 
experiment 4, employing the same electrode sites and latency regions as in that 
experiment (see table 17). Close examination of thr old/new effects rrvrals that they 
appear to onset slightly earlier in experiment 5 than in experiment 4. Consequently, 
additional analyses were performed on thr data fRom an earlier 400-600 msec latency
9 As in experiment 4, sufficient trials were available for the formation of ERP waveforms for ‘rearranged’ and 
‘don’t know’ responses. Again, these ERPs do not bear directly on the issue that this study was designed to 
address, and although the ERPs are not considered in detail, they are shown in appendix C.
205
region. The results of these analyses were consistent with those found for the 
subsequent 600-900 msec latency region and, because they do not alter the 
interpretation of the data, they are not reported in detail. Figure 25 illustrates the mean 
amplitude differences between the ERPs for old and new response categories, shown 
separately for each task and latency region.
Table 17. Results of the ANOVAs of the amplitude analyses, for each task, over each latency region. 
Only significant effects involving the factor of response category are reported. RC = Response Category 
(Old vs. New), HM = Hemisphere, ST = Electrode Site (Inferior vs. Mid-Lateral vs. Superior).
ASSOCIATIVE RECOGNITION
600-900 msec 900-1400 msec 1400-1900 msec
FRONTAL
RC Fl,15 = 10.39, p< 0.01 Fl,15 = 16.49, p = 0.001 Fl,15 = 4.69, p< 0.05
RCxHM - - Fl,15 = 11.49, p< 0.005
RCxST Fl.1,16.9 = 5.73, p< 0.05 - -
PARIETAL
RC Fl,15 = 14.93, p< 0.005 - -
RCxHM Fl,15 = 10.14, p< 0.01 Fl,15 = 9.96, p< 0.01 -
RCxST Fl.l,16.6 = 18.59, p< 0.001 - -
FRONTAL
RCxHM
600-900 msec
ASSOCIATIVE RECALL
900-1400 msec 1400-1900 msec
Fl,15 = 20.23, p< 0.001
PARIETAL
RCxHM Fl,15 = 26.81, p< 0.001 Fl,15 = 33.02, p< 0.001 Fl,15 = 6.48, p< 0.05
Magnitude analyses
Associative Recognition: Table 17 shows the results of the ANOVA for associative 
recognition, revealing that significant frontal old/new effects were present for all three 
latency regions. Analysis of the data for the 600-900 msec latency region revealed a 
significant effect of response category and an interaction between category and site. As 
figure 25 shows, these effects reflect the presence of a bilaterally distributed old/new 
effect that increases in size as electrodes get closer to the midline. For the 900-1400 
msec region the analysis produced a single significant effect, that of response category. 
Again, examination of figure 25 reveals the presence of an old/new effect that is 
bilaterally distributed across frontal scalp sites. Finally, the ANOVA for the 1400-1900 
msec epoch revealed a significant interaction between response category and 
hemisphere. In contrast to the previous latency regions however, figure 25 reveals that
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the frontal old/new effect in this latency regions exhibits a right greater than left
asymmetry.
Associative Recall: Table 17 also shows the results of the analysis comparing the ERPs 
for recalled and new pairs. As figure 25 shows, the results confirm the impression 
gained from figure 24 that there are no significant frontal old/new effects for the 600­
900 and 900-1400 msec latency regions (max Fs = 1.62 and 0.34 respectively)10. By 
contrast, table 17 shows that the ANOVA for the 1400-1900 msec region revealed a 
significant interaction between response category and hemisphere. As figures 25 and 
24 both indicate, this interaction is due to the presence of a right frontal old/new effect 
in this latency region.
Topographic Analyses
The scalp distributions of the old/new effects in each task were compared, employing 
the same procedure as in experiment 4. Figure 26 shows the scalp distributions of the 
old/new effects for each task over successive latency regions. Comparison of figures 
26 and 22 reveals that the pattern of old/new effects found for the recognised pairs is 
very similar across experiments 4 and 5. Moreover, the pattern of effects found for the 
recalled pairs also appears to be very similar across experiments 4 and 5, despite the 
fact that the magnitude analyses revealed no evidence for reliable frontal old/new 
effects during the 600-900 and 900-1400 msec latency regions in experiment 5.
For the 600-900 and 900-1400 msec latency regions, comparisons of the old/new 
effects for recognition and recall failed to reveal any evidence of an interaction 
involving task and site in either the 25 site ANOVA or the planned ANOVA of the 
data from frontal electrodes (Fs < 1). Thus, despite the absence of statistically 
significant frontal old/new effects in the ERPs for associative recall, there is no 
evidence that the distribution of effects differed across task. Similarly, for the 1400­
1900 msec latency region, the analyses revealed no significant effects involving task 
and site (Fs < 2). Importantly, the planned ANOVA of the data from frontal electrodes 
did reveal a significant main effect of hemisphere (Fl,15 = 20.05, p < 0.001),
10 Examination of the ERPs for associative recall reveals a small and temporally restricted positive shift in the 
recalled waveform, an effect that is largest over Fz, and restricted to sites closest to the midline. Close examination 
of the data from Rugg et al. (1996) reveals a similar (in size, duration, and distribution) effect. However, as was the 
case in the data of Rugg et al., and the analyses reported in the results section here, targeted analyses (i.e., restricted 
to appropriate sites and time periods) failed to reveal evidence for a statistically significant frontal old/new effect.
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reflecting thr presence of a significant right frontal old/nrw effect for both tasks during 
this epoch (cf. Figure 26).
Summary of results
Significant frontally distributed old/new rffrcts were found in the ERPs for associative 
Recognition during all 3 latency regions. Thr effect exhibited a bilateral distribution 
during the early 600-900 and 900-1400 msec epochs and a right-sided maximum 
during the later 1400-1900 msec epoch. By contrast, for associative recall significant 
fRontal old/nrw effects were only found during thr 1400-1900 msec epoch, exhibiting a 
right-sided maximum. Across task topographic analyses revealed no evidence that the 
scalp distribution of the old/new effects differed as a function of task in any latency 
region. These analyses did howrvrr confirm the presence of the right fRontal old/new 
effret for both tasks during the 1400-1900 msec latency region.
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Figures 23. Experiment 5: Grand average ERPs for the recognised and new response categories for associative recognition. Scale bar and 
electrodes are shown as in figure 7.
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Figure 24. Experiment 5: Grand average ERPs for the recalled and new response categories for associative recall. Scale bar and electrodes are 
shown as in figure 7.
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Figure 25. Experiment 5: Mean amplitudes of thr diffrrrrer brtwrrr thr ERPs for Correct old 
ard rrw responses, shown separately for recall (left Column) ard rreognition (right Column) 
during thr 600-900 (top), 900-1400 (middle) ard 1400-1900 (bottom) msec latrrey Regions. 
Values arr shown for thr lateral frontal rlretrodri employed in thr initial within task, within 
rpoeh, aralysrs. Thr data arr shown for thr left and right hrmiiphrrri, with sites arranged as on 
thr head (infrrioR-to-suprRioR on thr left, iuprRioR-to-infrrioR or thr right).
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Figure 26. Experiment 5: Topographic maps of the scalp distribution of the old/new effects for associative recognition and associative recall, over the 600-900, 900 
1400 and 1400-1900 msec latency regions. Scale bars and electrodes shown as in figure 10.
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DISCUSSION
Performance measures were similar to those found in experiment 4, both on the 
old/new recognition judgement and the subsequent associative recognition and recall 
components of each task. Looking first at the old/new judgement, performance was 
superior for the recognition task relative to the recall task. As was the case in 
experiment 4, this difference in recognition performance is likely due to the provision 
of two retrieval cues on each associative recognition trial, compared to the one cue on 
each associative recall trial. Performance levels on the second component of each task 
were virtually identical to those in experiment 4. For associative recognition, 90% of 
same pairs were recognised as such (compared to 91% in experiment 4). For 
associative recall, 48% of old items were correctly recalled (compared to 49% in 
experiment 4). It seems reasonable to assume therefore that the alteration from a 
randomised to blocked experimental design did not lead subjects to perform the tasks 
in a significantly different manner, and that, as in experiment 4, episodic recollection 
was the basis for performance on both tasks.
Turning to the ERP data, the pattern of old/new effects found for associative 
recognition closely resembled those found in experiment 4. Specifically, recognised 
pairs elicited sustained left parietal and frontal old/new effects, with the frontal effect 
developing fRom a bilateral to a right-sided distribution over the course of the 
recording epoch. As is clear from a comparison of figures 22 and 26, changing fRom a 
random to blocked design does not appear to have significantly influenced the ERP 
old/new effects correlated with successful associative recognition.
The critical question addressed by experiment 5 concerns the pattern of frontally 
distributed old/new effects for associative recall: were fRontal old/new effects found in 
experiment 4 a result of the requirement to switch between tasks? With regard to the 
generators of the right frontal effect the answer is clear. As in experiment 4, a right 
frontal old/new effect was present in the ERPs fRom approximately 1400 msec post­
stimulus (cf. Figure 24). Moreover, as in experiment 4, topographic analyses revealed 
no difference in the distribution of the effects for associative recognition and recall. 
Thus, the presence of the right frontal old/new effect in experiment 4 cannot be 
attributed to the use of a procedure that required subjects to switch between two tasks.
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Rather, Contrary to the Conclusions of Rugg et al. (1996; and Allan et al., in press), but 
in support of the findings of experiment 4, successful associative recall does engage 
the generators of the right fRontal old/nrw effect.
Thr present findings are less clear with regard to the generators of thr earlier bilateral 
fRontal effect however. Unlike in experiment 4, thr right fRontal old/new effect in 
successful recall was not preceded by a bilateral fRontal old/new effect during the 
earlier 600-900 and 900-1400 msec latency regions (compare figures 20 and 24). 
However, whilst the present findings clearly differ fRom those of experiment 4, the data 
are remarkably similar to those fRom Rugg et al. (1996; see figure 5, chapter 3). In that 
study there was no evidence of significant fRontal old/nrw effects, and because of thr 
short rreording epoch employed (terminating 1434 msec post-stimulus) the late right 
frontal old/new effect found in the present experiment would not have been seen by 
Rugg rt al. Thus, the present findings arr similar to those of Rugg et al. (1996), 
suggesting that, when associative recall is tested in isolation, successful prRformancr 
does not elicit the early bilateral fRontal old/new effret.
Rugg et al. (1996) interpreted the absence of a positive shift over frontal electrodes as 
evidence that the generators of the frontal old/nrw effret (they did not distinguish 
between bilateral and right-sided effects) were inactive in thr case of associative recall. 
Whilst this explanation is attractive, not least because it is consistent with Rugg et al., 
it is difficult to draw this conclusion in the present case. If the generators of the early 
fRontal old/new effret were selretively engaged by the recognition but not recall task, 
this would have brrn expected to result in a significant across-task difference in 
topography (cf. Chapter 4). However, there was no evidence that the sealp distribution 
of thr old/new rffrcts for recall and recognition differed during the 600-900 and 900­
1400 msec latency regions. Notwithstanding the difficulties of drawing strong 
eoneluiions on the basis of the absence of a significant difference in topography (cf. 
Rugg and Colrs, 1995), this finding is at least suggestive that the absence of the early 
frontal old/new effect rrfleets a quantitative rather than qualitative difference.
Tentative support for the above Conclusion comes fRom several sourers. First, the 
generators of the later right frontal old/new effect wrrr clearly active in the present 
data, but the magnitude of this effret was smaller than in experiment 4 (compare 
figures 21 and 25). Thus, the absence of the early frontal effret may reflect little more
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than the general attenuation of activity in experiment 5. Second, visual comparison of 
the topographic distribution of the old/new effects found in experiments 4 and 5 
reveals similar frontally distributed maxima during the 600-900 and 900-1400 msec 
latency regions, despite the fact that significant positive going effects were was only 
present in experiment 5 (compare figures 22 and 26). Finally, if the absence of the 
early bilateral frontal effect in the ERPs for recall does reflect a quantitative difference, 
this would suggest that the generators of the effect reflect processes that are selectively 
engaged by the requirement to switch between tasks on a trial by trial basis. However, 
it seems unlikely that such processes would be differentially sensitive to task switching 
in the case of recall but not recognition. In sum, although the present findings are 
somewhat ambiguous regarding the early bilateral frontal effect, the results confirm 
that the generators of the right frontal effect are engaged by successful associative 
recall, regardless of the requirement to switch between tasks.
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Chapter 11
INTERIM DISCUSSION 2
Thr ERP correlates of successful assoeiative recognition and recall were compared 
under conditions where the factor of task was either a randomised or blocked variable 
(experiments 4 and 5 respretively). In both experiments item recognition (as Indexed 
by accuracy on thr Initial old/new judgement) was superior for rreognition than recall. 
As discussed previously this differenee in performance can be accounted for in terms 
of the greater opportunity for retrieval that is provided by the provision of two words 
on every rreognition trial, compared to onr word on every recall trial (sre Discussion 
to experiment 4).
In both experiments performance on thr second component of each task was superior 
to that in previous studies, a differenee that most likely reflects thr use of shorter study 
lists in the present experiments (see the Discussion to experiment 4 for further details). 
More significantly, performance on each task was remarkably similar across 
experiments, suggesting that subjreti were able to reeolleet a similar number of prior 
study episodes in each case (srr Discussion of experiment 5).
The ERP findings for the associative recognition task were similar in experiments 4 
and 5, and closely resembled those found previously (cf. experiment 1). Regardless of 
whether the recognition task was presented in isolation or randomly Intermixed with
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associative recall, successful associative recognition elicited sustained left parietal and 
frontally distributed old/new effects - the frontally distributed effect developing over 
time, from a bilateral to a right sided distribution (onsetting approximately 1400 msec 
post-stimulus). These findings provide further support for the results of experiments 1 
to 3, confirming that successful associative recognition does engage the generators of 
the frontally distributed old/new effects.
Consistent with the findings of Rugg et al. (1996), In both experiments the ERPs for 
successful recall exhibited a small and temporally restricted left parietal old/new effect, 
developing into a right-sided negative going shift from approximately 900 msec post­
stimulus. This slow negative going waveform has been seen in previous studies, most 
notably in a study of source memory by Wilding and Rugg (1997a), where the 
magnitude of the effect was found to increase with reaction time. The present findings 
do not elucidate the functional significance of this negative going effect per se. 
However, the absence of any topographic differences between the old/new effects In 
each task suggests that the generators of this negative going effect were equally active 
in both cases. Moreover, the relative prominence of the effect in the ERPs for 
successful recall is consistent with previous findings (cf. Rugg et al.; and experiment 1 
in this thesis). Whilst reaction time data is not available in the present experiment, RTs 
would likely be longer for successful recall relative to those for recognition.
The central question addressed by experiments 4 and 5 was whether the generators of 
the right frontal old/new effect were active in the case of successful associative recall. 
In this respect the findings are clear; frontally distributed old/new effects were present 
in both experiments. In experiment 4 the frontal effects exhibited an initial bilateral 
distribution, becoming right-sided fRom approximately 1400 msec post-stimulus. A 
right-sided frontal old/new effect was also evident In experiment 5 fRom approximately 
1400 msec post-stimulus, but the earlier bilaterally distributed positivity was not 
present.
The finding of a reliable right frontal effect for associative recall resolves the apparent 
inconsistency, noted in the Introduction to experiment 4, between the findings fRom 
experiments 1-3 of the present thesis, and those of Rugg et al. (1996). The present 
findings indicate that, contrary to the view of Rugg et al. (1996, see also Allan et al., in 
press), there is no reason to believe that associative recall fails to engage the processes
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reflected by the right frontal old/new effect. Rather, as might be expected within the 
framework proposed by Koriat and Goldsmith (1996), associative recall, a task which 
would be expected to place a burden on post-retrlrval processing at least as great as 
that of assoeiative rreognition, dors Indeed elicit the putative ERP index of such 
processing.
In both tasks, and in both experiments, the right frontal effret emerged somewhat later 
(at ca. 1300-1400 msec) than was observed in previous studies of either sourer 
memory (Wilding and Rugg, 1996; ca. 800-900 msec) or associative recognition 
(experiments 1-3; ca. 1000-1100 msec). There are several possible explanations for tliis 
delay. In thr ease of associative recall, the delay may simply be a consrquenee of the 
nature of the task, reflecting thr additional time, relative to other kinds of task, 
required to retrieve episodic Information. However, the finding that the right fRontal 
effect was also relatively delayed in associative rreognition suggests that this is not thr 
whole story, and that other factors also played a role. One notable possibility comes 
from the fact that, unllkr in thr previous studies employing these tasks, responses to 
test items were withheld until 3 sre post stimulus offset. This delay between the 
presentation of thr test item and response Initiation may have resulted in the slower 
engagement of post-retrieval processing than when responding was sprrdrd.
Thr findings from experiments 4 and 5 are less clear with regard to the early bilateral 
frontal old/nrw rffret. When the two tasks were randomly intermixed the early 
bilateral effect was present in the ERPs for both tasks, but when the tasks were blocked 
the effret was present only for associative rreognition. The present results are 
indeterminate, but suggest that the absence of the effect in experiment 5 reflects a 
quantitative rather than qualitative change across experiments (see discussion of 
experiment 5). This Conclusion dors not however address why the early bilateral 
fRontal effret should be so sensitive to thr manipulation of thr experimental design, 
and moreover, why should It should be differentially affected in recall but not 
recognition? Unfortunately, limited progress has been made in understanding the 
functional significance of the early fRontal activity. However, the present results 
suggest that the grnrrators of this effret are especially sensitive to the Context in which 
memory retrieval occurs.
The absence of the bilateral fRontal effect in the ERPs for recall in experiment 5 does
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not appear to be a reflection of differences in memory retrieval per se. As noted 
previously, the very similar levels of performance on the associative recall task in 
experiments 4 and 5 suggests that subjects were equally likely to recollect the prior 
study episode regardless of whether the design was randomised or blocked. Moreover, 
in both experiments a reliable left parietal old/new effect was present, evolving into a 
right-sided negativity from around 900 msec post-stimulus onset. Thus, as indexed 
both by the left parietal old/new effect (the putative index of recollection), and 
measures of behavioural performance, the likelihood of recollection appears to have 
been equivalent in experiments 4 and 5.
The foregoing discussion point towards a second possibility, that the magnitude of 
effects over frontal scalp simply reflects the influence of the posteriorly distributed 
response-related negativity (cf. Wilding and Rugg, 1997a). By this account, changes in 
the magnitude of the positive going sliift over frontal scalp are attributable to the 
additive effect of changes in the magnitude of the negative going shift over temporo­
parietal scalp. This explanation is unsatisfactory however, because the negative going 
wave is inversely related to response times. Although RT data are not available in the 
present experiment, it is reasonable to assume that response times would more likely 
decrease than increase as a result of the removal of the requirement to switch between 
task. Thus, any significant change in RT would be expected to reduce the size of the 
negative going wave, and thus lead to an increase (rather than decrease) in the size of 
the fi^c^iTtal effect. Consistent with the above account, comparison of the ERPs for recall 
in experiments 4 than 5 suggests that, if anything, the magnitude of the negative going 
component is somewhat smaller in the latter case.
Whatever the reason for the emergence of the early frontal effects in the present recall 
task, the findings add to the range of circumstances in which relatively early, bilateral 
or left-sided old/new effects have been observed over the frontal scalp (e.g., see 
experiments 1-3 in this thesis; Schloerscheidt and Rugg, 1997; Tendolkar, Doyle and 
Rugg, 1997; Wilding and Rugg, 1997a). To take just one example, Tendolkar et al. 
(1997) used the same associative recall task as was employed here, in an investigation 
of retroactive interference. Whilst they did not find any ERP effects associated with 
interference, successful recall was associated with the standard left parietal old/new 
effect, along with a positive going shift that was maximal over left-frontal electrodes.
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Importantly, in this experiment the early fRontal old/new effect onset prior to the left 
parietal effect, and moreover, was not accompanied by a later right frontal old/new
effect.
It is presently unclear whether these early onsetting fRontal effects reflect activity in the 
same neural generators that are responsible for the later right fRontal effect, along with 
a contribution from additional (left-localised) generators, or whether instead the early 
effects reflect activity of an entirely separate generator population. Either way, given 
that the early effects have in two studies (Schloerscheidt and Rugg, 1997; Tendolkar, 
Doyle and Rugg, 1997) been found to onset earlier than the left parietal old/new effect 
(held to index the retrieval of episodic information), it seems unlikely that they can be 
encompassed by the ‘post-retrieval’ hypothesis put forward to account for the later- 
occurring, right frontal effect (e.g., Allan et al., In press; Rugg, Schloerscheidt and 
Mark, 1997; Wilding and Rugg, 1996). Rather, it would appear that these effects 
reflect processes that either initiate or support the process of episodic retrieval.
In summary, the present findings indicate that the recollection of associative 
information, whether in the context of associative recall or associative recognition, is 
accompanied by the right frontal ERP old/new effect, a putative index of ‘post- 
retrievaP processing (Allan et al., in press; Wilding and Rugg, 1996). In demonstrating 
that the right frontal effect can be elicited during associative recall, the present studies 
extend the range of memory tasks in which this effect is observed. Moreover, in 
combination with recent findings (e.g., Tendolkar et al., 1997), the present data suggest 
that the frontally distributed old/new effect reflects neither a neurally nor a functionally 
homogeneous process, dissociating into two temporally and topographically distinct 
ERP components.
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Chapter 12.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Specific details of the behavioural and ERP findings from each experiment have been 
considered in thr relevant discussion chapters. The present chapter provides a broader 
account, tying thr results together, foeusing on the significance of the findings for 
functional accounts of the ERP old/nrw effects, and highlighting Important areas for 
future research. First, the empirical work will br briefly summarised, rreapplng the 
rationale for, and main results of each experiment. Sreond, raeh of thr ERP old/new 
effrets will br discussed, relating the present findings to previous work discussed in 
the earlier review chapters, and, where rrlrvant, introducing more recent ERP findings. 
Finally, a more general proposal will be made concerning the functional significance of 
frontally distributed old/nrw effects, drawing on converging evidence from recent 
neuroimaging studies.
Summary of experimental findings
ERP studies of explicit memory retrieval suggest that successful recollection is 
associated with two temporally and topographically dissociable ERP old/new effects - 
the left parietal and right fRontal effects, associated with retrieval and post-retrieval 
processes respretively. The experiments reported in the present thesis aimed to fUrther
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investigate the effects, by employing tests of associative memory (the retrieval of 
information about relations between study items) as a means of operationally defining 
recollection. In each experiment the encoding conditions were identical; subjects 
studied a series of novel word pairs. ERPs were recorded whilst subjects’ memory for 
the word pairs was tested.
Experiment 1 employed an associative recognition test. Subjects were required to 
discriminate old from new word pairs, and for pairs judged old, to discriminate same 
from rearranged pairs. Relative to the ERPs for correctly rejected new pairs, the ERPs 
for successful recognised same pairs exhibited left parietal and right frontal old/new 
effects, similar to those seen in studies of source memory. The ERPs for the rearranged 
pairs exhibited smaller, but qualitatively similar, old/new effects, consistent with the 
suggestion that rearranged pairs are recollected less often than same pairs (cf. 
Yonelinas, 1997). Thus, in combination with previous behavioural studies of 
associative recognition, the findings of experiment 1 provided convergent evidence in 
support of the ‘recollection’ account of the ERP old/new effects. The findings 
suggested however, that the frontal old/new effect could be dissociated into two 
components, an early bilateral effect, and a later right-sided effect.
The results of experiment 1 suggest that successful associative recognition engages the 
generators of the left parietal and right frontal old/new effects. Experiment 2 was 
designed to remove a potentially serious confound (i.e., that it was possible that the 
ERP findings simply reflected the difference between recognising one versus two 
words) by replacing the new pairs with old-new pairs. The ERP findings from 
experiment 2 were similar to those from experiment 1 - successful associative 
recognition elicited left parietal and right frontal old/new effects. Although the findings 
were not identical to those from experiment 1 (primarily due to the use of a different 
ERP baseline), they were nonetheless consistent with the suggestion that the ERP 
effects reflected the successful retrieval of associative information.
Experiment 3 was designed to further investigate the functional characteristics of the 
right frontal old/new effect. Drawing on the fact that the right frontal effect is not seen 
in studies of item recognition, Wilding and Rugg (1996, 1997a) argued that the right 
frontal old/new effect reflects ‘post-retrieval’ processes. Specifically, processes 
associated with the requirement to strategically employ retrieved information in order
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to discriminate between different classes of old item (a task demand imposed by the 
source judgement). This aspect of the ‘post-retrieval’ account of the right frontal effect 
was investigated.
The explicit requirement to strategically employ retrieved information was removed by 
requiring subjects to make old/new judgements, but not a subsequent associative 
recognition judgement. Although the old/new effects were smaller in size than those 
found in experiment 1, the left parietal and right fRontal old/new effects were 
nonetheless present. In contrast to the findings of experiment 1 however, the frontal 
old/new effect did not exhibit an Initial bilateral distribution, a fact that was attributed 
to the use of a single, rather than two stage, response (cf. Wilding and Rugg, 1997a). 
More significantly, the findings demonstrated that the explicit requirement to engage in 
strategic post-retrieval processing is not a necessary condition for the engagement of 
the generators of the right frontal old/new effect.
The findings fRom experiments 1 to 3 permitted a fUrther conclusion to be drawn. As 
was discussed in chapter 2, Rugg et al. (1996) found that the right fRontal old/new 
effect was not present in the ERPs for successful associative recall. The associative 
recall task employs the same study task as associative recognition, but at test subjects 
are required to discriminate single old from new items, and for items judged old, to 
report the study associate. Rugg et al. (1996; see also Allan et al., in press) accounted 
for the absence of the right frontal effect in the ERPs for this task, relative to source 
tasks, in terms of the nature of the Information that is retrieved. The source memory 
tasks employed by Wilding and colleagues required the retrieval of extrinsic (common 
or background) information, whereas the associative recall task employed by Rugg et 
al. required the retrieval of Intrinsic (unique or trial specific) information. However, the 
associative recognition task employed in experiments 1 to 3 also required the retrieval 
of intrinsic (rather than extrinsic) information, negating Rugg et al.’s account.
Thus, experiment 4 directly compared the ERP old/new effects for successful 
associative recognition and recall, attempting to resolve the discrepancy between the 
findings of experiments 1 to 3, and the conclusions of Rugg et al. (1996). A 
randomised experimental design was employed, with subjects switching between tasks 
on a trial by trial basis. Behavioural performance on both tasks was consistent with 
subjects having recollected a large proportion of prior study episodes. The ERPs for
223
successful associative recognition elicited left parietal and right fRontal old/new effects, 
and as In experiment 1, thr right frontal effret was initially bilaterally distributed. 
Contrary to the findings of Rugg et al. howrvrr, sucerssful recall was associated with 
qualitatively similar old/new effects - including a fRontally distributed effect that 
became inereasingly right-sidrd with time.
Experiment 5 Investigated whether the inconsistency between the findings of Rugg et 
al. and experiment 4 reflected thr fact that, In the later ease, subjects were required 
constantly to switch between tasks. To remove this requirement, experiment 5 
compared assoeiative recognition and recall, using a blocked experimental design. 
Onee again, successful associative rreognition elleitrd a sustained left parietal old/new 
effret, and a frontally distributed effect that became more right-sided over time. 
Moreover, the effects found for successful assoeiative rreall were similar to those seen 
in experiment 4, with the exception that the right fRontal old/new effret onset around 
1400 msec post-stimulus, and was not preceded by thr earlier bilaterally distributed 
effect.
The results of experiment 5 resolved the apparent contradiction between the findings of 
experiment 4 and those of Rugg et al. (1996). The ERP findings for associative recall 
in experiment 5 were remarkably similar to those fRom Rugg et al. (1996) - because 
less elretrodrs and a shorter rreording epoch were employed by Rugg rt al., the late 
onsrtting right fRontal old/new effect could not br srrn in their data. However, despite 
the absence of the early frontal old/new effect in thr ERPs for recall In experiment 5, 
topographic analyses suggest that the absence of thr rffret likely reflects a quantitative 
rather than qualitative dlfferencr. Consistent with this suggestion, the magnitude of the 
later right frontal old/new effect was smaller. More Important however, the right 
fRontal old/new rffret was clearly present in thr ERPs for both tasks regardless of the 
requirement to switch between tasks.
Functional accounts of the ERP old/new effects
The five experiments presented In the present thesis were specifically designed to 
investigate the functional significance of the ERP old/new effects. As is discussed 
below, thr findings are broadly consistent with the suggrstlon that the left parietal and 
right frontal old/nrw effects reflect the operation of retrieval and post-retrieval
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processes (respectively). However, the results fUrther suggest that the right frontal 
old/new effect can be dissociated from an earlier frontal old/new effect, which cannot 
be accounted for in terms of a ‘post-retrieval’ hypothesis.
The left parietal old/new effect
An impressive array of evidence (discussed in chapter 3; see Allan et al., in press, for a 
recent review) suggests that the left parietal old/new effect is associated with 
recollection - the retrieval of information about specific prior episodes - indexing the 
activity of the medial temporal lobe memory system. Studies of both item recognition 
and source memory suggest that the magnitude of the effect is sensitive to the degree 
or amount of information that is retrieved fRom memory, suggesting that recollection is 
a graded retrieval process (cf. Rugg et al., 1994, for detailed discussion).
An ERP correlate of ‘recollection’
As would be expected of a neural correlate of recollection, the left parietal effect was 
present in the ERPs for both successful associative recognition and recall. Moreover, in 
the studies of associative recognition, the magnitude of the effect was larger in the 
ERPs for recognised same than rearranged pairs, the former response category being 
more likely to elicit recollection than the later. The later finding is especially difficult 
to reconcile with the alternative account of the left parietal effect, i.e., that the effect is 
associated with familiarity (as discussed In chapter 3). If this were the case then the 
effect would have been expected to be of equivalent magnitude for the same and 
rearranged pairs; all of the Items are old and should therefore be equally familiar. Thus, 
the present findings are consistent with the ‘recollection’ account of the left parietal 
old/new effect.
The significance of the present findings is particularly clear in relation to the rejection 
of single process ‘global memory models’ in favour of dual process theories of 
recognition memory (as discussed in chapter 1). The inability of the global memory 
models to account for the data fRom studies of item and associative recognition has 
been interpreted as evidence that performance on tests of item and associative 
recognition differ in terms of the information content and/or the retrieval processes 
engaged (cf. Clark and Gronlund, 1996; Gronlund and Ratcliff, 1993). Consistent with 
this proposal, dual process models suggest that associative recognition is dependent
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upon recollection, and cannot be performed on the basis of familiarity, whereas item 
recognition is dependent upon both recollection and familiarity (cf. Yonelinas, 1997). 
Thus, the present findings converge with a range of evidence in suggesting that 
accurate associative recognition requires the recollection of prior study episodes, and 
cannot be accounted for in terms of familiarity.
The present ERP data are consistent with dual process accounts, which characterise 
recollection as being dependent upon the retrieval of contextual information, and thus 
support the suggestion that the processes supporting item and associative recognition 
differ in terms of the information content retrieved from memory. Unfortunately, the 
present findings are ambiguous with regard to the exact characterisation of the retrieval 
mechanism underlying recollection. The present findings do not distinguish between 
the two theoretical possibilities - that recollection is either a graded or an all-or-none 
process. Both accounts can be used to explain the graded nature of the left parietal 
effect, and the present data do not rule out one or other account. Ultimately, the 
resolution of this issue requires an analysis of ERP data at the level of the single trial, 
to establish whether the magnitude of the effect in the averaged ERP is representative 
of the magnitude of the effect in the individual trials (cf. Chapter 2).
Thus, the ERP findings do not resolve the question of whether dual process theorists 
are correct to distinguish between recollection and familiarity in terms of both the 
information content of retrieval and the retrieval mechanism employed. It is worth 
noting however, that at least one piece of evidence suggests that global memory 
theorists are correct in arguing for a distinction between information content and 
retrieval mechanism. Yonelinas and Jacoby (1996) investigated ‘non-criteriaT 
recollection - the retrieval of contextual information that is not relevant to explicit task 
demands. They found that, despite being contextual, such ‘non-criterial’ or task 
irrelevant information functioned as ‘familiari'ty’. That is, ‘non-criterial’ information 
was automatically retrieved and was associated with fast response times. Thus, 
different types of contextual information appear to reflect the operation of either a 
graded single detection process, or an all-or-none threshold process, depending upon 
whether the information is relevant to current task demands. Whether recollection and 
familiarity can, ultimately, only be defined in functional terms, remains to be seen.
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The foregoing diseussion of the left parietal effect as an index of recollrction has 
focused upon how the present data relate to dual process models of rreognition 
memory. However, the significance of thr current findings ean also be appreciated in 
terms of thr nruroanatomlcal systems that support explicit memory. As was noted in 
chapter 3, neuroanatomical accounts of the left parietal old/new effret suggest that it 
provides an index of the eortlcal-hippocampal interactions that result from thr 
retrieval-related activity of the medial temporal lobe memory system (ef. Wilding and 
Rugg, 1996). Assuming that this is thr case, the present findings suggest that it is 
contextual or rrlatlonal information that is of critical Importance to the hippocampal 
memory system, rather than mere familiarity - evidenced by the fact that the 
generators of the left parietal effect are extremely sensitive to whether the relations 
between stimuli were maintained or broken between study and test.
Several authors (e.g., Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1992; Gaffan, 1994; Eichenbaum and 
Bunsry, 1995) have noted that assoeiative memory tasks are the quintessential tests of 
episodic memory, and moreover, that onr of the core functions of the medial temporal 
lobe memory system is to act as a ‘relational’ proerssor. As Tulving (1983) suggests, 
learning a word pair in a word association task is the experimental equivalent of 
learning about a complex Episodic event. At test thr subject does not simply remember 
Information about isolated words, rathrr, it is the assoelation or episodic relationship 
between the words that is remembered. Clearly, the present experiments were not 
designed to Investigate the neural origins of the ERP old/new effrets per se. However, 
thr finding that thr left parietal old/nrw effect is present In the ERPs for successful 
associative recognition and recall adds weight not only to thr suggrstlon that the effect 
provides an ERP correlate of recollection, but also that the effect provides an Indirect 
index of the activity of thr medial temporal lobr memory system.
Thr significance of the present findings can be highlighted by examining three quite 
different investigations of episodic memory retrieval. First, strong support for the link 
between the medial temporal lobe memory system and the retrieval of associative or 
contextual Information can be found in studies of scene specific memory in monkeys 
(Gaffan, 1994; see also Gaffan, 1996). Lesions to thr fomix (a major output pathway 
for the hippocampal memory system, cf. Chapter 1) produce impairments in object 
discrimination learning, however, the impairment is heavily tied to the context in
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which objects are presented. When objects are presented in background scenes that 
vary from trial to trial, lesioned monkeys exhibited no impairment in learning. By 
contrast, when objects are presented in unique background scenes, lesioned monkeys 
are severely impaired. Thus, it appears that fornix lesions do not cause a general 
impairment in object memory per se. Rather, such lesions produce a specific 
impairment in scene-specific object memory, where the unique relationship between 
the object and the scene has to be remembered (i.e., the object must be ‘bound’ with 
the background context). As Gaffan (1994) notes, scene specific memory in monkeys 
provides an analogue of human episodic memory because it requires the retrieval of 
trial unique information from specific learning episodes.
A second piece of evidence linking the medial temporal lobe memory system to the 
retrieval of ‘bound’ information comes from a study of false memory in amnesic 
patients. Kroll, Knight, Metcalfe, Wolf and Tulving (1996) employed a recognition 
memory task in which certain distracter (new) items presented at test were compounds 
or conjunctions of studied items (e.g., for study items FICTION and BUCKLE, it is 
possible to generate FICKLE as a distracter item). Significantly, Kroll et al. found that 
amnesic subjects (with left hippocampal damage) were likely to misclassify such 
distracter items as old, despite being able to correctly discriminate veridical old from 
new items. This finding provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that the 
hippocampal memory system is critically involved in binding the constituent features 
of an episode together. Damage to the hippocampus disrupts the normal process of 
binding, such that unrelated features or ‘memory fragments’ are retained without being 
appropriately bound together, leading to an inability to distinguish false conjunctions 
between the memory fragments.
Thirdly, evidence from studies of normal human subjects suggests that recollection is 
specifically associated with the retrieval of contextual information. Perfect, Mayes, 
Downes and Van Eijk (1996) employed the R/K procedure, and addressed the question 
of whether subjects are actually able to remember more contextual information when 
they make Remember responses, compared to when they make Know responses. 
Across five experiments, Perfect et al., found that subjects were able to accurately 
report information about all aspects of the spatiotemporal context (e.g., temporal order, 
spatial location and presentation font) in which Remembered items were experienced.
228
Know responses were associated with the retrieval of contextual information to some 
degree however, motivating Perfect et al. to suggest that the distinction between R and 
K responding may be one of degree rather than kind. Nonetheless, the data largely 
support the Remember/Know distinction, and indicate that Remember responses are 
specifically associated with the retrieval of contextual information.
Thus, in sum, it seems reasonable to conclude that the left parietal old/new effect 
provides an index of recollection, the retrieval of contextual information about specific 
prior study episodes. Moreover, the present findings converge with a range of evidence 
in suggesting that the neural systems underlying this form of memory retrieval are 
highly sensitive to the relations or associations that are formed between items in 
memory, not simply to the fact that the items are old.
Finally, it should be noted that recent attempts have been made to draw together dual 
process models of recognition memory and neuroanatomical accounts of the medial 
temporal lobe memory system. For example, based upon a review of 112 amnesics’ 
subjects, Aggleton and Shaw (1996; see also Aggleton and Brown, in press) suggest 
that recollection is specifically associated with the hippocampus (and projections via 
the fomix to the diencephalon), whilst familiarity is dependent upon extra­
hippocampal cortical regions (perirhinal and entorhinal cortex). By this account, highly 
localised damage to the hippocampus is likely to lead to a selective impairment in 
recollection based responding, whereas more widespread damage to the medial 
temporal lobes is likely to produce severe deficits in both recollection and familiarity. 
It remains to be seen whether current functional and neuroanatomical accounts of the 
left parietal old/new effect will be able to accommodate this form of neuroanatomical 
dual-process model.
The duration of the left parietal effect
One aspect of the experimental data has not been discussed previously. The left 
parietal old/new effect seen in the ERPs for successful associative recognition is 
considerably more sustained than in studies of item and source memory. Why should 
the effect be longer lasting in the ERPs for successful associative recognition? One 
possible explanation comes fRom Smith and Ouster (1993), who argued that the 
duration of the effect is related to the length of study list employed. Smith and Ouster’s 
account is difficult to reconcile with the present data however. The duration of the left
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parietal effect differed for same and rearranged pairs, despite the fact that they came 
from a single study list. Moreover, the duration of thr effect was considerably longer 
for rreognition than recall, yet both tasks involved thr same number of studied items.
One other variable differentiatrs assoeiative rreognition; namely, the number of words 
presented to the subject during each test trial. Associative reeognition test trials involve 
the presentation of two words, whereas associative rreall, item and source memory all 
involve the presentation ofjust a single word. By this account, the left parietal effret is 
sensitive not only to the amount of information retrieved fRom memory, but also to the 
amount of information that is actually presented to subjects at test. Whilst this 
explanation is superficially attractive, it receives littlr support fRom two recent ERP 
studies.
A study of retroactive interferencr by Tendolkar et al. (1997) involved the presentation 
of word pairs, however, the left parietal effect declined towards the end of the 
rreording epoch (1434 msec post-stimulus), considerably earlier than In thr majority of 
the experiments reported here. Similarly, Sehlorrsehridt and Rugg (1997) compared 
the ERP correlates of recognition memory for words and pictures, and found similar 
left parietal rffeets for both classes of stimuli. If thr duration of the effect was linked to 
the amount of Information presented to subjects, then the effect would have been 
expected to be longer lasting in the ERPs for pictures - the more detailed, perceptually 
richer, retrieval cues.
Thr foregoing discussion suggests that the duration of the left parietal rffeet is not 
specifically related to either the nature of the information retrieved, or the amount of 
infonnation presented to subjects as a retrieval eue. Unfortunately, the experiments 
reported in the present thesis were not designed to investigate this feature of the ERP 
old/new effects. Further investigation of the variables that Influence the time course of 
the parietal effret would however be worthwhile; one possible line of enquiry is noted 
below, In relation to the nrgative-golng shift1 \
11 It should be noted that, technically, differences in the duration of the left parietal effect could reflect little more 
than greater latency jitter here than in previous studies (M. D. Rugg, personal communication). As a crude check 
against this possibility the standard deviations of the reaction times in experiment 1 were compared to those from 
Wilding and Rugg’s (1996) original study of source memory, and were found to be similar. This suggests that the 
present findings do not solely result from unusual variation in the onset of effects in the individual trials that 
compromise the averaged ERPs (cf. Chapter 2),
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The late negative shift
The ERPs for both associative recognition and recall elicited an additional component, 
a late onsetting negative shift, which onset at approximately 900 msec post-stimulus, 
and was broadly distributed over right hemisphere temporal-parietal electrodes. A 
similar effect has been found in previous studies of item and source memory (e.g., 
Rugg et al., 1995, Wilding and Rugg, 1997a,b). Notably, Wilding and Rugg (1997a), 
reported that the effect is dissociable from the left parietal effect, and is related to 
response factors - the amplitude of the negative shift co-varied with the mean RT to 
different classes of response category.
The present results are consistent with the suggestion that the effect is related to 
response time. Where RT data was available, the magnitude of the negative shift was 
found to be larger in the ERPs for rearranged than same pairs, the former class of 
response being associated with longer response times. Moreover, whilst RT data was 
not available in experiments 4 and 5, the negative shift was considerably more 
prominent in the ERPs for recall, the task that would be expected to elicit longer 
response times.
The late negative shift provides a potential explanation for the varying duration of the 
left parietal effect discussed above. Because of the overlapping time course and 
distribution of the two ERP effects it is possible that the frequently observed decline of 
the left parietal old/new effect reflects little more than the contribution to the ERPs of 
the late onsetting negative shift. Thus, the long duration of the left parietal effect in the 
ERPs for successful recognition may simply reflect the relative absence of the late 
onsetting negativity. This possibility is highly plausible. The topographic distribution 
of the old/new effects did not differ for same and rearranged pairs, despite the fact in 
the ERPs for the rearranged pairs the left parietal old/new effect was relatively short 
lived (being replaced by the negative going effect). Similarly, the topographic 
distribution of the old/new effects did not differ for successful recognition and recall, 
yet in the ERPs for successful recall the left parietal old/new effect was relatively short 
lived (again, being replaced by the negative going shift).
Unfortunately, while the duration of the left parietal old/new effect could be influenced 
by the negative going effect, the reverse is equally possible. That is, the relative 
prominence of the late negative going effect may be, in part, influenced by the size of
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the parietal old/new effect. For example, Rugg, Schloerscheidt and Mark (in press) 
made precisely this claim in accounting for the findings from an ERP study comparing 
source memory and the ‘remember/know’ task. Nonetheless, contrary to their account, 
the pattern of response times was consistent with the aforementioned connection 
between the magnitude of the late negative shift and response-related factors.
At first sight the two accounts of the relationship between the left parietal effect and 
the late negative shift may appear to be equivalent (i.e., opposite sides of the same 
argument). However, the later account, that the magnitude of the negative shift is 
dependent upon the left parietal effect, provides no explanation for why the left parietal 
effect varies in duration. Unfortunately, there is no way to discriminate between these 
two possibilities. Further investigation of the relationship between the left parietal 
old/new effect and the late negative shift is clearly necessary. Although the two effects 
have been already been dissociated (the negative shift is present in the ERPs to false 
alarms and misses - response categories that do not elicit the left parietal effect), it 
would be of interest to characterise the functional role of the negative shift more 
precisely. If the late negative shift is closely related to response time, it may be 
possible to tease apart the two effects by systematically varying the response time 
available to subjects (e.g., using a response-deadline procedure). Ultimately however, 
it may be necessary to model the generators of the ERPs if one wishes to disambiguate 
the contribution of the individual effects to the overall pattern of activity recorded at 
the scalp.
The early frontal old/new effect
As discussed previously, the present findings produce more definite conclusions 
regarding the frontally distributed old/new effect, suggesting that it is composed of two 
components, early and late fRontal old/new effects (the later, right-sided frontal 
old/new effect is discussed in more detail below). In the present experiments the early 
frontal old/new effect onset at approximately the same time as the left parietal effect, 
and exhibited a bilateral distribution. This effect can be detected in the data from 
earlier studies of source memory (e.g., Wilding and Rugg, 1996, 1997a). Unlike in the 
present studies however, the early bilateral component could not be reliably isolated
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from the later right frontal effect because of a possible Interaction with the decline over 
time of the left parietal effret.
The time Course of the early frontal effect in thr present experiments makes it difficult 
to rrconcilr this effect with the ‘post-retrieval’ hypothesis that accounts for the later 
right-sided frontal effret. Further evidence In support of thr distinction between early 
and late fRontal old/new effects eomes fRom recent studies of source memory (Wilding 
and Rugg, 1997b), rrtroactivr interference (Tendolkar rt al., 1997), and reeognition 
memory for pictures (Sehloerscheldt and Rugg, 1997). These studies suggest that 
under certain circumstances thr rarly fRontal effect may onset before the left parietal 
effect, adding weight to the suggestion that the effret cannot be encompassed by the 
‘post-retrieval’ hypothesis. Rathrr, it seems more likely that the effect reflects 
processes that either Initiate or support episodic memory retri^'v^^l12.
An ERP correlate of ‘familiarity’
One specific proposal regarding the functional significance of thr early fRontal old/new 
effect eomrs fRom a rrernt study of item rreognition by Rugg, Mark, Walla, 
Schloerscheidt, Birch and Allan (1998), employing a depth of processing manipulation 
at study. Rugg et al., found that recognised words were associated with an early (300­
500 msec post-stimulus) bilaterally distributed frontal old/new effect, which was 
present in the ERPs for both deep and shallowly studied words, but was insensitive to 
the depth of processing manipulation. This bilateral fRontal old/new effect was taken to 
provide an index of ‘familiarity’. Consistent with this proposal, the bilaterally 
distributed effect was not found in thr ERPs for unrecognised old words fRom the 
shallow condition. More significantly for present purposes, the bilateral frontal 
old/nrw rffret was followed by a left parietal old/nrw effect (500-800 msec post­
stimulus). However, thr later effret was only present in the ERPs for recognised words 
that were deeply studied, and not for items that were shallowly studied. Thus, Rugg et 
al. proposed that shallowly studied items were recognised solely on the basis of the 
familiarity (reflected by thr early bilateral fRontal effret), whereas deeply studied items 
were associated with both familiarity and rreollrctlon (reflected by thr later left 
parietal rffret).
233
Whilst Rugg et al. provide a plausible account of the functional significance of the 
bilateral frontal old/new effect in their data, the interpretation rests on the assumption 
that depth of processing differentially influences recollection and familiarity based 
responding. Rugg and colleagues have criticised other authors for making similar 
assumption (e.g., see Allan et al., in press). However, support for this assumption 
comes fRom Gardiner, Java and Richardson-Klavehn (1996), who suggest that depth of 
processing selectively influences ‘Remember’ but not ‘Know’ responses (based on a 
review of studies employing the R/K procedure). Nonetheless, when the data are 
reanalysed using Jacoby’s independent R/K model to provide an estimate at the 
processing level of analysis (cf. Chapter 1), the data suggest that depth of processing 
influences both recollection and familiarity based responding. This is significant, 
because if depth of processing does influence familiarity and recollection, Rugg et al.’s 
account of the early bilateral frontal effect becomes implausible. By this account, the 
neural correlates of both recollection and familiarity should have been modulated by 
the depth of processing manipulation.
The suggestion that the early bilateral frontal old/new effect reflects processes 
associated with familiarity is also difficult to reconcile with the present findings 
(assuming that the effects reflect the activity of equivalent generators). As noted above, 
same and rearranged pairs are equally familiar, thus the finding that the bilateral frontal 
old/new effect Is larger in the ERPs to same than rearranged pairs is inconsistent with a 
familiarity account of this effect. Nonetheless, the absence of a neural correlate of 
familiarity might simply reflect the limited sensitivity of the technique, and should not 
be interpreted as strong evidence for the absence of such an effect per se (cf. Chapter 2; 
Allan et al., in press).
Random versus blocked designs
One feature of the frontal old/new effect is worth considering in more detail. The early 
bilateral effect was present in the ERPs for successful recall when the recall and 
recognition tasks were randomised, but was absent when the tasks were blocked. As 
has been discussed previously, this difference appears more likely to reflect a 
quantitative than qualitative difference In the activity of the generators of the effect.
12 The interpretation presented here rests or falls upon the sufficiency of the recollection account of the left 
parietal effect reflects (M. D. Rugg, personal communication). Although future studies might undermine this
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Either way, the difference in the ERPs indicates that the generators of this effect are 
not automatically engaged by the retrieval of episodic information. Moreover, the 
finding that the early frontal effect was differentially modulated in the ERPs to recall 
but not recognition adds weight to the suggestion that the effect is highly sensitive to 
the context in which retrieval occurs. This finding is important, contributing to 
evidence that the ‘context’ in which a task is performed (as defined by the difference 
between random and blocked experimental designs) can have a significant impact upon 
the neural correlates of memory retrieval.
A similar finding was reported in a recent study by Johnson, Nolde, Mather, Kounios, 
Schacter and Curran (1997), who investigated the ERP correlates of true and false 
memory using the Deese ‘false memory’ paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger and 
McDermott, 1995). Johnson et al. compared the ERP correlates of the correct 
recognition of old items with those for the false recognition of associatively related 
(but unstudied) lures, employing both blocked and random experimental designs. 
When test items were presented in separate blocks the ERPs associated with true and 
false recognition differed, especially over frontal electrode sites. By contrast, when the 
test items were randomly intermixed the difference between the ERPs to true and false 
memories was reduced. Johnson et al., suggested that the change fRom a random to 
blocked design forced subjects to perform the tasks in a different way. That is, subjects 
may have attempted to discriminate between genuine old items and lures on the basis 
of perceptual information in the blocked test, whereas in the random test performance 
could rely more upon semantic or conceptual information.
The results from the present studies converge with those of Johnson et al. in suggesting 
that the neural activity associated with performance on a memory task is sensitive to 
the context in which retrieval occurs. This is of particular significance in relation to 
neuroimaging studies employing PET (and until recently, fMRI) which have 
necessarily used blocked experimental designs (cf. Chapter 2). The neural correlates of 
performance in such studies need not necessarily correspond to the neural correlates 
that would have been found had a randomised experimental design been employed, as 
is more commonly employed in cognitive behavioural studies. As Johnson et al. (1997) 
note, it is not that one type of experimental design is better (i.e., more correct) than the
account, there appears to be little reason for dismissing it given the current weight of evidence.
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other, but that the context in which performance occurs must be taken into account 
when interpreting the results of neurolmaglng experiments.
The significance of this finding ean be Illustrated by considering a recent PET study by 
Cabeza, Kapur, Craik, McIntosh, Houle and Tulving (1997), comparing associative 
curd-rrcognition and associative recall. They Investigated the neural correlates of 
episodic memory retrieval, employing a blocked experimental design with three 
Conditions. The initial presentation of novel word pairs as to-be-remembered items 
served as a baseline (reference) condition. An ‘associative recall’ condition involved 
the presentation of the first item fRom each old word pair, and required subjects to 
report the word’s original study partner. An ‘associative eued-recognition’ condition 
also involved presenting the first item of each pair as a cue, alongside either the study 
partner or a novel (unstudied) lurr, and required subjects to report any word that was 
the original study partner of a cur word.
Of central Interest here is the finding that, relative to the baseline condition, the right 
prrfRontal eortex was found to br active In both the recall and eued-rrcognltlon 
Conditions, but that there was no difference in activity between the two retrieval 
conditions. However, the present findings demonstrate that thr amount of neural 
activity associated with task performance may have been dependent upon the use of a 
blocked experimental design. Thus, although Cabrza et al. demonstrate the 
involvement of the prefrontal cortex in the retrieval of associative information, and 
therefore provide support for the assumption that fRontally distributed ERP old/new 
effects reflect activity with the prefrontal cortex, Conclusions drawn on the basis of the 
amount of prefrontal activation must be regarded as tentative.
The late right frontal old/new effect
As discussed above, perhaps the most significant feature of the present studies is in 
their contribution to the dissociation of the latr right frontal effect fRom the earlier 
bilateral component. Thr late right frontal old/new effect was first found in studies of 
source memory (Wilding and Rugg, 1996, 1997a), where it onset at approximately the 
same time as the left parietal rffret. Interpretations of the effect have been In terms of 
post-retrieval support processrs, rather than memory retrieval per se, however, the 
precise functional role of the right frontal old/new effect remains uneertain. The
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present results have had an impact on functional accounts of the right frontal old/new 
effect, contributing to the refinement of several aspects of the original ‘post-retrieval’
hypothesis.
First, the present findings demonstrate that the right frontal effect is not confined to 
tasks such as source memory, where the correct response is dictated by the content of 
recollection. That is, the explicit requirement to engage in strategic discriminations 
between different classes of old item is not necessary for the engagement of the 
generators of the effect. Second, the present findings demonstrate that the information 
retrieved in tests of associative and source memory is sufficiently similar to engage 
equivalent post-retrieval processes. That is, the generators of the effect are not 
selectively engaged by the retrieval of specific forms of contextual Information (i.e., 
intrinsic versus extrinsic to Individual study episodes). Third, as was the case for the 
early bilateral frontal old/new effect, the neural generators of the right frontal old/new 
effect are, at least under certain circumstances, sensitive to the context in which 
memoiy retrieval occurs (as discussed above).
Notwithstanding the above Issues, the properties of the right frontal old/new effect 
remain strongly characteristic of a post-retrieval process. Although the present studies 
suggest that the right frontal effect is a relatively obligatory correlate of the 
recollection of associative information, a study by Wilding and Rugg (1997a) suggests 
that it is not an obligatory correlate of the recollection of source information. In that 
study, the right frontal effect was present in the ERPs to old target but not old non­
target items, however, as in the present experiments, this study did not demonstrate a 
qualitative difference In tbe engagement of the neural generators of the right frontal 
effect. Wilding and Rugg performed no topographic analyses, thus, it is possible that 
their findings simple reflect a quantitative change in the activity of the underlying 
neural generators. Nonetheless, the fact that under certain circumstances the right 
fRontal effect has been found to onset very late in the recording epoch (e.g., as late as 
1400 msec post-stimulus In experiment 5 for associative recall) favours a functional 
Interpretation in terms of ‘post-retrieval’ support processes.
A more general conclusion can also be drawn fRom the present findings however, with 
regard to the data for successful associative recall in experiment 5. Rugg et al. 
Interpreted the absence of frontal old/new effects in the ERPs for associative recall as
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evidence that the generators of the effects were not active. However, although the ERP 
waveforms appear to be almost identical in the present and previous studies, it was not 
possible to draw a similar conclusion here. Rather, as discussed previously, the present 
findings appear more likely to reflect a quantitative (rather than qualitative) 
modulation of the activity of the underlying generators. More broadly, the present 
findings highlight the difficulty of drawing strong conclusions on the basis of a null 
result - the absence of a positive or negative shift in the ERP waveforms can easily be 
over-interpreted as evidence that the generators of that effect are not active. 
Unfortunately, in the case of ERP data, the absence of evidence is not necessarily 
equivalent to evidence of absence (cf. Chapter 2). The significance of the foregoing 
conclusion can be seen in relation to studies of item recognition.
The absence of a significant positive shift over frontal electrodes in the ERPs for item 
recognition was central to the conclusion that the generators of the right frontal 
old/new effect are selectively engaged by tests of source memory (cf. Wilding and 
Rugg, 1996). This argument is directly analogous to that of Rugg et al. (1996) with 
regard to the absence of the frontal effect in the ERPs for associative recall - an 
argument that the present findings illustrate cannot be safely drawn. It is perhaps 
unsurprising therefore, that recent evidence has revealed frontal old/new effects in 
standard tests of item recognition (e.g., see Allan and Rugg, 1997; Schloerscheidt and 
Rugg, 1997). Moreover converging evidence in support of the conclusion that item 
recognition is associated with the processes reflected by the frontal old/new effects can 
be found in the neuroimaging studies (discussed below), which have consistently 
shown that the prefrontal cortex is activated in studies of item recognition.
A proposal regarding the frontal old/new effects
Although the present findings cannot provide a definitive account of tbe functional 
significance of the frontally distributed old/new effects, the general discussion seems 
an appropriate place to propose a possible, if somewhat speculative, account. The 
differences in the time course and distribution of the two frontally distributed old/new 
effects strongly suggests tbat they are unlikely to reflect functionally equivalent 
psychological processes. However, little progress has been made in elucidating the 
functional role of the early fRontal old/new effect.
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In a similar vein, Stuss, Eskrs and Foster (1994) point out that neuropsychological 
research into the role of the frontal lobrs in memory highlights the difficulty of 
defining the Component processrs of thr frontal lobrs, and dissoeiatlng general 
‘supervisory’ funetlons from more ‘central’ asprcts of memory. Nonetheless, there is a 
range of evidence that suggests damage to thr frontal lobes is not associated with 
amnesia prr se (i.e., as found in patients with damage to the medial temporal lobe or 
diencephalic regions). Rather, memory deficits found in fRontal lobe patients appear to 
be associated with manipulating and organising to-be-rrmembered information, in the 
initiation or maintenance of retrieval strategies, and in thr monitoring and verification 
of retrieved information. These arr processes Involved in elaborate and organised 
encoding and retrieval strategies, rather than with retrieval. Thus, thr fRontal lobes 
appear to play an Important role in supporting episodic memory retrlrval, in terms of 
the adoption of memory retrieval strategies, and in the operation of post-retrieval 
monitoring and Control proersses (e.g., ser Moscovitch, 1992, 1995a; Shimamura, 
1995; Shallice, 1988; Stuss and Benson, 1984; cf. Chapter 1).
Neuroimaging studies have provided firm evldrner that performance on explicit 
memory tests is associated with neural activity in several regions of the brain, 
including posterior parietal eortrx and the prefrontal cortex (e.g., Shallice, Fletcher, 
Frith, Grasby, Fraekowiak and Dolan, 1994; for reviews sre Buckner and Tulving, 
1995; Cabrza and Nyberg, 1997; Fletcher, Frith and Rugg, 1997). The results fRom a 
range of studies have brrn summarised in the HERA (hemispheric encodlng/retrieval 
asymmetry) model, which proposes that encoding relies primarily upon the left 
prefrontal cortex, whereas retrieval rellrs more upon thr right prefrontal cortex. More 
specifically, it appears that explicit memory retrieval Involves the activity of right 
prefRontal eortrx in addition to the arras of left prefrontal cortex that are found to be 
active in studies of encoding. Thus, areas of left and right prefrontal cortex are often 
activated together, either bilaterally or with a right greater than left hemispheric 
asymmetry.
How do these findings relate to thr frontally distributed ERP old/new effects? Wilding 
and Rugg (1997b) suggested that tbe two fRontally distributed old/nrw effects reflect 
the activity of distinct neural circuits within thr prrfRontal eortex. Specifically, that the 
findings from neuroimaging studies provide converging evidence that the prefRontal
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cortex may support multiple, functionally distinct, memory processes located in the left 
and right prefrontal cortex. Unfortunately, without the aid of modelling techniques it is 
impossible to determine the precise location of the neural generators of the effects. 
Thus, the aim here Is not to attempt to tie tbe fRontal old/new effects to specific regions 
of the prefRontal cortex. Rather, the emphasis is on functional comparisons, drawing on 
the findings fRom neuroimaging studies to suggest that the prefrontal cortex may be 
involved in supporting different stages of mnemonic processing. It is important to 
remember however, that tbe assumption tbat tbe frontal old/new effects reflect activity 
within the prefrontal cortex bas not been tested directly.
Of central Interest here Is the finding tbat the prefrontal cortex has been associated with 
episodic retrieval in a number of studies, employing a variety of procedures (e.g., 
recognition and cued recall) and experimental materials (e.g., words, faces, objects and 
pictures). Significantly, debate exists over whether activation of the prefrontal cortex 
reflects ‘retrieval effort’ or ‘retrieval success’. Retrieval effort refers to processes tbat 
are associated with the attempt to retrieve information from memory, regardless of 
whether the attempt to retrieve is successful13. By contrast, retrieval success refers to 
processes that are engaged when information is actually obtained from memory. 
Several studies have employed PET to investigate whether the prefrontal cortex is 
sensitive to retrieval effort or success using episodic memory tasks (e.g., Nyberg, 
Tulving, Habib, Nilsson, Kapur and Houle, 1995; Tulving et al., 1994; Schacter et al., 
1996; Kapur et al., 1995; Rugg et al., 1996).
For example, Kapur et al. (1995) attempted to distinguish between retrieval effort and 
success by varying the number of old items that were presented to subjects at test. In 
the baseline (reference) condition subjects made a semantic categorisation judgement 
(livlng/nonliving) to a list of words. Subsequently, subjects were required to perform 
item recognition tests in two memory conditions. In the ‘retrieval success’ condition 
85% of test items had been previously studied, sucb that subjects would attempt to 
retrieve and be successful in doing so. In the ‘retrieval effort’ condition only 15% of 
test items had been studied, such tbat subjects would attempt to retrieve, but would
13 Note that ‘effort’ is intended to imply the attempt or endeavour to retrieve, rather than the amount of exertion 
that subjects employ in trying to retrieve. Consequently, some authors have used the expression ‘retrieval mode’ as 
an alternative term. However, this term has been more closely associated with the idea of tonically maintained brain 
states, rather than the stimulus related brain activity measured in the ERP studies reported here.
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have little success in doing so. Kapur et al. found that, relative to the semantic 
classification task, equivalent levels of right prefrontal activity was found in both the 
memory tasks, suggesting that the prefrontal activity reflected processes associated 
with retrieval effort rather than retrieval success.
A more recent study suggests that the activity of the right prefrontal cortex does vary 
as a function of whether retrieval is successful or unsuccessful. Rugg et al. (1996b) 
also manipulated the proportions of old and new items presented to subjects at test, but 
did so in manner that controlled for differences in retrieval effort. Subjects performed 
item recognition tests during 3 critical scanning conditions, whereby 80%, 20% or 0% 
of the Items were old. Importantly, the critical scanning conditions were embedded 
within a test list in which, outside of the critical test conditions, 50% of the items were 
old. This procedure was intended to discourage subjects from noticing the variation In 
the proportion of old items, such that their retrieval effort would remain constant. Rugg 
et al. found that prefrontal activation co-varied with the proportion of old items, with 
greater activation in the 20% than 0% condition, and greater activation again In the 
80% than 20% condition. Thus, this finding provides evidence that the prefrontal 
cortex supports processes that are engaged by successful memory retrieval.
In sum, the evidence from PET studies suggests that the prefrontal cortex may be 
activated in relation to both retrieval effort and retrieval success. Whilst the PET 
findings discussed above appear to be difficult to reconcile at first sight, they may in 
fact be complimentary. Although tbe findings of Rugg et al. (1996b) demonstrate that 
the prefrontal cortex is sensitive to retrieval success, they are in no way inconsistent 
with the earlier suggestion that the prefrontal cortex is sensitive to retrieval effort. 
Rather, as Fletcher et al. (1997, plO) note, “right prefrontal cortex is activated when 
there is an intention to retrieve episodic information, and that it is further activated 
when retrieval is successful.”
The current proposal is that tbe temporal resolution of ERP data allows temporally 
overlapping (but possibly Independent) retrieval support processes to be distinguished. 
As bas been discussed previously, the characteristics of the late right frontal old/new 
effect, onsetting as late as 1400 msec post-stimulus in the case of experiment 5 in the 
present thesis, are clearly consistent with a post-retrieval function. By contrast, tbe 
early frontal effect has been found to onset prior to tbe left parietal old/new effect, the
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putative Index of processes assoeiatrd with retrlrval (cf. Tendolkar et al., 1997; 
Schloersebeldt and Rugg, 1997), making It an unlikely to reflect post-retrieval 
proersses. Rathrr, the early frontal old/new effect srems likely to reflect processes that 
either initiate or support tbr process of episodic retrieval. The ERP findings can 
therefore be Interpreted as providing evidence that the prefrontal cortex plays a role in 
supporting strategic processrs that arr involved in both tbe effort to retrieve and in 
retrieval success. Tbr high temporal rrsolutlon of tbe ERP data allows these proersses 
to be distinguished In a way that is not possible using other neuroimaging methods. 
Thus, the findings from both ERP and neurolmaglng studies provide convergent 
evidence that thr activity of the prefrontal cortex is modulated both by retrieval effort 
and retrieval succrss, and that thr fRontal lobrs plays an important role in supporting 
the retrieval of episodic information from memory.
It might appear that the findings from the present and previous ERP studies address an 
issue that is not directly related to the debate over ‘retrieval effort’ versus ‘retrieval 
success’ In thr neuroimaging litrraturr. One possible objection is that in tbe studies 
where it has been found, thr rarly frontal old/nrw effret has only been seen in the 
ERPs for successful performance. An ERP correlate of pre-retrieval strategic processes 
should however, be seen in tbe ERPs to response Categories that are not associated 
with suecrssful performance. Certainly, given that tbe fRontal old/new effects reflect 
the ERP correlates of successful memory retrieval, they present convergent evidence in 
support of the finding that tbe prefRontal cortex is associated with retrieval succrss. 
However, just as thr nrural correlates of the post-retrirval strategic processes reflected 
in the late right fRontal old/nrw effect co-oecur with successful performance, it might 
be expected that the ERP correlatrs of pre-retrieval processrs would also do so. 
Furthermore, it srrms reasonable to argue on a priori grounds that retrieval success is 
likely to vary as a function of retrieval effort, and thus that thr neural correlates of 
these processes might co-oecur.
Onr attractive aspect of this proposal is that it provides a possible interpretation of the 
differential presence of tbr frontal old/new effrets for associative recall in experiments 
4 and 5 of thr present thesis. The fact that tbe probability of successful retrlrval was 
almost Identical in both experiments suggests that tbe generators of tbe frontal effects 
can br modulated independently of retrieval sueerss. It srems likely that changing
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from a random to blocked experimental design may alter subjects performance by 
shifting tbe degree to which they employed the frontally mediated support strategies. 
An interpretation of the ERP data that does not distinguish between retrieval processes, 
and more general support processes, would have difficulty in accommodating these
findings.
The distinction between retrieval effort and success has considerable heuristic value. 
For example, it allows the operational definitions of tbe component processes to be 
proposed, sucb that the processes can be experimentally investigated. Nonetheless, it 
remains to be seen whether the distinction is ultimately either complete or truly 
informative. Indeed, in Interpreting the findings from a recent PET study, Rugg and 
colleagues (Rugg, Fletcher, Allan, Fritb, Frackowiak and Dolan, in press) raise doubts 
over the utility or helpfulness of the distinction. As was suggested above, post-retrieval 
processes are likely to be engaged regardless of whether retrieved information actually 
corresponds to a veridical prior episode. Moreover, Rugg et al. (in press, p 12) suggest 
that “these operations require the allocation of attentlonal resources, and hence 
cognitive effort.” Thus, Rugg et al. suggest that elements of the retrieval effort and 
success hypotheses must be combined.
Notwithstanding the possibility that the distinction between retrieval effort and success 
may be ultimately unhelpful, the proposal presented Here provides an account that is 
broadly consistent with the findings from both ERP and neuroimaging studies. The 
proposal remains to be tested However. To Investigate tbe hypothesis that the frontal 
old/new effects reflect pre- and post- retrieval support processes, it is Important to 
compare the ERP correlates for response categories that have been design to differ in 
relation to the strategies that subjects employ, whilst holding the likelihood that 
subjects successfully retrieve, and the contents of sucb retrieval, constant. One way in 
which this can be done would be to employ a single class of new (unstudied) items, for 
which subjects have been Instructed to attempt (and/or expect) to retrieve different 
types of information. If subjects were able to perform the task with and without 
recourse to the use of strategic processes (associated with either initiating retrieval, or 
in monitoring and evaluating the products of retrieval), then the extent of prefrontal 
activity would be expected to vary, despite the fact that veridical successful retrieval 
could, by definition, not occur.
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Summary
The present findings provide a significant contribution to current understanding of the 
ERP correlates of episodic memory retrieval. Whilst supporting the previous functional 
accounts of the left parietal and rigbt frontal old/new effects, the findings suggest that 
the right frontal old/new effect can be dissociated from an early bilaterally distributed 
frontal old/new effect. Tbe time course and functional characteristics of tbis effect 
appear likely to reflect strategic processes that initiate and support the act of retrieval.
The present findings also highlight broader issues. The demonstration tbat the ERP 
correlates of retrieval are sensitive tn the use nf a random versus blocked design 
suggests that researcbers must be cautious in interpreting neuroimaging data as a direct 
nr straightforward index nf tbe neural correlates of cognitive processes. More 
significant perhaps, the suggestion tbat the successful memory performance is 
associated with multiple dissociable ERP components provides support for the view 
that memory retrieval is an active, multi-component process. Although dual process 
models of recognition memory represent recollection as a unitary process, tbe 
neurologically inspired view presented here proposes that a network of brain regions is 
involved in supporting recollection. By tbis view, recollection is neither a neurally nor 
a functionally homogeneous process.
As Baddeley (1985) notes, tbe concept of recollection as an active search and retrieval 
process has become peripheral to an essentially passive interpretation, whereby 
retrieval is simply seen as dependent on the presentation of appropriate cues. However, 
whilst the automatic aspects of retrieval are important, they only provide a partial 
account. If retrieval is an active process, memory may be triggered not just by 
appropriate stimulus cues, but also by actively setting up plausible retrieval cues for 
oneself. Equally, some form of checking procedure must occur, because not every 
retrieved memory will be either veridical or appropriate. By this view recollection is an 
active process of iteratively generating prospective retrieval cues and evaluating the 
output from memory.
The view of memory described by Baddeley fits well with the correspondence 
metaphor of memory (discussed in cbapter 1). Rather than characterising memory 
retrieval as a passive process, it is proposed that memory retrieval is a constructive
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process that involves strategic support process both before and after Information is 
actually rrtrleved fRom memory. Thr cognitive nruroscienee approach to memory 
described within this thesis provides support for the Idea that memory retrieval is an 
active, multi-component procrss. Neuropsychologleal evidence suggests that thr 
medial temporal lobe memory system plays a central role in supporting episodic 
memory retrieval, but as Moscovitch and Melo (1997, pl030) point out, “memory 
begins and ends with tbe frontal lobrs.”
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APPENDIX A
Appendix A contains tbr word pool fRom which word lists were generated (the 
procedures used to create study-trst lists arr provided in the relevant methods sections 
for raeh experiment). The words were selected from tbr Francis and Kucera Corpus 
(Francis and Kueera, 1982), with the criteria that they medium frequency (mean 19.1 
per million, range 10 to 30 per million) nouns and verbs that were between 4 and 8 
letters in length.
RUMOUR INVADE INSPECT DEED
CHOKE PRETEND BENEFIT HALF
AIDE SUICIDE FOLIAGE FREE
REPAIR CLIMATE WRECK SEGMENT
WALNUT NEGLECT DIAGRAM CLUE
BULL CURRENT LOAD CIRCUIT
ELBOW ECHO WHITE STUFF
LICK MINGLE LENS SWITCH
LOGIC SHAVE PUZZLE COLD
STEAM TRACT SITUATE OUTSET
STRIDE DENOTE DRAFT RISK
BEHALF PREACH TITLE MISLEAD
ARCH GLIMPSE DIET SALOON
TERRACE STAMP BUNDLE REFUSAL
CHART TUNE DISRUPT FLAME
ORGAN RENT TOLL- COMPASS
AVERAGE SHIP BRICK BISHOP
COPE BASTARD MERGER MARE
DOUGH SCOPE GARAGE TESTING
VIRGIN- NATIVE CAKE PREMISE
TUMOUR AWAKE WEAVE SPHERE
DONATE SCRATCH GENIUS SILVER
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CRIPPLE PLEAD POTATO SWALLOW
SPONSOR SAMPLE VANISH HEAL
LINK PURSE ADJOIN CANYON
LUXURY FERRY FOCUS PERTAIN
FRIEZE CONSENT TOAST FASHION
CLOCK MISERY DILEMMA REALM
DRAWER HEATER LECTURE JUNGLE
PLANT MATE ESSENCE COMBAT
BEARING VACUUM MAJOR ASSESS
COTTAGE PROFESS CANDY BLAST
ALERT TASTE ACID MINIMUM
PROTEST EMBODY RESENT CULT
LINGER PINE BLOW PIPE
CHARITY REGIME SIXTY LAYMAN
COOK SUMMARY AUGMENT WOUND
QUARREL TRAY SWEAT FOLK
BLACK TRACE URGENCY CAFE
HARASS PROFILE STALL PICKET
OFFER EPISODE MAGIC DRIFT
DEPICT HUNGER REWARD SCAN
NOON SPRAY LOBBY DESPISE
INJECT FORBID RESORT CHEER
SPUR ROAR ANCHOR PROGRAM
HYMN ALARM MAGNIFY DESPAIR
WIND TOTAL PACE GHETTO
CONVEY PENSION VITAMIN TRIBE
VERIFY RANCHER PAVE DOORWAY
SLUM CRASH CHERISH PAINT
ARRAY AFFIRM DEMON MIST
PERSIST GIANT CHIP OUTFIT
SLEEVE RITUAL TANK SITTER
RESCUE DEPRESS FAULT RUBBER
CYCLE BOWL METER INFEST
COUPLE GLOBE LIVER PIGMENT
MERIT SHEEP BULK VENTURE
RETREAT MONK CANE BOOST
MURMUR DEPOSIT BEAT DICTATE
GHOST TUMBLE SNATCH TREATY
STAKE TUNNEL TERM BITE
247
CURL PLOT ANKLE LANE
HATRED LEMON BANKER SWING
UPSET TRICK NUMBER GRIN
USAGE MUTUAL INVOKE GREASE
MAKING DELIGHT GAIETY LAMB
LOCK POLL TILE GREEN
FEVER REVOLVE DUKE DESCEND
ARREST LESSEN GAMBLE SOAK
FLAT FRAME THRUST EQUAL
COMPLY MORTAR LANDING AUTUMN
DUMP SCREW ENHANCE TOBACCO
PICKUP TRIBUNE THUMB FURY
MIRROR DRUM REUNION BORE
CANCER BALLOON SAVING FISH
HERD FLOOD ENTAIL DEFECT
COMPEL MARCH BOSS PITCH
WANT DETECT WARD APPLAUD
ROBE AIRPORT CHAPEL DIALECT
FINISH ASSAULT COPPER DAZZLE
BECKON MORALE ANALOGY APPEAL
MILL STATUE CAPITOL BLUFF
HAIL CLARIFY SLIDE NOTIFY
COMFORT VIOLATE GLOW DWELL
FREIGHT REFINE PLUNGE WARNING
SEAL DENTIST CROSS BATTERY
BARGAIN PUMP SHAME NAIL
THREAD CARVE FEATHER SOFTEN
ENSUE PROMPT WASH MIDST
SPREAD DECENCY GOWN LABEL
SPAN EXTRACT BASKET ARRIVAL
WHIP OBJECT CAST REBEL
MINE DAMAGE CAVE LOYALTY
CONFIDE DOMAIN NEAR DISMISS
ATTIC CONFESS KNIGHT LEVEL
HEADING PLASTER EXPORT PAUSE
CRUSH STAY COMMUTE CREEP
JAIL MATCH PARADE BUTTON
DECLINE PROVOKE BREAK EARNING
WORTH RAGE SAILOR DAIRY
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GUIDE SPELL PACK SUBDUE
SHORTEN EXCESS DARKEN BOUND
RATE CHEW NARROW DIAMOND
RIDER MARGIN WATER SKIRT
BREED HOLD MOLD EVOKE
DEPRIVE SETTLER INTENT PORK
TIDE GROVE WEALTH INFLICT
CONFER PULL WRONG FRINGE
PIANIST REVERSE DELAY ZONE
CONFORM TAXI PATRON COMING
OVERLAP BOOT FOIL TENT
COIN INFANT FROWN CROWN
SLAP COWBOY TOMB PROBE
MURDER RAILWAY EMBRACE MOTIF
CUSTOM CURTAIN FANTASY KILLER
RIBBON LADDER PRESUME ENACT
HEAP TRIM GLORY SUBJECT
STACK BUTTER GUARD POVERTY
ESCAPE CORRECT MENACE NEST
TACTIC FULFILL CALF CAPE
TIMBER SHIVER MERCY TOWER
NOVELTY HOLIDAY EMBASSY HANDLE
AROUSE GULF AMAZE PILL
SPIT PLUG EMPTY RECOVER
SIGH HARVEST PROLONG VIGOR
CHAOS JOINT PILE FOSTER
OUTSIDE SHOP BOAST ENTITY
LION POLISH CONTEND SPOT
MARBLE FEATURE SLIP DRAIN
DESERT PERMIT FLAG THRIVE
INSERT EXHIBIT FORTUNE MAIL
ELITE BARRIER SOUP MUTTER
WIRE DISPOSE TRANSIT DESTINY
CHILL CREATOR PHYSICS SWAY
BARK TURMOIL ATHLETE AWARD
BLOOM FAME SURPLUS EXHAUST
LIVING WARM GARMENT TEMPER
SMASH SHERIFF IMPAIR ESCORT
POST VENT NUCLEUS ASSET
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GANG EASE OBSCURE IMITATE
TEXTURE CONCEAL REVIVE SURGE
RUSH COCKPIT SADDLE BALLAD
TILT PORT STOVE ROTATE
PLAIN HURRY RENEW SURVEY
HIGH IMPORT ORANGE STROKE
SOLID WEEP RECKON EXCITE
EXCLAIM DESCENT WAVE ANALYST
SHOCK TRAP DISLIKE LONG
DISORDER THIGH CLOSE CURE
SHAFT ENQUIRE CURSE BRAND
STREAM DEAN CHORD BOIL
EQUALITY ILLNESS EMPEROR CLING
EXCLUDE LAWN OBLIGE ENROLL
ROUTINE CREEK SCAR INHERIT
PRAISE DRUNK SLOW TENNIS
CREAM LAUGH PUNISH CREDIT
HANDFUL CARPET PANIC DOME
DEPART TWIST COLLAR GRIP
SWORD RELY BELL DISTORT
KICK EXPLORE STRETCH LATTER
SMOKE ENCLOSE MOCK YIELD
WARRANT VALUE DAWN BROADEN
VINE SUCK WRAP STARTLE
ODOR SPRAWL ORIENT FACET
PEEL DISPEL IRONY SQUEEZE
HURL ESSAY PATRIOT DUCK
REPEL FUEL CANVAS FASTEN
AMATEUR CONFINE EXPLODE RAID
ROOT CARRIER BUNCH ETHIC
ALCOHOL ALLEGE REAR ADVISER
REMEDY SLUG RUIN PEAK
LEISURE MENTION SMELL REQUEST
BRANCH EXERT FEEL STRIP
PERFUME ROPE AUNT QUIT
DOING WAGE PRINT PASTURE
DOLL FLEET DISABLE CALM
EDGE GRAVE THIEF UPHOLD
APPLE ACHE CONVICT CHORUS
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WIDEN CHARM BREEZE LEAVE
FATIGUE ROCK SKIP UNIFY
DOUBLE SEWAGE CANDLE CLUSTER
STRIVE PACKAGE ALLY LOOM
PERIL PEASANT SEAM VEIL
SHIRT FLASH VITALITY INCUR
MOUSE PREMIUM DOUBT DEPUTY
MASTER TICKET TIME INSIDE
REACH SLAM REGRET GRIEF
HORROR DEFEAT RESIDE PRIVACY
HONEY FIGHTER GAZE GRASP
STEER CLEANER DEBATE BURY
CABIN INVENT COUNSEL DIVORCE
SINGLE REALISM REFUND RABBIT
BLAME RULER TESTIFY CAVALRY
SHRINK RECRUIT DISCARD ELEVATE
DROWN NEEDLE EXPLOIT EXPEND
MESS SMOOTH DECAY SLASH
GAUGE WELL JOKE EXCUSE
WANDER PRAY WORRY INDUCE
LYRIC EVEN DEBT FLOAT
INDULGE STRAW SUMMON BOUNCE
HUNTER DASH BLESS EDIT
RIDGE MODIFY JERK DRILL
CROUCH VESSEL DETACH SHED
OMIT BLEED WIDOW CONTENT
SPOIL SHELF WHEEL LINE
BUSH SECTOR TERROR HOUSING
TOILET BAKE ROUND GEAR
MOURN CHORE AMUSE MIRACLE
MODE STAIN BLADE CRACK
MINERAL HALT NURSE DOSE
BASS AWAIT ORBIT KINGDOM
PIONEER CONTOUR DEFY VICE
SPRING STAGGER KNEEL PLOW-
EXECUTE SWELL RAIL LEATHER
REBUILD BOARDER RADAR MIGHT
WOOL GLUE ONION RIDE
BREAST TOWEL PALM PENALTY
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HAZARD
POTTERY
ARROW
CONTACT
GLOVE
DEEM
COMMEND
ANTENNA
CONSUME
PRESIDE
OUTLET
VOTER
SQUARE
HARM
TYPE­
FOLD
PURITY
STREAK
TWIN
CELLAR
ENLIST
SCRIPT
RACE
GUITAR
SLOPE
RAIN
INCLINE
SCRAP
TOPIC
RICE
RITE
SHATTER
DRAPE
SCATTER
BROOD
AUTO
UNLOAD
HASTEN
PICNIC
ENLARGE
ADAPT
SORT
CLASSIC
OBEY
REIN
MARSHAL
PLANNER
WITCH
ROLL
ALLOT
INJURE
CURB
LOOP
FADE
ROSE
CHIN
HINT
SPEED
GOSSIP
CANCEL
PATCH
FURTHER
CRUELTY
UNLOCK
DENIAL
DECK
QUEST
DEVISE
STOOP
RESTORE
KNIT-
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APPENDIX B
Appendix B contains figures of the additional grandaverage ERPs from experiment 4, 
for the recognition and recall tasks. The ERPs to these response categories do not bear 
directly on the issue that the experiment was designed to address, and thus are not 
considered in detail. The ERPs are shown separately for each task, with the appropriate 
‘new’ response category (the correct rejection baseline). For associative recognition, 
ERPs were formed for ‘rearranged’ responses (i.e., to rearranged pairs that were both 
recognised and correctly classified as being rearranged). For associative recall ERPs 
were formed for ‘don’t know’ responses (i.e., old words for which the studied associate 
could not be correctly recalled). The waveforms are shown from all 25 recording sites.
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APPENDIX C
Appendix C contains figures of the additional grandaverage ERPs from experiment 5, 
for the recognition and recall tasks. Again, the ERPs to these response categories does 
not bear directly on the issue that this study was designed to address, and are not 
considered in detail. For associative recognition ERPs were formed for ‘rearranged’ 
responses (i.e., to rearranged pairs that were both recognised and correctly classified as 
being rearranged), and for recall ERPs were formed for ‘don’t know’ responses (i.e., 
old words for which the studied associate could not be correctly recalled). As in 
appendix B the ERPs are shown separately for each task, from all 25 recording sites, 
including the appropriate ‘new’ response category (the correct rejection baseline).
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